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ABSTRACT
This work develops a theory of contract grounded in empirical analysis of individuals'
experience with and interpretations of form-adhesive contracts. Form-adhesive
contracts are unilaterally drafted, typically by organizations, intended for multiple
signers. They are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with no opportunity afforded to
negotiate in the traditional sense during the pre-agreement phase. This type of contract
dominates the way in which exchange relationships between organizations and
individuals are governed in many areas of contemporary life-including, but not limited
to, employment, medical treatment, intellectual property licensure, telecommunications,
and social networking. The theory poses the question, "how do individuals experience
and interpret these agreements?" and explores the relationship between the answer on
one hand, and two other elements on the other: (1) socio-economic exchange between
the drafting organizations and signers, and (2) trust in the rule of law.
The first part of the dissertation explains the theory. The second part explores the
theory's empirical basis in an employment relationship. Employees' interpretations of a
mandatory-arbitration agreement they signed as a condition of their employment are
compared to MBA students' interpretations of the enforceability of a similar clause.
MBA students with considerably greater educational attainment and employment
opportunities are found to be significantly more likely to believe that they could escape
the contract's terms to which they consented than employees of a large, national
electronics retailer with consistently less education and fewer job opportunities. For
both MBAs and employees, regarding the signed agreement as unenforceable is
correlated with a greater likelihood of viewing the employment relationship as one
devoid of trust or loyalty.
In the third part, a large-scale web experiment is used to measure the behavior of
signers of a form-adhesive contract. Both pre-agreement conditions varying the
adhesiveness of the contract and post-agreement prompts (legal, moral, social and
instrumental) urging signers to continue to perform as the contract purportedly requires
are tested as competing determinants of contract performance. Results suggest that
when subjects see and choose the contract term during the pre-agreement consent
phase, they are more likely to perform as that term purportedly requires in the post-
agreement performance phase, and that prompting contractual performance based on
an appeal to morality generates the greatest rate of performance. Consistent with the
behavioral theory advanced in this research, a legal threat is associated with a level of
contractual performance no better than a control condition in which subjects were
requested to perform the same task, except without signing any contract requiring
performance of that task.
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Thesis Supervisor: Susan Silbey
Title: Leon and Anne Goldberg Professor of Humanities
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Part 1: Introduction: Theory & Background
Introduction
In a way, this dissertation is about everything, and in another way, it is about nothing. It is about
everything because it articulates a theory about contract, and contract is at the heart of all social
and economic exchange. The theory is based on observation of how individuals experience and
interpret the most common contract prevailing in relationships between organizations and
individuals in contemporary life. That earns another point in the "about everything" column
because relationships between organizations (employers, hospitals, service-providers, etc.) and
individuals (employees, patients, consumers) are as important as they are quotidian. If contract
is a "social artifact" as Suchman (2003) convincingly argues it is, we can learn a great deal about
the socio-economic exchange relationships between the organizational and individual contractors
by studying their agreements.
On the other hand, this dissertation is about nothing because it examines our collective
experiences with and interpretations of fine print, "boilerplate" form-adhesive contracts-those
pesky, unavoidable legal speed-bumps that slow our ability to start a job, receive medical care or
otherwise engage as productive social members. Why bother studying such tiny, albeit
ubiquitous creatures? What impact could they have? The rest of this part of the dissertation
addresses these questions more fully, but the short answer, beyond the response alluded to above
(that contract is worthy of study as artifact, among other things, and is therefore a useful means
of understanding important relationships between the drafting parties and how individuals regard
the rule of law generally), is "termites." If perceptions of law are like a house, there is a strong
argument that it is worth studying the effect of hurricanes, fires or earthquakes on the house. In
these instances, one big event could drastically alter or destroy the house. By analogy,
something like the Rodney King trial or O.J. Simpson's criminal exoneration could be regarded
as an earthquake--a single event that caused mass confidence-loss in the rule of law (Gibson
1991; Nadler 2005: 1400, 1426; Tyler and Rasinski 1991). Form-adhesive contracts are like
termites. One of them is not going to harm the house. Nor would a few of them. But I argue
that our collective house, our collective faith in the rule of law, is infested with millions of
termites taking the form of form-adhesive contracts. They are in the kitchen, the bathroom,
bedrooms, and eating away at the drywall and foundation. Everywhere you look in the house,
there are form-adhesive termite-like contracts, quietly devouring the foundation of our faith in
the rule of law, in tiny, singularly undetectable bites. It may not be as obvious as the damage
caused by a fire, flood or earthquake, but I argue, quite worthy of study nonetheless.
The Over-Arching Goal
The over-arching goal of this dissertation is to articulate a novel theory of contract, which I call a
"behavioral theory of contract." In the broadest sense, I do this to explain the interconnectivity
among three things: (1) socio-economic exchange, particularly focused on the exchange
relationships between organizations and individuals (primarily the employment relationship), (2)
experiences and interpretations of contract, and (3) trust in the rule of law. This work asserts that
how individuals experience and interpret contracts is an important yardstick by which to measure
the viability of social and economic interaction, including, and most closely focusing on, the
"social contract."
The next few paragraphs outline the progression of the argument underlying the theory. After
that, in the rest of this first part of the work, I explain the rationale for the approach adopted.
This is followed by a brief historical account of the evolution of contract, which is important for
understanding how the behavioral theory of contract fits into the existing framework of contract,
law and exchange between organizations and individuals.
The remainder of the dissertation is divided into two parts. The second part includes the first set
of studies reporting on the empirical support of the theory in the employment context. The third
part steps back to search for empirical support of the theory in the most marginal of cases-a
form-adhesive contract in a single-transaction exchange on the internet where anonymity
theoretically minimizes the social and moral normative effects on perceived enforceability, and
the low dollar amount at stake and readily available alternatives to the exchange minimize the
effects of socio-economic power and dependence on resources. Overall implications for the
work are discussed in the conclusion.
Progression of the Argument of the Theory
The progression of the overall argument of the behavioral theory of contract advanced in this
work is as follows: First: Existing theory states that contract underlies economic exchange and
functions as a bedrock on which our capitalist economy rests (McIntyre 1994; Schwartz and
Cartwright 1973; Weber 1954). The law is an important part of the relationship between contract
and capitalist exchange. Without it, enforcement of contracts would default to extra-legal means
such as violence, power and dependence or other potentially undesirable, inconsistent and
unpredictable means. The rule of law, and our collective trust in the enforceability of "binding"
promises, therefore, is a critical component of sustaining a viable economy.
Second: Voluminous research on the "social contract" theorizes that individuals feel obligated to
reciprocate the receipt of certain fair and equal treatment by the state with socially correct and
desirable behavior (Thibaut 1968; Tyler 1997). This reciprocity of fair and just treatment occurs
not just in the relationship between the state and individual citizens, but between organizations
(employers, banks, etc.) and individuals (Kochan 1999; Kochan and Shulman 2007) as well.
Theory posits that the opposite of this positive reciprocal exchange of fairness for obedience
happens too: More perceived unfairness and lack of justice in law (to the extent that law deviate
from moral normative expectations) corresponds with a potentially reciprocal desire or tendency
to flout the law or avoid it (Budd 2004; Engel 1995; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Spencer 1986;
Tyler 2006).
Third: Contract enables the most powerful social actors, which in contemporary bureaucratic life
are typically organizations like employers, banks, etc., to enact "private law" in which the state is
always a third party even to the most private arrangement (Durkheim 1933; Ehrlich 1936; Weber
1954). These powerful social actors exploit contract law's legitimized law-making power to
replicate pre-existing power imbalances (in the resource-dependence sense) vis-A-vis "binding,"
enforceable contracts forced upon individuals dependent on these actors for the resources they
control. Contract law conforms to these power-replicating ideals without announcing this fact,
lest the less powerful individuals learn of this and diminish the degree of respect for the law and
hence the power of the more powerful actors. This conforms with Nonet and Selznick's (1978)
classic theory of how law progresses. The extent to which social actors respect the binding
nature of contracts entered into "lawfully" is a measure of the degree to which they respect the
state's legal authority and the rule of law more generally. Hence, it is critical to observe how
contract has evolved, and how social actors' experience with and interpretations of common
forms of contract affect their perceptions of the rule of law generally.
Fourth: Historically, contract evolved in parallel with social progress (Friedman 1959; McIntyre
1994). It reflects the changes social theorists ascribe to the development of contemporary social
and economic life. In this historical evolution, contract has transmogrified into its current form
away from "status" and other non-contractual bases for enforcing promises (Maine 1954 [1861]).
The tangible result is the "form-adhesive agreement" that dominates the contemporary
contractual landscape. Indeed, the form-adhesive agreement is the dominant means of
memorializing exchange relationships between organizations and individuals (Ben-Shahar 2007).
Almost all important spheres of life involve such exchange relationships. For instance, work
almost invariably involves relationships between organizations and individuals and form-
adhesive contracts drafted by employers, and signed by employees without any opportunity to
negotiate over the terms. The same is true for medical care (hospitals draft contracts, and
patients sign to receive treatment), monetary lending (banks draft and borrowers sign),
intellectual property licensing, (producers and distributors draft, consumers sign), consumer sales
(sellers draft and consumers sign), etc. It is difficult to identify a sphere of life not dominated by
organizational-individual exchange relationships, and hence also not purportedly governed by
terms contained in form-adhesive contracts drafted by the organizations and signed by all of us.
Fifth: Evaluating social actors' experiences with and interpretations of common form-adhesive
agreements in various spheres of social and economic life is a useful means of understanding
how individuals regard the rule of law, and how contract has evolved, perhaps, beyond the realm
of social theorists' existing descriptions. Because these form-contracts are everywhere, they may
have broad, albeit subtle effects on many important aspects of how we regard the law,
organizations and fellow citizens. This is the "termite" analogy described above. I argue that
there is a connection between how individuals regard the enforceability of something as
mundane as the "contract" on the back of a parking lot receipt purporting to waive the liability of
the owners of the lot on one hand, and individual beliefs about employers' abilities to make
employees waive their right to a jury trial as a condition of employment, as well as their
tolerance and acceptance of violating intellectual property licensing rights (particularly in the
form of downloading music, movies and other media without paying for it).
The theory goes further to explain how the ubiquity of form-adhesive contracts has diluted our
collective respect for the rule of law, and has in turn, shifted our focus from status to contract,
not back to status as some argue, but away from law in the positivistic or "natural" sense
(Greenawalt 1985), towards extra-legal bases for contractual enforcement. This could be viewed
as at odds with theorists like Nonet and Selznick (1978) in that the evidence of how individuals
experience and interpret contracts presented below may show a move not towards "Responsive
Law," from "Autonomous Law," but towards something else, in which law's role is diminished
and not responsive at all. It also seeks to explain the role of contract and the rule of law in what
could be characterized as post-Durkheimian and post- Weberian contemporary life, wherein the
role of law is reduced, and perhaps more importantly, compartmentalized-ending up
functioning more as a parallel or shadow of other extra-legal sources of power, authority, status
and norms of social exchange, instead of a driving force influencing social and economic
exchange on its own. In the place of law (as a means of determining outcomes) emerges another
dividing point-a behavioral measure of the extent to which individuals recognize the extra-legal
forces at work, and position themselves to exploit these forces accordingly.
To illustrate this point, imagine someone on one extreme who regards all exchange relationships
and the resulting agreements (contractual or otherwise) as merely a series of tactics-as
something surmountable via exploitation of resource dependencies, norms or status. A form-
contract for this person is just a manifestation of a tactic. When faced with signing a form-
adhesive contract, this person is likely to regard it as unenforceable, as a surmountable obstacle,
given the application of the right counter-tactic. Lacking an available counter-tactic, this
individual would seek out alternative means of "settling the score" with the organization that
exploited him via this contract in round one. In later "rounds," this person might be more likely
to ignore the law or respect the law less when the person has the perceived upper hand. For
instance, he might be more likely to illegally download or copy music, movies or other media
without paying for these things in retribution for large production companies forcing him to
agree to form-contracts when he purchased their products.
Imagine another individual on the other extreme who lacks this perspective, and is therefore
stuck in the "Autonomous Law" phase to borrow Nonet and Selznick's (1978) term. This person
is more likely to see a form-adhesive contract as a legally valenced and therefore as a significant
document controlling behavior. Perhaps it is enforceable because signing a legal contract means
that one has to perform according to the document's terms. This is what the law requires,
regardless of the substantive fairness of the contract's terms.
Surely, this dividing line between these two perspectives existed long before the rise of form-
adhesive contracts. I do not argue that form-adhesive contracts' ubiquity gave rise to this divide
and the other behavioral characteristics around contract performance. Rather, I suggest that the
historical evolution of contract has reduced the marginal influence of the rule of law-the ever-
present third party to all private contracts-and thereby allowed to flourish the influence of
extra-legal sources of authority discussed in greater detail throughout this work.
In this way, the model advanced by this theory is a response to the way that traditional theory has
explained the relationship between the state and individual citizens vis-a-vis contracts. In this
traditional model, there is a direct, reciprocal trade between the state and all social actors. This
includes organizations and individuals alike. For purposes of this theory, there is no reason to
distinguish between these two categories. In fact, there are good legal grounds not to distinguish
between organizations and individuals, as a substantial body of law has developed that has
equated organizations and individuals for purposes of entering into contracts. The state offers
fair and just laws and court rulings, in exchange for which, citizens of the state reciprocate with
obedience to and respect for the rule of law and state-derived authority generally (Garth and
Sarat 1998; Gibson 1991; Tyler 1997; Tyler 2006). Figure 1 depicts this traditional theory
visually. In the traditional model, contracts between or among citizens and other citizens,
organizations and other organizations or organizations and individuals all entail a silent third
party, the state, which underwrites the contracts and ensures consistent perceived enforceability.
In this way, contracts among citizens and organizations are no different from other contracts. All
individual actors are thought to enter into free-choice relationships with others. As Atiyah put it,
"the overall social structure was made up of huge numbers of such one-on-one relationships"
(1979: 724). The law is the law in all cases, and perceived enforceability is considerably
uniform across social actors because the state is considered a democratic ideal that does not
discriminate against those with greater resources. In Figure 1, there is an arrow going down
from the state towards all citizens, and one arrow from all citizens going up to the state,
representing this uniform reciprocal relationship. Contracts are represented by a horizontal line
among citizens (regardless of whether they are organizations or individuals). Note also that the
contract arrow is double-headed, representing the embodiment of the objective theory of
contract-all contracting is a function of free-will, with limited interference with the substantive
terms of agreements.
Figure 1: Traditional model
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The traditional model differs substantially from the model advanced by this work. As
demonstrated by Figure 2, in the behavioral theory's model the reciprocal relationship between
the state and individuals is still present, but in terms of how contract fits into the picture, the
reciprocal relationship is functionally mediated by organizations drafting and promulgating
form-adhesive contracts. Consistent with decades of research on law as a differentiated resource,
contract law ends up replicating existing power and resource-dependence relationship. As
explained in greater detail below, as contract law evolved and continued to replicate existing
power and resource-dependence relationships, the corporation grew in tandem as the dominant
entity. The law of contracts expanded to permit corporations to contract just like individuals,
and ascribed to corporations many other individual rights. Corporations became as dominant a
force as the state. Some political economists argue that corporate power has even eclipsed the
state in many ways. The behavioral theory model depicted in Figure 2 reflects this critical fact.
Corporate actors are no longer on the same horizontal level as individuals. Instead, they are
above individual citizens making law by dictating contract terms unilaterally and imposing them
on individuals. Hence, the uni-directional arrow representing such contractual relationships.
Individuals reciprocate their treatment at the hands of the contract-drafting organizations in part
as a function of the extent to which they recognize how much law underwrites the unfair
contractual treatment. Some notice it and think that that is what the law does, some do not notice
it, and some notice it and think that the law prevents it and protects individuals from unfair
contractual exploitation. With any of these three possible responses, individuals reciprocate the
treatment (perceived or otherwise) by the contract-drafting organizations in two ways. First,
they respond to the contract-drafting organizations. Consistent with the literature on
"psychological contract" violation (Coyle-Shapiro 2002; Kotter 1973; Rousseau 1989), and the
social contract, particularly in the employment arena (Kochan and Shulman 2007), individuals
may respond in the classic exit, voice, loyalty, neglect framework (Hirschman 1970). Second,
individuals reciprocate with the state (the silent third party to these form-adhesive contracts).
Overall, the effect of the ubiquity of these agreements and the building awareness of their effects
contributes to our collectively diminished respect for the rule of law. This notion of the
connection between negative experiences with form-adhesive contracts and their apparent
ubiquity on the one hand, and diminished trust in the rule of law and a corresponding increased
resort to extra-legal and sometimes asocial means of adjudicating disputes among other extra-
legal responses on the other hand is consistent with the literature on obedience to the law and
responses to apparently unjust procedures or outcomes in court cases (Cole 1999: 1090-1091;
Lind and Tyler 1988; Nadler 2005; Thibaut and Walker 1975; Tyler and Rasinski 1991).
What takes the place of the law in terms of underwriting enforceability of promises made is an
empirical question worthy of study, as is the inquiry of when this occurs. The law becomes like
a prism without light emanating from within. Rather, the law reflects and refracts illumination
from alternative sources such as socio-economic bases of authority like norms of social
exchange, economic self-interest, power and dependence and moral standards of behavior. This
effect is described in greater detail in the third part of this work.
Figure 2: Behavioral theory model
Behavioral Theory Model
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It is the objective of this work to begin exploring and empirically vetting this model and
underlying theory by asking questions about how individuals experience and interpret form-
- --
adhesive contracts they are made to sign. Specifically, the second part of this work explores how
individuals regard a form-adhesive contract in the employment context (a mandatory arbitration
agreement), and how these interpretations relate, if at all, with how individuals exchange with
their employers. Is there a relationship between perceptions of enforceability of this form-
contract and how employees relate to their employers-is work a mere economic exchange,
devoid of trust or loyalty, or is it more of a relationship, where trust and loyalty are exchanged
and expected? The third part of the work observes individual behavior with respect to
enforceability of an extremely common form-adhesive agreement occurring on-line. This part of
the work experimentally examines how individuals behave when the contractual prism is
constant, and the moving parts are the circumstances under which individuals consent to the
contract, and the way that enforceability is prompted-along the extra-legal dimensions alluded
to above-(1) legal, (2) moral, (3) instrumental and (4) social.
The Approach
Even apart from the implicit rationale explicated above, given that the dominant form of
exchange for resources involves organizations providing resources to individuals (employment,
medical care, communication services, etc.), and that these exchanges almost invariably involve
contracts, it makes sense to ground a novel theory of contract ultimately aimed at explaining
social interaction and the viability of institutional social structures in empirically studying
experiences with and interpretations of form-adhesive contracts between organizations and
individuals. This argument builds on pre-existing social theories, by integrating several of their
contributory notions, but also deviates from pre-existing approaches in several critical respects.
I develop and ground this theory in the following ways: First, I observe and describe
individuals' experiences with and interpretations of form-adhesive contracts in the employment
context. Specifically, I offer evidence of variation in perceptions of enforceability of a
mandatory arbitration agreement. Second, I observe and describe individuals' behavior
indicative of their perceived enforceability of another common form-adhesive agreement in an
experimental setting online.
I argue that evaluating how social actors (employees, consumers, etc.) experience and interpret
contract is a useful way to understand how they interact with the organizations that draft the
form-adhesive agreements they sign in order to receive the benefit of the bargain (employment,
medical treatment, phone service, the intellectual property purchased, etc.). In so doing, the hope
is to advance theory about these important social-exchange relationships-most notably, the
employment relationship. More broadly, this research bears on theories about interpretations of
law and how such interpretations critically affect almost all facets of contemporary exchange
between organizations and individuals.
The approach taken is distinct from other existing theories of contract in three respects: First,
this approach starts from the realist question, "how do individuals experience and interpret
contracts," rather than the more common starting point for existing theories of contract, "what
should the law of contract be and do?" (see, e.g.: Fried 1981; Kronman 1980; Posner 1999).
The goal is for the answers to the former question to inform the latter, among other related
questions. That is, I rely on observations of individuals' behavior with respect to contract to
understand what the law of contract should be and do (if anything). The idea of law as
"expressive" (Sunstein 1996) underlies the rationale for the traditional starting point. This is the
idea that law tells us how to behave. Individuals learn from the expression of law via numerous
overt sources like laws and court rulings. This clearly happens, and is an important part of both
the traditional model as well as the model articulated in this work. I argue that it is not only uni-
directional as the traditional model and classic approaches to contract theory apparently assume.
Law trickles up as much as it trickles down.
Second, the approach taken herein examines individuals' experiences with and interpretations of
form-adhesive contracts as opposed to the standard arms-length, bilaterally negotiated fare.
Form-adhesive contracts are drafted by one party, typically an organization, intended for
multiple signers. They are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, without opportunity afforded the
signers to negotiate over their terms. Form-adhesive contracts likely outnumber bilaterally
negotiated agreements by an order of magnitude in contemporary social life. As such, I argue
that it makes more sense to ground theory in subjects' experiences with and interpretations of
this ubiquitous form of contract.
Third, this approach relies on decades of research that suggests that the way that individuals
experience and interpret the rule of law carries important consequences for understanding social
interaction broadly (Bies and Tyler 1993; Bumiller 1988; Coleman 1990; Ewick and Silbey
1998; Galanter 1974; Kritzer and Silbey 2003; Macaulay 1963). In this sense, I argue for the
connection between sociological studies of law and contract theory broadly.
Why do I ground a novel theory of contract in examination of social actors' behavior with
respect to form-adhesive agreements? Why not base such a theory on the standard, arms'-length
contracts used as the starting point for all pre-existing theories of which I am aware? There are
three reasons: theoretical, phenomenological and methodological. The theoretical reason is that
most theories of contract begin by analyzing arms'-length, negotiated instruments, typically
dyadic exchanges between individuals, and offer evidence of contract's life with instances of
efficiency (Bebchuk and Posner 2006; Posner 1999), morality (Fried 1981), community,
cooperation, collaboration (Markovits 2003-04), social-structure and social ordering (Suchman
2003). These efforts typically carve out form-contracts from the intended scope of the theories,
often citing form-contracts' illusory consent, divorce from real social interaction, or the fact that
most form-contracts involve an organization, not an individual as at least one party to the
exchange. My view is that form-adhesive contracts are such marginal instances of contract that
they offer an optimal setting in which to explore when these elements of contract's life spring up.
By marginal, I mean that form-contracts are barely contracts. How much like a contract any
given document is could be placed on a continuum from "no one thinks this could be a contract"
to "everyone agrees that this is a contract." If the elements of contract in the classic, legal sense
are: consideration, meeting of the minds, and a set of mutual obligations consented to by all
parties to the contract, most form-adhesive contracts are likely to fall lower on this scale than
arms'-length agreements, but probably above documents like newspapers, magazines and
advertising pamphlets. This is why I call them "marginal" instances of contract. This
marginality is what makes form-adhesive agreements optimal instances for seeing when they can
produce the evidence of contract's life cited above. This is analogous to the difference between
observing plants growing in ideal climates versus observing how and when they grow in a desert.
In the latter instance, we can more clearly see the minimum amounts of sun and water that enable
the plants to survive. As my theory of contract involves a similar minimalist environment, form-
contracts are a better starting point than arms'-length deals.
The second reason is methodological. The structure of form-contracts is inherently more suited
than arms'-length contracts for teasing out the extra-legal sources of contractual authority from
the rule of law. This is because they exist in a relatively constant context of asymmetric power-
imbalance and social ordering, with substantial variation in the socio-economic status of the
individual signers of these contracts. For instance, in the employment context, it is the case that
there is wide variation in the socio-economic status of signers of mandatory arbitration
agreements. Highly educated and highly compensated employees of security-trading firms
routinely sign such form-adhesive contracts, as do poorly educated and poorly compensated sales
associates of retail electronics stores like those studied in the first part of this dissertation. The
constant is the content of the contract they sign, even the very wording in many instances.
Similarly, in the case of emergency medical care, everyone who comes through the emergency
room signs the same piece of paper waiving their rights in order to be treated.
The third reason is phenomenological. These contracts are the norm, not the exception to the
rule. They abound in contemporary social life. Social actors enter into form-adhesive contracts
exponentially more frequently than they negotiate agreements. Plus, they exist in almost every
facet of contemporary life---employment, consumer relations, purchasing almost anything
online, intellectual property licensing, and medical treatment.
It is insufficient to say that form-adhesive contracts exist and they are the dominant form of
contractual exchange between organizations and individuals without at least an attempt at
understanding how this became the case. Understanding how contract evolved along side other
key elements of economic, social and legal elements is critical to understanding the place of the
behavioral theory in the existing literature, and how it could be viewed not only as a way of
understanding contract, but could be regarded as a social theory as well. What follows, therefore
is a brief history of contract in the United States, in order to historically and theoretically ground
the theory advanced in this work.
A Brief History of Contract
A. Pre-Law Extra-Legal Sources of Contractual Authority
Contract existed before law. This is not a novel idea (Seagle 1947). Contract, in this pre-law
sense, and, I would argue even in the contemporary legal sense as well, is a bilateral exchange of
promises associated with expectations of some future performance (Friedman 1965). Even if one
disagrees with the suggestion that contract preceded law temporally, at the very least, it is worth
acknowledging and identifying sources of contractual authority that exist independent of law. It
would be difficult to deny that, even with law, contracts are often enforced without regard or
reference to law (Macaulay 1963). Research in enforceability of collective bargaining
agreements has shown this to be the case in the employment arena for at least three decades
(Walton and McKersie 1965).
This begs an obvious question: In the absence of law, what formed (and continues to form) the
basis for authority to enforce contractual agreements? The extra-legal bases for authority to
enforce contracts in absence of law in the formal sense (codified by a state actor) may be
subdivided into three categories: (1) power and resource dependence, (2) social structure and
social ordering, and (3) moral norms. The principle disparity between these extra-legal bases of
contractual authority and legal authority for contractual enforcement is in the latter instance, the
state (or some version of a third party state actor) is a necessary component without which,
contract could not be enforced. In the cases of power and resource dependence, social structure
and social ordering and moral norms, even absent a state actor dictating the scope of contractual
enforcement, contracts may be binding. It should be said that even when these extra-legal bases
of authority exist along-side formal, legally-valenced written contracts, they are not vacuum
sealed. That is, they interact with perceptions of law and, like the law, affect behavior on the
margins. This is akin to explaining variation with statistical modeling. I am not arguing that all
the variation in post-agreement behavior is determined by any one of these extra-legal sources,
or that they consistently and uniformly trump "the law" as a way to explicate when social actors
live up to terms in contracts they signed. Rather, I suggest that they interact, and sometimes
shine more brightly than other elements depending on various constraints, some of which are
explored in greater detail in the second and third parts of this paper.
What follows is a brief explanation of these three extra-legal bases of contractual authority.
Following this, I explain how the legal birth of contract coincided with a critical economic and
social transition period, giving rise to the modern objective legal theory of contract. The extra-
legal sources of contractual authority do not simply dissipate with the birth of legal authority for
contracts. What happens to the extra-legal sources and how they interact with the legal basis of
contractual authority is a difficult question with important consequences. This research
contemplates this interaction and begins to explain circumstances under which the extra-legal
bases are actually more salient than the legal basis in contract enforceability. As discussed
above, I argue that form-adhesive contracts are the natural extension of this historical evolution.
Along with this, comes a collective augmented reliance on extra-legal bases of authority for
contractual enforceability and a corresponding diminished trust in the rule of law. I posit that,
consistent with existing social theory, this shift carries negative social and economic
consequences (Cole 1999: 1090-1091; Lind and Tyler 1988; Nadler 2005; Thibaut and Walker
1975; Tyler and Rasinski 1991). I conclude this part of the dissertation by introducing the
subsequent empirical components.
1. Power and resource dependence
In classical social-exchange theory (Blau 1964; Emerson 1962; Homans 1974), two things
predict greater likelihood of enforceability of contracts: (1) the extent of asymmetry in mutual
dependence in the relationship of the contracting parties, or put another way, the ratio of the
resources controlled and needed by the party seeking enforcement of the contract to the resources
controlled and needed by the other party, and; (2) the extent to which there exist relatively
available and low-cost alternatives to the contractual exchange being enforced (Blau and
Richardson 1973; Blau 1964; Coleman 1990; Granovetter and Swedberg 1992; Molm 1997). A
simple example illustrates these points. A signs a contract with B in which A agrees to give B
fifteen percent of the profit earned from land leased to A by B. A is a farmer and lives on the
land owned by B and leased to him according to this contract. Farmland is mostly unavailable,
and land that is available is difficult to farm in this region. Plus, A has sufficient sunk costs
associated with the land-A improved the land substantially with his labor by building a barn
and an irrigation system. If A refuses to pay the fifteen percent owed according to the contract,
B has sufficient power over A to evict A from the land. A would be homeless and without any
revenue coming in if A were evicted. Even if a dispute arose about the way that the contract was
to be interpreted (for instance, is it fifteen percent of the gross or net profit?), A would be
significantly disadvantaged to the extent that he is dependent on B for the land and his livelihood
and to the extent that it is difficult and costly for A to move to new farmland. There is great
asymmetry in the mutual dependence in this relationship because A is extremely dependent on B
for resources that B controls and A needs, but, due to the readily available supply of farmers
seeking to rent this land, B is not nearly as dependent on A for A's fifteen percent of profit made
from farming the land. As a result, even absent the law, A is significantly disadvantaged and B
is significantly advantaged in enforcement of this contract.
Additionally, the extent to which the parties have relatively available alternatives to the exchange
directly affects the ability to enforce the agreement. Farmable land is not readily available.
Therefore, A has few available alternatives to exchange. Because A has sunk investment of time
and money into developing the land by building a barn and establishing an irrigation system, A is
further disadvantaged because these investments raise the costs associated with moving to new
farm land (or they lower the relative cost of staying at the current location). A's lack of available
low cost alternatives to exchange make it marginally easier for B to enforce the contract's terms.
This is how classical social-exchange principles of power, resource dependence and available
alternatives to exchange affect contract enforceability even in the absence of law.
2. Social structure and social ordering
Anthropologists like Malinowski (1920) and Levi-Strauss (1969) have demonstrated that even
absent law, power and dependence or external sources of morality, contract is a function of
reciprocity and exchange. In fact, some like Hobbes (1969) and Williamson (1985) argue that
the notion of "contractual" reciprocal exchange is the building block of social ordering
(Suchman 2003). In Malinowski's classic study, an elaborate system of social ordering was
established across eighteen island communities and thousands of individuals by way of a system
of reciprocal exchange of necklaces and armbands. The "kula" items exchanged were not used
for any purpose other than for enhancing one's social status. Exchanges were clearly
"contractual" in nature, with systematic expectations built in and treated as socially binding.
Failure to conform could result in social ostracization or other sanctions such as boycotting of
trade of goods or food (Malinowski 1920). Without the exchanges, the social order would not
form as it did. The reciprocal exchange of the kula formed the basis of the social ordering in the
absence of formal laws or external moral ordering (Ekeh 1974).
Modern theorists like Coleman (1990) have similarly advanced the notion of the social basis of
authority of enforcement of contracts. The common thread in all of this work is the recognition
that social interaction and contract are intertwined. The shared expectations of which "contracts"
are enforceable make up what some call the "civil contract" (McIntyre 1994: 20). Individuals
tend to internalize the social constraints and act accordingly, even independent of laws, moral
constraints and economic interests. Research on conformance with socially expected behavior
has repeatedly demonstrated this (Cialdini 2001; Hermann, Thoni and Gachter 2008; Marshall
2002; Posner 2000; 2007). While a thorough review of the extent to which social constraints
strongly influence behavior generally is beyond the scope of this work, numerous studies across
varied contexts have demonstrated that social forces affect judgment and perception (Asch's
famous line experiment (Allen and Porter 1983: 295-303)), obedience to authority (Milgram's
(1965; 1974)), and even social roles (Zimbardo's Stanford prison experiment (1969)). It is not a
far stretch from this extensive line of research to argue that post-agreement behavior is similarly
socially constrained to the extent that form-adhesive agreements are often experienced socially.
For instance, at an emergency room, when bringing my one-year old daughter in for treatment
for a high fever, the person behind plate glass at the counter handed me a clipboard full of legal
forms to sign. She told me to sign them and return them so that they could admit my daughter. I
could not have signed those forms faster. Later, I learned that one of them was a mandatory
arbitration agreement waiving my right to sue for the hospital's improper treatment of my
daughter.' As described in the second part of this dissertation, the social context in which social
1 The hospital treated my daughter well, and she was fine. I only noticed the mandatory arbitration
agreement later because I was curious to read what I signed.
actors sign a form-adhesive agreement in the employment context is also important for
understanding how these agreements are experienced and hence interpreted.
3. Moral norms
As Daniel Markovits observes, "promises lie at the center of persons' moral experience of one
another, and contracts lie at the center of their legal experience of one another" (Markovits 2003-
04: 1419). It is a widely held and often articulated belief among philosophers like Kant (Wood
1999) and Rawls (1971), historians (Atiyah 1979; Farnsworth 1982), contract scholars (Fried
1981) and even biologists (Hinde 2004), that people tend to adhere to a universal moral principle
of promise-keeping and that this moral grounding forms an extra-legal basis for contractual
authority (Soper 1984). As Fried aptly puts it,
...[t]he obligation to keep a promise is grounded not in arguments of utility but in
respect for individual autonomy and in trust. ... An individual is morally bound to
keep his promise because he has intentionally invoked a convention whose function
it is to give up grounds-moral grounds-for another to expect the promised
performance. To renege is to abuse a confidence he was free to invite or not, and
which he intentionally did invite. To abuse that confidence now is like (but only
like) lying: the abuse of a shared social institution that is intended to invoke the
bonds of trust (1981: 16).
Fried grounds his moral basis for contractual performance by invoking both social norms ("abuse
of a shared social institution") and in the tandem concepts of free choice and trust ("intentionally
invoked a convention..." and "invoke the bonds of trust..."). As discussed in greater detail in
the third part of this work, it is interesting to observe just how powerful the moral basis for
contract has become, even when trust is diminished, as is the free-will aspect of consenting to a
contract. As other have noted, the decline of free choice in contract law has important
consequences (Atiyah 1979: 717-721) worth exploring.
Many (Atiyah 1979; Fried 1981; Schwartz and Scott 2003; Schwartz and Cartwright 1973) note
the interconnectedness of this shared norm and the Durkheimian ideal of communal
togetherness. As Markovits describes, many theories emphasize that "promissory and
contractual obligations promote the well-being of both promises and promisors, by increasing the
reliability of social coordination and promoting the efficient allocation of resources" (Markovits
2003-04: 1419). We make promises and rely on them because of the universal ideal of keeping
our word. Keeping one's word is a universally normative constraint-the promisor is
empowered with the ability to generate the norm when she makes the promise (Craswell 1989:
497; Raz 1981). The common denominator for all of these works is that they find morality as the
underlying root enabling force for legitimacy of enforceability, either independent of law or as a
precursor of law, enabling the enactment of specific doctrinal manifestations of the moral ideals.
As already suggested, these three broadly defined extra-legal bases of contractual authority are
not necessarily mutually independent of one another. Nor are they independent of the rule of law
as individuals perceive it. As an example, Durkheim (Schwartz and Cartwright 1973) advanced
the argument that society is "fundamentally a moral system." By this, he meant that "human
groups are held together by their members' commitment to a common set of values" (Sutton
2001: 32). In simpler terms, this means that we join together in our collective adherence to the
ideal principle of living up to promises made, upon which others have come to reasonably rely.
A more practical, empirical example of this is the social structure described by Engel (1995) in a
small town where people kept their word to each other. "Keeping our word" is this commonly
accepted notion that binds us together socially. As such, disconnection from this social bond
(like in Malinowski's kula ring example) is one critical repercussion associated with promise-
breaking. The "social contract" is a mere extension of this promise-based ideal to expect that the
state too keep its promises. Figure 1 above demonstrates this visually.
If one imagines these three extra-legal bases of contractual authority temporally, what happens as
the legal basis for contract emerges and takes hold? This historical shift deserves some attention,
as it is critically important if one is to understand the modem iteration of contract (the form-
adhesive variety specifically) and its socio-economic heritage.
B. Historical Evolution of Doctrinal Contract
Contract in the symbolic sense of the term (as distinguished from the notion of barter), was born
out of the transition from a feudal system to a capitalist one (Beirne and Quinney 1982; Sutton
2001), from "use value" to "exchange value" in a Marxist sense (Marx 1964; 1978), from
Mechanical to Organic Solidarity in Durkheimian (1933) terms, from Gemeinschaft
(community) to Gesellschaft (society) in Ferdinand T6nnies's (1957) terms, from Irrational-
Substantive to Rational-Formal law in Weberian (1954) parlance, or from Repressive Law to
Autonomous Law in Nonet and Selznick's (1978) terminology. For all of the above-cited
theorists, doctrinal contract began its life as these transitions occurred. Where there is less
consensus is in discussion of the specific role contract played and the scope of that role. For
instance, was it an enabling device relied upon by the powerful to exploit the less powerful vis-a-
vis the appearance of institutional authority, or was it merely an innocuous means of ensuring the
order, viability and organization of newly emergent systems of social or economic organization,
or was it simply a means of memorializing and formalizing the moral normative basis of
promise-enforcement, such that the job of enforcement of such promises was passed on officially
to the state? These are difficult questions, not readily discernable, although they are addressed
by many engaged in the debate about the role of contract and how contract has evolved with
social, political and historical forces. These issues are discussed in greater detail below. This is
particularly important to the behavioral theory of contract advanced in this work because of the
extent to which contract evolved in tandem with the growth, prominence and power of the
organization, or the dominant economic-legal form of the organization, the "corporation."
Starting at the beginning, all theorists seem to agree on some fundamental pre-shift facts. As the
feudal system that existed on the basis of status made way for the market based economic
system, this shift in social organization was paralleled by a corresponding transition "from status
to contract" as the central metaphor for legal reasoning in modern societies (Ellickson 1991: 246;
Maine 1954 [1861]; Selznick 1969: 62; Sutton 2001: 29). By "status," Maine primarily meant
the "law of persons," which proscribed actors' legal identities, and hence their ability to
exchange economically and interact socially. People's status and their legal identities were
hierarchically arranged and readily discernable. For instance, identities such as slave, serf,
servant, ward, wife, cleric, lord, duke, king, were mostly mutually exclusive and relatively
immutable. As Weber and Selznick each note, other forms of "status," clearly emerge from so-
called "purposive contracts." (This will be discussed in greater detail below.) However, the
argument here is that in order for a market system to function, there needs to be some mechanism
upon which private actors may rely to ensure adherence to terms of agreements. This sentiment
echoes the declaration of Adam Smith that "freedom of contract"-to enter into enforceable
bargains-would encourage individual entrepreneurial activity (Hurst 1964 [1956]). This is
because the economy relies on direct bilateral exchanges between individuals and business
entities (Farnsworth 1982). Before, status as Maine meant it, ensured adherence because those
beholden to higher status actors were obliged to exchange and share goods accordingly. Factors
such as kinship and age, over which actors had no control, determined, in large part, actors'
obligations to share (Farnsworth 1982). This was reinforced by pressure from peers and from
religion. As Thompson (1975) and others note, with the shift of social organization to a market
based economy came the need to secure current investment returns in the future, in other words,
in the most general sense, to confine arbitrary decisions of the royal prerogative and ensure
compliance without regard to status. In short, the change created a strong need for formal,
legitimate, state-sponsored law that ensured the reliability of inter-citizen promises and
exchange.
For Marx (1978), capitalism is associated closely with the notion of "exchange value" (valuing
commodities according to their capital worth independent of their actual utility) as distinct from
"use value" (valuing commodities by their actual utility). To function effectively, capitalism
requires protection of private property. Contract was the optimal way of ensuring a state-backed
institutional means of supporting this system. In a mechanical society, in the Durkheimian
sense, it makes sense that contracts are imbued with morality. Here, law and the communal
values are perfectly intertwined, and the autonomy and differentiation of the law discussed by
Nonet and Selznick are non-existent. Capitalism breaks up this mechanical interdependence, and
social actors become alienated strangers. Then, in Stuart Macaulay's words, "the legal system
supplies a kind of synthetic community based on rights and duties enforced by courts" (1985:
467). The free market capitalist system necessarily depends on freedom of contract to sustain
itself and to ensure protection of wealth accumulated vis-a-vis economic transactions between
and among citizens of the state. This is why commentators generally agree that the state in
capitalist societies such as the United States gives freedom of contract (on which contract law
depends) more legal scope than do pre-industrial and socialistic economic systems (Farnsworth
1982; Friedman 1965: 10; Gilmore 1974). Indeed, a modern legal historian concluded that in
America, the years from 1800-1875 were, "above all else, the years of the contract," because
they embodied the very essence of "energetic self interest" required of a free-market system.
(Hurst 1964 [1956]). This becomes increasingly important as capitalism paved the way for the
rise to power of the modern organization and by extension, the dominant form of contract--the
form-adhesive agreement. But, as the moral center originally underscoring law, particularly
contract law disintegrated, the state loses its credibility as an actor looking out for everyone's
best interests and the trust and obedience reciprocated in the traditional model makes way for the
reciprocity relationship depicted in the behavioral theory model. As George Orwell, famously
wrote in Animal Farm, "all animals are created equal, but some animals are more equal than
others" (1945).
A variant on the story is that capitalism imbued the pre-existing Durkheimian mechanical
solidarity and interdependence with a spirit of autonomous, economic self-interest. Contract law
supplied the glue needed to hold individualists to their bargains instead of the communal, social
or dependence on resources. As discussed earlier, in this view, contract emerged as a formal
embodiment of pre-existing morally derived authority. Enforcement of pre-existing norms of
morality shifted away from inconsistent, power-hungry elite to the democratic, egalitarian state.
This, in turn, promotes efficiency (Budd 2004; Posner 1986). Even if this is true, it is difficult to
deny that economic freedom paved the way for the rise of the corporation as the most powerful
form. When organizations are granted the power to contract, to have their own interests, the
same legal standing as an individual even though lacking a physical body had enormous
consequences for the development of society (Coleman 1990; Swedberg 2003: 209-210). As
Coleman notes, contemporary life is "asymmetric" in that an individual has next to no power as
compared to that of the modern corporation (Coleman 1990: 145-170). So, even if it is the case
that the promise-enforcing moral normative constraints are alive and well in contract, and have
been entrusted at least in part to the state to enforce, this fact is not a static one. I argue that the
dominance of corporate form and the point made by Coleman and others needs to be accounted
for when evaluating how the moral normative authority of contract has dynamically shifted in
contemporary social life.
Evaluating Weber's views on this subject shed more light on how this dynamic shift may have
occurred. Weber (1954) agrees with this idea that contract, the ultimate representation of what
he refers to as "private law," emerged as a significant means of ensuring the viability of a market
economy. He writes that "the present day significance of contract is primarily the result of the
high degree to which our economic system is market-oriented and of the role played by money"
(1954:105). Again, it is not that contract did not exist in some form prior to the rise of the
market-based system, but the way that agreements were operationalized, and the way that they
related to the law as a form of institutionalized and legitimate power changed. Voluntary
agreements for barter, or as Weber calls them, "primitive type 'status contracts,"' echoing
Maine's (1954 [1861]) terminology, made way for the "exchange or market economy 'purposive
contracts,"' echoing Marx's terminology (Weber 1954). Hence, the movement towards
purposive private contracts represents for Weber, the quintessential move towards rational-
formal law and the resulting "legal domination" through the elite's manipulation of the
bureaucratic administrative staff (Weber 1968).
This Weberian notion of contract's critical role in the usurpation and exploitation of the law as a
particularly subversive form of social control by the powerful, socially elite has been
documented repeatedly in the Law & Society literature (Black 1983; Chambliss 1964; Hall 1952;
Thompson 1975). Particularly, with Thompson's account of the Black Acts and Jerome Hall's
description of the evolution of the laws of property and theft, we witness the way in which the
social tendency towards Positivistic adherence to the rule of law is exploited by those with
power. Contract is a particularly easy way to exploit this tendency because it acts as a tabla rosa
on which the powerful may write their own laws, and have the courts enforce them in the interest
of promoting free-market economic liberty.
The framework set out by Nonet and Selznick (1978) is a useful way of further understanding the
life and death of contract in contemporary society. They model three types of law, making up
stages of evolution in the relation of law to the political and social order. The three stages are (1)
Repressive Law, (2) Autonomous Law, and (3) Responsive Law. The authors describe the social
response to Repressive Law as "acquiescence founded in awe and sustained by apathy leaves a
wide path for legitimate but unrestrained authority" (1978:32). This is essentially an explanation
of the birth and rise of contract law out of the transition from Repressive Law to Autonomous
Law. The point is not that there were no agreements before the shift from Repressive to
Autonomous Law. Rather it is that there was a significant shift in the force of law bolstering the
contracts, which resulted in the increased specter of "legitimation" that rendered contracts so
powerful a tool in the hands of the elite. As the authors explain so eloquently, "repression is
perfected when it can forego coercion." This is exactly what contract accomplished-perfected
repression by the avoidance of coercive exercise of power, replaced instead with institutionally
legitimate means. Hence, as described in greater detail in the second part of this work, contract
law is one of the primary means through which powerful owners of the means of production rely
on institutionally endorsed means of control to secure their accumulated wealth, and to ensure
compliance and acquiescence of the ones being controlled and subordinated.
This is exactly what is meant by the term, "dual law" used by Nonet and Selznick. The
dynamics by which the legal order upholds social subordination are paradoxically a chief source
of evolution away from coercive Repressive Law and towards institutions that can divorce
themselves from consolidated state power. The result is "differentiation," or the separation of
powers required of Autonomous Law. In other words, "dual law" builds into the very structure
of Repressive Law a mechanism of transition to Autonomous Law, and contract law offers the
institutionalized, acceptable, legitimate mechanism for retaining control in the transition (Nonet
and Selznick 1978).
Through this differentiation and dual law, we see the evolution of contract, its maturation along
the same progression of other laws that are used a means of social control. This is the ongoing
paradox of liberal legalism that emerges from the transition from Repressive to Autonomous
systems: The more the system appears rule based, legitimate, applicable to all in an equal, non-
discriminatory way, the greater the power of those who can defy the differentiation. Contract
offers a primary vehicle for this defiance at the hands of the winners under the capitalist system.
Individual freedom of contract diminishes and makes way for routine form-contracting between
the now-dominant organizational actors and their employees, customers and other individuals
dependent on the resources they have come to monopolize. As Atiyah explains,
[w]hat we now have is a relatively small number of large organizations, who
exercise more or less control over their own members, and who enter into
relationships, whether commercial or otherwise, with other similar organizations.
The role of the individual as the centre of a network of relationships has largely
disappeared. And this is the sense in which it is correct to speak of an enormous
decline in the role played by contract in modem society (1979: 724).
As the "winners" under this system are organizations, it makes sense that they would create the
form-adhesive agreement in order to maximize their leverage of imbalanced mutual dependence
over the millions of individuals with whom they contract as a group.
Given this paradox and Nonet and Selznick's framing described above, it should be no surprise
that the ramifications of contract on employment and collective action are greatly important. In
the employment world, the paradox noted above is particularly problematic given the inherent
inequality of bargaining power between labor and capital. Hence, freedom of contract affirms
equality, but lays the foundations of the unregulated subordination frequently exhibited in non-
union employment situations (Selznick 1969: 122-137). Unfortunately, in keeping with the legal
liberal tradition, courts routinely struck down labor legislation on the grounds that it interfered
with freedom of contract (Kaufman 2003; Stone 1981). This is why Richard Ely remarked at his
presidential address to the American Association for Labor Legislation that "when economic
forces make possible oppression and deprivation of liberty, oppression and deprivation of liberty
express themselves in contract" (Kaufman 2003: 8). He too regarded freedom of contract as a
fagade used to restrict true human freedom.
Selznick (1969) too believed contract to impede the evolution of a "law of associations," (labor
laws) as he called it, for two reasons. First, he claimed that the contract model was "nominalist
in spirit." By this, he meant that it reduced group reality to the acts and relations of individuals.
Second, he claimed that contract weakened the very meaning of social participation. As he
eloquently put it, "[t]he idea of a person in his wholeness, and in his potential as a group
member, lost its hold on the legal imagination. The new jurisprudence could more comfortably
apprehend a fragmented act of will." (1969:53). Selznick thought that the conflict between the
voluntaristic, individualized, obligation-driven world of contract was at odds with the
commitment-based, open-ended, relationship world of association. The only way such a system
could survive, and in truth, continue to replicate the pre-existing status-type hierarchical
oligopoly, is through the appearance of strict adherence to elaborate rules by legitimate legal
authority.
Similarly, the rise and fall of the arm's-length contract and the associated "freedom of contract"
paralleled the rise and fall of liberal economics as a working philosophy (Friedman 1959;
Macaulay 1985; Selznick 1969). For instance, the classical contract law doctrine of
"consideration" rejected the notion that any price fixed freely by two parties might be
condemned in law as unfair or inadequate. Only the market, as evidenced by what a willing
seller would pay a willing buyer, measures value. This notion is even crystallized into formal
doctrine, and is often referred to as "the peppercorn theory of consideration," after the idea that
consideration may take the form of as little a thing of value as a peppercorn, and courts are not to
interfere with the substance of parties' contracts (Friedman 1959: 91; Patterson 1958). That is, if
I want to sell my Rolls-Royce Phantom for a dollar, that is my business, and courts are not to
interfere. It is not difficult to see how this objective theory of contract primarily benefits the
modern corporation contracting with numerous individuals simultaneously, applying uniform
terms to all. It would seem horribly unfair and illegal, but for the peppercorn theory, on the
margins if contracting for the same amounts from individuals of varying means-$1,000 for a
sandwich is not objectively unfair if the individual purchasing the food is Bill Gates, but it is
probably unfair if the person is homeless, jobless and penniless. Contract law was losing its
credibility as the guardian and keeper of the pre-law moral normative power of promise-keeping
as a direct result. Law needed to at least maintain the appearance of fairness, and so, it did adopt
numerous substantive contractual limitation in numerous consumer, labor, and communication
contexts.
Another illustration of the parallel between the rise and fall of contract law based on freedom of
contract and the premise of individual freedom to contract on the one hand and rise and fall of
liberal economics as a working philosophy on the other is how the law of contract damages
accounted only for generalized types of economic damages, ignoring personal damages like
embarrassment or humiliation from the alleged breach. Damages recoverable for breach of
contract to deliver goods were computed based on the difference between contract price and
market price at the moment of breach. This formula assumes a frictionless and perfectly
competitive market, operating instantaneously and universally. Contract law would not abide
contracts for which no market price was conceivable--like contracts so vague or one-sided that
they lacked ascertainable value. This is perhaps best illustrated in the phrase, "no one rationally
buys or sells a mere guess" (Friedman 1965: 88). This too, was severely eroded, as contract
began withering and dying.
The law of "mistake" in contracts is another example of this parallel. Contracts are generally
only set aside or reformed by courts if the mistake is judged to be "material." Materiality,
however, was almost ubiquitously measured by whether the mistake affected only the price, that
is, whether the mistake was related to measurement of value or risk. The juxtaposition of liberal
economics and contract law is perhaps most stark when contract law is confronted with the
concept of fairness of the bargain. The general rule of law, alluded to above, is that unless
illegal, or contrary to public policy, the agreements of parties is to be the law by which their
rights are to be measured. As Lawrence M. Friedman noted in his seminal work, Contract Law
in America (1965), "...the law of contract was the legal reflection of [the free] market and
naturally took on its characteristics." That is, the law of mistake was to be as narrowly construed
as possible. Not surprisingly, it took a long time for the law of mistake to be gain a broader
interpretive berth by courts, but close inspection of contemporary case law reveals a fair degree
of evidence of erosion (Gilmore 1974).
C. The Death of Contract in Contemporary Society?
With the anthropomorphic dramatization of "death" ascribed to an otherwise seemingly lifeless
legal doctrine such as "contract," writers like Friedman and Macaulay intend to demonstrate not
that contracts are written less, but rather, that the social distance between the courts and the
business world (the actors to whom Friedman and Macaulay primarily refer) has increased such
that the institution of law in contemporary society is removed from the contracts into which it
once breathed life. As Friedman describes this process, the bench became removed from the
business community over time, such that by the 1950s, judges did not comprehend the
underlying intentions and meanings of contract required to ensure continuation of market
conditions. Friedman cites the expanding landscape of the business world such that it was
impossible for a judge to understand the ins and outs of so many burgeoning and disparate areas.
For instance, it was impossible for a judge to understand the intricacies of the logging industry,
labor-management relations and real estate all at once. Judges could no longer be subject matter
experts, as they were prior. As a result, contract acquiesced to statutory regulation specific to
these (and many other) industries. Formal, statutory legislature supplanted the common, judge-
made case law. Friedman also cites the rising costs of going to court, and the institutionalization
of private dispute-settling methods along with increased fluidity and ambiguity of business
relations as additional causes of contract's decline. Contract law simply could not keep pace
with businesses' need for dynamic change and hence, increased abstraction and fast, cheap,
subject-specific-knowledgeable dispute-resolution mechanisms (Friedman 1965: 200-205). The
result of these changes was increased centralization of power in the hands of the contract writers,
(the powerful, business-owning social and economic elite) and less reliance on the state to
bolster the agreements that facilitate economic transactions.
Interestingly, Friedman writes that the diminished capacity of courts and common law contract
law left room for courts to adopt a new role-that of protector of individual "civil liberties"
(1965:209). In the example cited of Pattenge v. Wagner Iron Works, Friedman explains how a
court relied on contract law to protect employees who were fired for striking in support of the
CIO, a rival to the AFL union in place at the plant. Here, contract law was not a symbol of the
market, or as Friedman writes, "a set of interstitial principles to be applied residually, where
legislation was silent." Instead, it was a weapon of due process. (1965:210). It is not surprising
that a court sought to bend the rules in order to achieve a more just outcome. However, I
question the degree to which this example proves the rule, as Friedman alleges it does, that the
law's new role is to protect the defenseless. Surely, this happens from time to time, but perhaps
it does only marginally to the extent that it is required to do so to avoid Rodney King incidents
(Nadler 2005: 1400).
Macaulay's work is the logical, realist continuation of Friedman's. He set out to demonstrate
empirically that the assumptions about the reliance on contract law for planning business
relationships and ensuring compliance with agreements were wrong, seriously misleading, or at
least, frightfully overstated. The prior common knowledge was that without contract law and the
state's monopoly of the legitimate use of force, performance of contracts would be uncertain
(Macaulay 1977). Indeed, this assumption was built up around the theories of contract's birth
developed above. In fact, there are many contract scholars who continue to adhere to these
beliefs, and argue against Macaulay and other realist scholars who align with him (see, e.g.:
Hillman 1988).
Macaulay (1963) did what he set out to do in his seminal article, "Non-Contractual Relations in
Business." There, he showed that businessmen (they were mostly, if not all men) relied on
norms of business relationships instead of their elaborate contracts that purported to govern their
exchanges. That is, there were two, independent sets of rules governing their exchanges-(l) the
legally defined, contractually prescribed ones, and (2) the business norms. Overwhelmingly, he
showed that the latter controlled. Specifically, Macaulay identified two business norms that
most saliently governed his subjects' interactions: (1) "Commitments are to be honored in
almost all situations." (Ellickson (1991: 190) calls this norm "welfare enhancing" because it
reduces the cost of enforcing any one given contract, and hence, even the cost of writing
elaborate contracts tailored to a specific exchange.) The second norm of exchange that
Macaulay identified is: (2) "One ought to produce a good product and stand behind it." This
transfers the risk of product defect to the seller, the party typically better informed about that
risk. It is a sensible norm, and one that was entirely inconsistent with the contracts Macaulay's
subjects crafted that frequently purported to do just the opposite! Put together, these norms
usurped or circumnavigated contractual limitations and remedies such that available damages
were almost wholly ignored. Here is a stark example of contract, and hence, the state and the
rule of law, being usurped by norms of exchange in the business community, not the other way
around, as had previously been considered the correct way to perceive of contractual norms as
emerging. That is, norms of exchange are supposed to be seen as emerging from and varying
with the law, not orthogonally to it.
A similar, and widely cited example of what Macaulay observed is found in David Engel's
(1995) account of "Sander County," a small, rural town in the U.S. in the late 1970s in which
everyone knows everyone else and there is a strong sense of community and shared norms and
values. There, Engel showed that contracts exist, but there is very little resort to formal legal
systems to enforce them. Contractual disputes usually involve a failure of a party to conform to
the commonly shared values and beliefs in the community. People kept their promises to one
another because there is a shared norm of trust in each other's "word." This was very important
to Engel's subjects. The core value of the traditional culture of Sander County was that
"promises should be kept and that people should be held responsible when they broke their
word" (1995:31).
Whereas Friedman and Macaulay argue that contract has shifted power away from the state into
the hands of the owners of the means of production, Gilmore (1995: 95) suggests that expanding
tort doctrine is gradually absorbing the "bargain theory" of contract, and in so doing, reducing its
viability and utility as a body of law upon which people may reasonably rely in planning their
affairs. In the legal realist tradition, Gilmore asserts that the bargain theory is an artificially
narrow construct generated by Langdell, Holmes and Williston at the turn of the century to jive
the law of business dealings with liberal economics and individualism. As such, according to
Gilmore, the "death of contract" was inevitable because the bargain theory began to disintegrate
when judges refused to follow it in the cases where doing so appeared unfair, when
inconsistencies and alternative hypotheses were available for cases, and when the "tide of
codification" focused analysis on legislative policy instead of the common law. (The latter
echoes the observations of Friedman about the transfer away from common law towards subject-
area-specific legislation.) Gilmore (1961) blamed this on the precedent-based legal system being
unfit for the scope of the modern economic world.
To put Gilmore's ideas in the context of capitalism and neo-classical economics, he believed that
our present welfare state inevitably caused the demise of the construct of consideration and
contract that was part and parcel of the individualistic economic system. As he put it, the
capitalist system was predicated upon the idea that "no man is his brother's keeper; the race is to
the swift; let the devil take the hindmost. The decline and fall of the general theory of contract
and, in most quarters, of laissez-faire economics may be taken as remote reflections of the
transition from nineteenth century individualism to the welfare state and beyond" (1995
[1974]:104).
D. Contract's Prismatic Resurrection
Contract may have died in the traditional, doctrinal sense, but it is far from dead in contemporary
life. One cannot start a job, join a gym, purchase anything, park a car, receive medical care, use
a cell phone, PDA or computer, log onto the internet, communicate with others (via phone,
online or in any other way), watch a movie, television show or video content on the internet, or
listen to audio recordings of any kind without encountering the most common form of contract-
the form-adhesive variety. Perhaps it is more appropriate to say that the way that contracts are
most commonly experienced has changed, but the law has not. In that sense, then, contract is
dead. Our current situation with respect to contract as experienced versus contract law on the
books is analogous to how it would be if we developed the capacity to travel via instantaneous
teleportation, but continued to apply the laws of highway travel to the new form of
transportation.
The traditional contract model, based in large part on freedom of individual choice, contemplates
the parties negotiating their agreement. Drafts are exchanged or verbal terms traded. Reviewing
any classic contracts case book will reveal this dominant traditional conception of contract
formation, where there is "offer", followed by "acceptance," and there is some "meeting of the
minds," and "consideration." There is a consent phase where all of these elements take shape, an
agreement phase, and then a post-agreement "performance" phase, which may or may not
involve one or both parties breaching the terms of the agreement, necessitating the non-breaching
party or parties to seek to compel compliance with the contract's terms. In the modern, most
common way that individuals experience contract, the consent phase is compacted-there is
often no time or perceived need to review the terms embedded in the "contract". Parties shift the
negotiation that occurs pre-agreement to the post-agreement, enforcement phase. As discussed
in greater detail in the second part of this work, whether signers initiate negotiations in the post-
agreement phase or not is partly a function of the way they regard the legal enforceability of the
contract. When the terms are activated (when the signers realize that they have been billed or
when the contract-drafters inform them that as per the terms of the contracts they have signed,
something is about to happen or has already happened) some signers initiate negotiations
regarding the enforceability of the terms, and some comply with the terms without initiating
negotiations-they just perform as the contract requires. The new form of contract contains
terms, but it is useful to distinguish between primary and secondary terms. In the traditional
contractual model all terms that are negotiated are incorporated into the written document, in
many cases barring resort to extra-contractual oral terms in interpreting the written document
(the so-called, parole-evidence rule). Terms excluded from memorialization are considered
intentionally omitted by the parties and hence, unworthy of legal consideration. However, with
form-adhesive contracts drafted by an organization intended to be signed by multiple signers,
this one-size-fits-all approach to contract makes the parole evidence rule seem grossly unfair,
inefficient and ultimately inapplicable.
I submit that a better approach would be to distinguish between primary and secondary terms.
Primary terms are the ones that are up-front, and clearly articulated to signers before they sign.
Primary terms are typically the only ones that signers see before signing. They usually include
price terms (in employment, the wage rate for the type of work performed), and an expected
duration of the relationship. In the medical care example mentioned earlier, I knew that the
hospital was going to provide medical care to my daughter in exchange for payment, partly from
my insurance company, and partly from me in the form of a co-payment. The primary exchange
was medical care for money.
Secondary terms are those drafted by the organization and included only in the form-contract, or
the fine print. These often include legally valenced clauses like choice of forum, jurisdictional
submissions, dispute resolution, or other contingency clauses. The secondary term that
ultimately became part of the contractual transaction in the medical treatment example was the
agreement to resolve any disputes that may arise by final, binding arbitration instead of in court.
I, as the signer, did not know that this term was part of the deal until after I signed (more
factually, after the primary terms had been fully executed).
The most troubling secondary terms modify the primary ones. For instance, the primary
exchange for the business known as "Girls Gone Wild" is one or two DVDs (depicting college-
aged women of various levels of inebriation in various states of undress) for a set price (it varies,
but is usually between $9.99 and $29.99). The company advertises on television and the
internet. When individuals agree to this simple primary exchange (a flat price for a set number
of DVDs), they agree to the company's tiny-fonted "terms & conditions"-a form adhesive
contract. This contract contains a secondary clause that changes the price term of the primary
exchange such that purchasers become contractually obligated to continue paying for more
DVDs over a period of months and pay an automatically renewing subscription fee of
considerably more money than the original amount. A cursory review of consumer complaints
about Girls Gone Wild on the internet reveals at least one consistent trend among those who
purchased the DVDs: many were surprised by the secondary term's amendment of the primary
term. For instance, the following are excerpts from the website
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/misc/wild.html:
Joseph of New Brighton MN (04/08/09) E Took trail offer and have been unable to
cancel[ about 200 dollars in lost revenue to me and I'm poor.
Thomas of Fall River MA (03/13/09)[2A few years ago I purchased a few DVDS
from Girls Gone Wild, and then for the next 5-6 months I was getting billed for
Dvds I never bought. Even after I canceled with them they kept sending videos and
charging my account. A lawyer sent me a form a few weeks ago telling me I wasn't
the only one who has been scammed, but it was thrown out on accident, I want
justice!!!
Scott of Lake Wales FL (02/28/09) 01 also order a video and a month later 2 more
came in so I tried to quit the sending them and they kept coming till the whole set
was sent and the whole time they was taking money from my account putting me in
a hole every time-every time they charged me it would put my account in the
negative then I would have to pay the extra money to get it out so I would have to
pay for the dvds and the hole it would put me in making me pay 60 to 70 dollars a
month every time they billed me.
Jacob of Middleburg FL (01/16/09)LI ordered 1 video to see what they were like
in Sept 08. I then was sent 2 videos in one package and they charged my account in
Oct 08. I called them to cancel and to NOT send any more. Now I have been
charged another $29 the first of January and I did not order anything nor have I
received any videos. I called and they said they would credit the account. They still
have not. I still have the 2 from Oct that are unopened. I am returning them in hopes
of getting my money for those. If I do not get my credit within a week, I will report
my card lost so that they can not charge anything else on the account. E 0 I am
unemployed at this time and can not afford for them to take money from my
account.
Conclusion
The Girls Gone Wild secondary term that amended the primary price term vis-A-vis the tiny-
fonted terms and conditions, (truly, a form-adhesive contract at its most nefarious), is a good
example of the way that doctrinal contract law and the objective theory of contract has died by
not catching up to contract as most commonly experienced. Traditional contract is an older
breed, dying out and making way for its progeny-the form-adhesive contract. Doctrinal
contract and the objective theory associated with it evolved out of the transition to modern
capitalist economic system. It was born out of strict and near-unanimous belief in economic
freedom. Contractual liberty was the quintessential embodiment of a liberal democracy. The
extra-contractual or pre-contractual bases for contractual authority (morality, social and cultural
norms of reciprocity, and mutual power and resource dependence) did not disappear when the
new legal, doctrinal contract law emerged married to economic freedom. Some argue that they
became incorporated into contract law. For instance, some contend that the state became the
neutral enforcer of moral norms of promise-keeping. What has actually happened to these extra-
contractual sources of authority is largely unclear. What is clear is that powerful actors thrived
in this system and exploited the contractual and economic liberty to exploit less powerful actors.
With the rise of the legal freedoms granted to the modern corporation such as the freedom to
contract as an individual (the notion of "persona ficta" or a fictitious person with the same legal
standing as an individual even though lacking a physical body (Swedberg 2003: 210)), and
ascription to corporations of many individual rights came the increased ability of corporations to
exploit vis-A-vis contract (Swedberg 2003: 209-210). What started out as a liberal ideal of
democratic freedom ended up giving rise to the dominant form of contractual relations between
organizations and individuals in contemporary life.
In its new form, contract acts like a prism through which the light of other extra-legal forms of
contractual authority shines. In the Girls Gone Wild example offered above, many of the
signers' complaints indicate how imbalanced mutual power and dependence seem to shine the
brightest--many reference how the company has their credit card number and uses this
information to leverage payment through costly and time consuming cost of reversing the
continued charges. But twisting the form-contractual prism could just as easily permit other
extra-contractual light to refract more clearly. The second part of this dissertation demonstrates
an important twist of the prism in the employment context--clearly one major area in which
form-contracts prevail. The third part of this work twists the prism several times in an
experiment designed to strip down the form-contract to its bare form, revealing more about how
and when these other lights compete and ultimately which one or ones shine the brightest.
Part 2: The Devil in the Details: Malleable Consent in the
Employment Context
Introduction
Trust in agreements underlies not only economic transactions, but lies at the heart of the civil
justice system, the rule of law, and to a larger extent, our ability to interact socially. The notion
that parties to an exchange may bind themselves presently, and often rely on their agreements in
the future, is simultaneously at the root of all commerce as well all social interaction. Norms
about such exchange, including the reliability and enforceability of agreements, are essential to
our collective propensity to sustain a civil justice system and to ensure continuation of healthy
and peaceful social exchange. What happens to these perceptions of enforceability when actors
bind themselves to contracts that they have had no opportunity to participate in drafting or
negotiating? Does variation exist in perceptions of enforceability of such agreements? What
effect(s), if any, does such variation have on the way individuals conceive of how they exchange
with the entities (mostly institutions) that draft such agreements?
The starting point for answering these questions should be an evaluation of individuals'
experiences with and interpretation of the most commonly experienced form of contract. Most
contracts between organizations and individuals are form-adhesive. Indeed, form-adhesive
contracts are ubiquitous. Anyone who has received a loan, entered into a mortgage agreement,
rented a car, purchased software, music, or other media, received medical care, entered into a cell
phone service contract, gone on a cruise, signed up for a credit card, joined a club, or engaged in
just about any other economic exchange with an organization in the last three decades has likely
encountered many such agreements. In fact, relationships between organizations and individuals
are rooted in these take-it-or-leave-it contracts drafted by organizations (or more often, lawyers
representing the organizations' interests), intended to be signed by numerous individuals such as
customers, employees, medical-care recipients and others. And yet, in spite of their ubiquity,
form-adhesive contracts are relatively understudied. When they are studied, it is rarely from a
socio-legal perspective, although the need to adopt such an approach has been acknowledged
(Rakoff 1983; 2006 p. 1244-46). Most of the attention paid to form contracts has been from an
economic or legal-economic perspective, focused on theory and model building as opposed to
empirical inquiry. Most existing scholarship has adopted the perspective of "society," the legal
system, the economy, or the drafters of form agreements. A focus on individuals' experiences
with and interpretations of these contracts is much less common.2 Individual behavior with
respect to such terms is usually assumed, theorized, or modeled. It is rarely empirically observed
and reported.
Assumptions made about how individuals experience and interpret form agreements may not be
accurate, and may lead to incomplete or inaccurate conclusions about the effects of such
agreements. As form agreements often dominate and define the contractual landscape in such
important areas as mortgage lending, consumer relations, intellectual property licensing, and
dispute resolution (in employment and consumer domains), it would seem like a worthwhile
endeavor to empirically explore the effects of such contracts both within and across socio-
economic strata, if for no other reason than to contribute to policy discussions in these areas.
Further, as explained in more detail below, prior socio-legal research suggests that form-adhesive
contracts may be a fruitful, but relatively untapped area in which to explore views about
citizenship in the state.
This portion of the dissertation seeks to fill these voids in the literature by employing several
empirical methodologies (structured face-to-face interviews and surveys) to study individual
social actors' experiences with and interpretations of form-adhesive agreements. In so doing, I
seek to contribute to the discussion of the role of the rule of law in daily life.
Existing research about form contracts has been framed by the observation that these agreements
are axiomatically different from contracts as classically defined. Specifically, drafting
organizations promulgating these contracts are invariably more powerful than, and less
2 One exception is Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas:
A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers' Propensity to Sue, 15
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 83 (1997) (presenting initial evidence that "exculpatory clauses [in form contracts],
if read, have a deterrent effect on propensity to seek compensation") (emphasis added).
dependent on, the individuals who sign them.3 There is often no "meeting of the minds" in the
classical sense of the term, as many signers do not read or understand what is in the agreements
they sign. In fact, some organizations take great pains to craft and deliver their forms
specifically to minimize the likelihood of such a "meeting of the minds" (Sullivan 2007: 8-10).
Scholarship has explored the nature of these differences and the important question of how such
differences affect judicial enforcement of these contracts. For instance, economists have
questioned the lack of competition over terms contained in such contracts (Gabaix and Laibson
2006; Korobkin 2003). Others have pondered whether these agreements are one-sided, the
extent of the one-sidedness, and the conditions under which they are more or less one-sided
(Hillman 2007; Kessler 1943; Rakoff 1983; Slawson 1971). Still others have contemplated when
such terms are enforced by courts and when they ought not to be (Baird 2006; Hillman and
Rachlinski 2002; Marotta-Wurgler 2007b; Slawson 1971). Some note that boilerplate is not as
bad as it may seem, in part because firms selectively enforce them against signers (Bebchuk and
Posner 2006; Johnston 2006; Marotta-Wurgler 2007a). As discussed below, this last observation
is perhaps the most interesting example of the underlying conundrum presented by form-
adhesive agreements. For the most part, however, those who have approached the subject try to
ascertain what the text of these agreements purports to do, when they are good or bad (where
"bad" means the language is one-sided in favor of the drafting organization), just how bad they
are, how courts have treated such terms, and how courts should treat such terms.
These approaches are useful and serve an important role in addressing policy discussions about
form-adhesive agreements. However, they collectively fall short of the mark when trying to
understand the role of such contracts in exchange relationships, or more significantly in
sustaining or undermining the rule of law. Also, it would seem that more than three decades of
3 The term "powerful" is used here in the classical, social exchange theoretical sense, essentially as a
function of imbalanced mutual dependence. See, e.g., JAMES COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL
THEORY 134-35 (1994) (diagramming the value of an individual's power and situations where that power
will be greatest); LINDA D. MOLM, COERCIVE POWER IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE 11-39 (1997) (describing
basic concepts, assumptions, and principles of social exchange theory and its conception of power);
Richard M. Emerson, Power-Dependence Relations, 27 AM. SOC. REV. 31, 31-36 (1962) ("In short,
power resides implicitly in the other's dependency."); George C. Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange,
63 AM. J. Soc. 597, 605-06 (1958) (discussing small-group research on social structure and exchanges of
influence).
socio-legal studies have repeatedly demonstrated the need to understand not only the formal "law
on the books" aspect of a legal phenomenon such as form contracts, but the "law in action"
aspect as well. The "law in action" approach is particularly salient in this area because, as noted
in the literature and confirmed by the research reported herein, form agreements are often not
even read or understood by the signers. It would therefore make sense to explore interpretations
of and experiences with form agreements (the "law in action" component) to determine how the
law should regard these contracts, and at the very least to supplement the existing research,
which has addressed the "law on the books" component almost exclusively.
It may occur to those steeped in the law and society tradition-particularly those of the legal
realist persuasion and even more particularly those familiar with the seminal work of Stewart
Macaulay (1963; 1985), Grant Gilmore (1974), and Lawrence M. Friedman (1965)-that such a
focus on the citizen is essential to fully understand these unusual forms of contract as
experienced. Contract as experienced, as Macaulay and others would likely agree, is often more
important than contract as written. In fact, the necessity of including empirical analysis of
individuals' experiences and interpretations of contracts is evidenced by the central finding of
Macaulay's important work on contracts among businessmen: individual opinions about
contracts more saliently predict how breaches are perceived and resolved than the contract terms
themselves. As Macaulay directly and succinctly introduced his classic work, the relevant
empirical inquiry remains the same: "what good is contract law? Who uses it? When and
how?" (1963: 55). This research seeks to extend the work of Macaulay and others by examining
how individuals actually experience form agreements, and how individual interpretations of form
agreements affect the way in which social actors exchange (contractually or otherwise) with the
organizations that require their consent on such forms.
The objectives for this analysis are therefore threefold. First, this part of the dissertation argues
that through an exploration of individual interpretations of and experiences with form-adhesive
agreements, it is possible to gain a fuller understanding of trust in the rule of law and by
extension, citizenship in the state. Second, this part of the dissertation seeks to contribute to the
important discussion among contract scholars about how form agreements ought to be regarded
in doctrine and legislation by demonstrating empirically the connection between interpretations
of form-adhesive agreements and how individuals regard their ongoing relationships with form-
drafting organizations. Third, in challenging the assumption of uniformity in individual
interpretation of form agreements, this part argues that observed differences of interpretations of
and experiences with boilerplate vary with socio-economic status (SES), such that higher SES
actors view the enforceability of contracts they have signed as more malleable than lower SES
actors. The implications of such SES-based differences of interpretation of form agreements for
theories of democracy and the liberal state may be far-reaching considering the degree to which
citizens' consumer and employment relations are governed by these contracts.
In sum, this part of the work attempts to elaborate on our understanding of the rule of law
through perceptions of contract. This is not at odds with prior research on boilerplate. In fact, it
is an extension of existing research in mostly uncharted directions. However, in so doing, I
challenge several critical assumptions made by existing scholarship about the uniformity of
perceived enforceability of form agreements.
To illustrate the importance of actor-centered empirical inquiry, consider the arguments
advanced by Lucian Bebchuk and Richard Posner in one article (2006: 827-28) and Jason Scott
Johnston in another (2006: 858). These authors claim that firms do not intend to strictly enforce
the terms contained in form agreements. That is, firms keep self-serving terms in form contracts
to selectively "fend off consumer opportunism," as Omri Ben-Shahar describes it, but otherwise
allow honest clients off the hook (2007: xi). These authors assume a uniformity of individual
interpretation of the form agreements they have signed. All actors, they argue, are assumed to
behave consistently with their interests--when the terms are activated and not in their interests,
individuals will speak up and demand circumnavigation from the organizations, otherwise honest
clients remain silent. Firms then sort the honest from the dishonest and enforce only against the
latter, resulting in a presumptively fair outcome. Johnston goes so far as to argue that boilerplate
encourages negotiation, suggesting that the terms contained in such agreements to which both
sides have ostensibly bound themselves are merely invitations to negotiate (Johnston: 864-77;
Wolfson 1999). This may be the organizations' view, and I later addresse how this approach
parallels the way in which powerful, ruling-class elite social actors historically transformed
statutory law to conform to their interests. But this assumption conflates the notion of self-
interest, on the one hand, with perceptions of one's ability to rely on the law to enforce a contract
or to wield the law as a sword to escape from a contractual provision that appears unlawful on
the other. I posit that these things are quite separate, and need to be measured separately,
especially when the exchange relationship of interest is axiomatically power-imbalanced as is the
case with form-adhesive contracts.
What if all individual signers do not view these contracts they have signed in this unusual way-
as invitations to negotiate? 4 Form agreements are, after all, binding legal contracts (at least they
may appear as such to some). What if some regard form contracts "myopically," thinking that
there is no post-agreement negotiation available, and others regard them, perhaps more
sophisticatedly, as open and quite negotiable, like the "myopes" and "sophisticated consumers"
in Gabaix and Laibson's terms? (2006: 507-09). This is exactly the type of division that prior
research on law as a differentiated resource suggests. Along these lines, what if the variation in
individual interpretations is such that the organizations' opportunities for sorting are not aligned
to distinguish opportunism from altruism? What if SES differences among individuals explain
part of the variation, such that lower SES actors are more likely to feel bound by one-sided terms
than higher SES actors? Again, this is consistent with prior scholarship on citizenship.
The purpose of this part of the dissertation is to raise questions, provoke discussion and begin to
empirically vet the theories developed about perceived enforceability of contract. It is also the
aim of this part to expand the scope of inquiry on the phenomenon of form contracts beyond the
present range of disciplines. Hopefully, this part illustrates the need for further empirical study
of citizens' engagement with these ubiquitous contracts, some of which is followed up on in the
second part.
To begin, this part examines these questions: What happens to interpretations of enforceability
when actors bind themselves to contracts that they have had no opportunity to participate in
negotiating or drafting? Does variation exist in interpretations of enforceability of such
4 Interestingly, there is research demonstrating significant gender differences in the way in which
individuals perceive opportunities to initiate negotiations. See generally LINDA BABCOCK & SARA
LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2003) (exploring gender gap
in propensity to initiate negotiations).
agreements? What effect(s), if any, does such variation have on the way individuals interpret
their exchanges with the entities (mostly institutions) that draft such agreements? Do groups of
socio-economic actors interpret enforceability of agreements differently and with what effect, if
any?
To address these questions, a construct called "malleable consent" is introduced, which is the
view that an agreement to which one has consented without duress or fraud is nonetheless not
enforceable against the signer in whole or in relevant part. Part II traces the theory underlying
the interrelationship among interpretations of contract, trust in the rule of law and citizenship in
the state. This Part also outlines malleable consent's theoretical utility as an indicator of trust in
the rule of law. Malleable consent is presented as a means of studying how individuals construe
and respond to form agreements, and as a way of examining popular faith in the rule of law.
Part III explains the two questions motivating the research methodology and findings. First, how
does malleable consent vary across SES? Second, what is the relationship, if any, between
malleable consent and how individuals exchange with their employers: as a transaction devoid of
trust and loyalty, or as an ongoing relationship? Part IV details the two studies in which
malleable consent was observed.
The main analysis is in Part V, which sets out the preliminary findings supporting the hypothesis
that higher SES actors are more likely to regard form-adhesive agreements as unenforceable
when compared to lower SES actors. Part VI then discusses the findings in support of the
hypothesis that actors are more likely to regard form agreements as unenforceable (high
malleable consent) when they view their jobs as instrumental transactions-as simply a financial
exchange. Where employment is regarded as an exchange of obligations as well as rewards, as
imbued with a substantive, moral relationship-what industrial relations scholars often refer to
as a "social contract" or a "relational exchange" (Kochan January 7-9, 2000; Kochan and
Shulman 2007; Osterman et al. 2001)-actors are more likely to regard the form-adhesive
agreements as enforceable (low malleable consent). Essentially, when actors view form-
adhesive agreements as unenforceable, there is less expressed trust in the employment
relationship. These results seem to hold across diverse populations, from low level employees of
a national company to MBA students at an elite business school. MBA students, who enjoy less
dependent employment constraints (for example, more job opportunities and less dependencies),
voice less respect for the enforceability of the contracts they sign. They display malleable
consent more frequently than sales associates with greater employment dependency and
constraints. Exploring these differences across the two divergent groups, the construct is
presented as a means of revealing otherwise unobserved differences among citizens'
interpretations of law in the employment context. Part VI discusses the implications of this
research and Part VII the limitations. The conclusion follows.
The Relationship Between Contract and Trust in the Rule of Law
There is a connection between interpretations of law and virtually all social and economic
exchange. By understanding such interpretations, we may gain a fuller understanding of the
circumstances under which individuals rely on the law, avoid the law, break the law and believe
in the consequences of actions that deviate from the law (Ewick and Silbey 1998; Ewick and
Silbey 2003; Greenawalt 1985). This connection is important because, in part, it defines
citizenship in the state. Work by sociologists and other scholars has repeatedly and consistently
demonstrated this connection (see, e.g.: Bies and Tyler 1993; Bumiller 1988; Coleman 1990;
Edelman and Suchman 1999; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Galanter 1974; Garth and Sarat 1998;
Gibson 1991; Kritzer and Silbey 2003; Merry 1990; Tyler 2006). As mentioned at the outset,
trust that agreements will be enforced underlies not only economic transactions, but also
underwrites the civil justice system, and more generally, the rule of law, and, to a larger extent,
our ability to interact with one another without resort to violence and other asocial means of
assuring compliance. The notion that parties to an exchange may bind themselves presently, and
often rely on their agreements in the future, is simultaneously at the root of all commerce and all
social interaction. Understanding this relationship is important because deterioration of the
critical mass of contract-enforceability believers yields a corresponding problematic
deterioration of law, associated with loss of social control and increased resort to non-legal
means of redress, including violence, asocial behavior and other potentially undesirable
outcomes (Black 1976; Black 1983; Ehrlich 1936).
This connection between perceptions of the rule of law on one hand and beliefs about
enforceability of contract on the other is discussed specifically by several notable scholars. For
instance, Eugen Ehrlich wrote that the contract is the "juristic form for the distribution ... of the
goods and personal abilities (services) that are in existence in society" (1936: 48). The law
embodies the norms of exchange in this "contract." Actors interpret and often reinterpret
contracts they have created (or at least to which they have consented). Actors' interpretations of
their contracts are colored by their views of the law specifically, in context with respect to the
relative power of the parties, and generally, often drawing on notions of justice, equity and
fairness (Gibson 1989; McEwen and Maiman 1986; Tyler 1997). Thus, a self-perpetuating loop
that enables both economic and social exchange to function is born.
Max Weber and others after him agree that contract creates law as much as law creates contract
(Weber 1954). This is why, for example, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) attempts to
embody and defer to industry custom (the norms of exchange), and why those creating contracts
governed by the UCC look to case law interpreting it and related statutes in negotiating their
instruments of exchange.
The proposition that our collective belief in the enforceability of contracts is necessary for the
law to remain self-sustaining is not novel. On the contrary, the idea of the embeddedness of the
state, and hence, the law, in all seemingly private contracts is, in fact, rather old. Emile
Durkheim explained that there are no private contracts--even in agreements between private
parties where no explicit reference to the state or the law is made:
It is true that obligations that are properly contractual can be entered into or
abrogated by the mere will to agreement of the parties. Yet we must bear in mind
that, if a contract has binding force, it is society which confers that force. Let us
assume that it does not give its blessing to the obligations that have been contracted;
these then become pure promises possessing only moral authority. Every contract
therefore assumes behind the parties who bind each other, society is there, quite
prepared to intervene and to enforce respect for any undertakings entered into. Thus
it only bestows this obligatory force upon contracts that have a social value in
themselves, that is, those that are in conformity with the rules of law. We shall even
occasionally see that its intervention is still more positive. It is therefore present in
every relationship determined by restitutory law, even in ones that appear the most
completely private, and its presence, although not felt, at least under normal
conditions, is no less essential (1933: 71).
It follows from the above proposition that belief in the enforceability of contracts is at least, in
part, a reflection of belief in the state's ability to enforce law generally. Ehrlich agreed with
Durkheim on this point and took the concept one step further. Ehrlich believed not only that the
law and the state lurk in the shadows of all private contracts, but that informal, everyday norms
of social exchange do as well (1936: 45-48). He noted that even in commercial dealings,
contracts are not entered into as with definite persons, "but as with the whole group of persons
who are in a mutual relation of exchange of goods with each other." (p. 46). This idea that
contractual relations norms extend beyond the four corners of private parties' agreements to
affect the scope of others' legal power is echoed in Weber's writings as well:
In certain situations the normative control through enabling rules necessarily extends
beyond the task of the mere delimitation of the range of the parties' individual
spheres of freedom. As a general rule, the permitted legal transactions include a
power of the parties to the transaction to affect even third parties. In some sense and
to some degree almost every legal transaction between two persons, inasmuch as it
modifies the mode of the distribution of disposition over legally guaranteed powers
of control, affects relations with an indeterminately large body of outsiders. (1954:
26)
Taken together, the ideas of Ehrlich, Durkheim and Weber yield the feedback loop described
above wherein law relies on norms of social exchange, which in turn rely on law to sustain social
order generally. Thus, the normative context of exchange, the social valences associated with
the provisions of agreements, and interpretations of law are all part of this critical interplay in
which emergent contracts are the legal representation of the interaction. This notion is
encapsulated in Abram Chayes's influential work, The Modem Corporation and the Rule of
Law, (1959) in social theoretical insights of how each person makes the law when he or she
writes a contract, and in the idea that the law is not about proscriptions, but about individually
crafted prescriptions (See also Friedman and Macaulay 1977).5 Because the way that parties to a
contract interpret their agreements has the capacity to affect the law, the "disposition over legally
guaranteed powers of control," and a host of other socially relevant measures, trust or faith in
the enforceability of contract is required for the feedback loop to be perpetuated.
This feedback loop-involving norms of exchange, interpretation of law, law "on the books" and
contract-begs the question of which element is in control of the loop. Macaulay (1963)
demonstrated that terms contained in negotiated, arms-length business contracts among
sophisticated and knowledgeable actors are often eclipsed by the norms of interaction. These
actors' interpretations of how business is to be conducted dictated how they behaved more so
than the written terms in contracts they had entered (see also, Gilmore 1974). Available
contractual remedies were foregone, and extra-contractual responses, including penalties for
breach, were negotiated and accepted in spite of pre-existing written agreements purporting to
dictate otherwise. These observations lead to the provocative Realist assertion that "contract is
dead" (Gilmore 1974; Hillman 1988). However, this assertion and its associated scholarship, do
not begin to fully explain the effects of this alleged death on contracting parties, and the
conditions under which these important norms and interpretations vary systematically. This
research seeks to pick up this very set of questions.
A. Variation in Malleable Consent
Depending on one's theoretical assumptions, it could be either expected or quite counter-
intuitive that actors vary in the way they construe the enforceability of agreements into which
they have entered. It may be expected for those who posit that law is a differentiated resource
(Ewick and Silbey 1998; Kritzer and Silbey 2003; Nonet and Selznick 1978). If form-adhesive
agreements are interpreted and experienced in the same way that other legal things are, it follows
that variation exists here as it does in contexts like the civil and criminal justice systems (Cover
1986; Kritzer and Silbey 2003; Moore 1973; Younts and Mueller 2001). Some could view
contract, regardless of adhesiveness orform-ness, as a set of moral obligations. In this instance,
5 Noting that "the source of law is said to lie in the will of the people. .... [T]he structure of the legal
system itself-the way in which 'custom' or 'public opinion' is translated into 'law'-is itself an
important factor ... ." p. 577-78.
the morality of agreement drives perceived enforceability and trumps other concerns like
fairness, instrumental cost-benefit calculations, or even legality. However, it is just as easy to
imagine how a different configuration of priorities could lead to regarding the same form
contract as unenforceable. Variation may therefore also be expected for those who subscribe to
the view of contract as an embodiment of moral obligations, where one person's morality may
differ greatly from her contractual counterpart's (Barnett 1986; Fried 1981). For some, a "deal's
a deal" trumps "it's not fair that I was forced to sign the waiver in order to receive emergency
medical treatment for my daughter." Lastly, it may be the case that variation in perceived
enforceability is expected for those who believe that resource-dependency dominates the
decision-making process. For instance, if one has to sign a contract in order to receive the
benefit of the bargain, one may very well be acutely aware of one's true resource-dependence on
the party requiring his signature. It would be rational and expected to assume that a party who is
able to force one to sign a contract is also quite capable of enforcing its terms.
Variation in perceived enforceability may be counter-intuitive for those who assert that action is
consistently, and almost uniformly, rationally self-interested, as is often the case in economic
models of behavior. In such models, people sign because it is in their interests. They prefer to
receive the benefit of the bargain and incur the costs of signing the agreement, because the
benefits less the costs are assumedly preferred to incurring the opportunity cost of foregoing the
benefit of the bargain. In the employment context, new hires are in a honeymoon period and
could not imagine having to sue their employers for being illegally fired or harassed. They
therefore view the costs of signing away their right to sue their new employers in court as either
extremely low or nonexistent. Why not give away a right if the likelihood of needing it is so
low? Down the road, when signers want to do something the terms of the agreement prohibit,
actors are assumed to regard the contract as unenforceable, proportional with their expected
utility of seeking escape from the contract less the perceived costs of seeking escape. This is
most often the case in economic analyses of behavior around contract (Hylton 2000; Plaut 1986).
Similarly, those who study law with regard to norms of exchange often laud the law as
supporting shared, uniform and socially accepted institutional rules as a reflection of public
opinion (Friedman 1959; Habermas 1987). For instance, Jilrgen Habermas notes that the law
allows actors to relate to each other as agents predictably because of a shared understanding of
legal obligation and responsibility, thereby removing a heavy organizational burden from
communicative skills.6  Variability of subjective contractual enforceability yields less
predictability and increased social discord. This part of the dissertation offers preliminary
evidence of this lack of uniformity, contending that actors vary in the degree to which they
regard the enforceability of terms, even when the terms are constant and against their interests.
B. The Relationship Between Form-Adhesive Agreements and Malleable Consent
Form-adhesive agreements are not new. In fact, writing in 1936, Ehrlich observed that "[m]ost
written contracts are drawn up according to printed forms, the content of which often is not made
known to the parties, for it is determined by society quite independently of their individual wills"
(p. 49). Form agreements were and continue to be justified byproducts of a bureaucratic,
industrialized society. Many judges and scholars initially viewed such forms as innocuous
conveniences-as the way to lubricate economic exchange given the unavoidable impersonal
nature of daily interactions. As Weber noted, "forms are necessary only to the extent that they
are prescribed for reasons of expediency, especially for the sake of the unambiguous
demonstrability of rights, and thus of legal security" (1954 p. 125). He believed, however, that
the expanse of their use would be determined by property rights and power. In fact, he theorized
that the very tenet of "contractual freedom," and courts' desire to avoid substantive analysis of
"fair deals," would result in institutionally legitimated and routinized power by the few over
others.7
The nascent evolution of the notion of malleable consent is traceable even in court opinions in
which boilerplate was sought to be enforced. In 1960, the Supreme Court of New Jersey heard
the case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. in which a car buyer sued the automobile
manufacturer for consequential damages allegedly resulting from a defective steering mechanism
6 "This is true of cases where the law serves as a means for organizing media-controlled subsystems that
have, in any case, become autonomous in relation to the normative contexts of action oriented by mutual
understanding." p. 365.
7 "The result of contractual freedom, then, is in the first place the opening of the opportunity to use, by the
clever utilization of property ownership in the market, these resources without legal restraints as a means
for the achievement of power over others." p. 189.
(1960 : 73, 75). The car maker argued that the buyer waived his right to sue for such damages
when he signed the contract containing a waiver of damages clause in the fine print. The court
ruled that the waiver did not apply:
The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of parties who are brought
together by the play of the market, and who meet each other on a footing of
approximate economic equality. In such a society there is no danger that freedom of
contract will be a threat to the social order as a whole. But in present-day
commercial life the standardized mass contract has appeared. It is used primarily by
enterprises with strong bargaining power and position. (p. 86).
The court's implied and uncanny prediction that the rise of the form-adhesive agreement would
upset the "social order as a whole" is particularly emblematic of the suggested scope and effect
of this research. Specifically, this work speculates that the more we enter into form-adhesive
agreements, the more our collective notion of contract becomes watered-down. With the
degradation of this bedrock on which our economic system is based, I forecasted major
instability in industries predicated on boilerplate contracts, like the mortgage lending industry.
Form mortgages are the norm, and because people have numbed to contracts that appear similar
and innocuous, this part of the dissertation speculates that many sign these agreements with
greater malleable consent than they should have for such contracts. A mortgage form may look
like the same form legalese as the "Terms & Conditions" that a cell-phone service provider sends
to its customers in the mail, but they are not. Greater perceived unenforceability on a mass scale
can have dire economic consequences if and when the drafting organizations seek enforcement
of terms that individual signers regarded incorrectly as mere invitations to negotiate just as
individuals might with more innocuous form agreements like the cell-phone service Terms &
Conditions or other commonly encountered forms. The greater the societal level of malleable
consent, the less trust there is in the rule of law. Less trust in the rule of law yields increased
resort to non-institutional, extra-legal forms of coercive power and other negative outcomes. 8
8 This logical progression is somewhat analogous to arguments about other pervasive social phenomena in
that it is easy to believe but hard to prove. For instance, it may be easy to believe that pervasive
depictions of violence in music, television, video games and on the Internet has some deleterious impact
on social action. This notion, however, is difficult to prove, in part because of the extent to which the
phenomenon exists.
Lastly, it is worth noting two additional notions that may be applicable when addressing
individual behavior around form adhesive agreements. The first comes from the literature on the
phenomenon known as "escalation of commitment" (Brockner 1992; Staw 1976; 1981; Staw and
Ross 1987). Part of this research has demonstrated that the less often or less actively actors
participate in a negotiation process, the less buy-in the actors are likely to feel to the terms of the
agreement (Bobocel and Meyer 1994: 360-61; Fisher, Ury and Patton 1991: 27-28; Walton and
McKersie 1965: 149-150). It follows that actors who do not participate at all in the process of
creating an agreement have no control over the terms or the process by which the parties bind
themselves (this is the definition of form-adhesive agreements). In most cases, these actors have
no personal connection with the party that created the agreement, and are more likely not to
accept the agreement as compared to actors for whom such conditions do not exist. It is possible
then, that such micro-level experiences also yield greater collective belief that such agreements
are unenforceable against them.
A second notion comes from an observation frequently noted in the legal scholarship on
boilerplate. People tend not to read the form-adhesive agreements they sign. As many argue,
this is rational behavior for a number of reasons (Eisenberg 1995: 241-42; Hillman and
Rachlinski 2002: 446-47). If signers do not read the terms at the time of consent, they would
have no opportunity to know (or care) whether the provisions are enforceable against them.
Later, when they learn that the terms exist, they can either accept that the entity that coerced
them to sign is legally entitled to use the form-adhesive agreement to the coercing entity's
advantage (it is enforceable), or they can believe that the law protects them, the individual, from
such unfair behavior (it is unenforceable). Thus, the fact that actors tend not to read or care what
it is that they sign is likely to produce ex-post differentiation in the perception of the agreements'
enforceability.
C. Malleable Consent and Law as Coercive Power
If law is a means of social control, as many argue it is, (see, e.g.: Black 1983; Fuller 1975; Pound
1942: 18-20), then form-adhesive agreements offer an appealing and convenient way for
institutions that draw from the well of institutionalized (legal) power to exert greater control. In
this sense, malleable consent can be a useful measure of the popular response to this
institutionalized form of control.
Institutions rely on form-adhesive agreements to protect their rights and interests often to the
detriment, exclusion or waiver of individuals' rights and interests (examples are waivers, penalty
clauses, etc.). Such contracts are a powerful and subtle form of social control through the
appearance of the law. Signing a form-adhesive agreement could mean either that pre-existing
individual rights and interests are canceled out or waived (the right to a jury trial, for instance),
or that future benefits are promised to be given by the individual to the institution usually upon
the occurrence of a described event (i.e. in credit card user agreements, agreeing to pay a penalty
for late payments). Institutions too could be said to vary in their malleable consent; they
selectively enforce form-adhesive agreements against individuals in much the same way that
laws are made and enforced against individuals. Numerous historical accounts exist of powerful
actors creating rules to selectively enforce them against the less powerful (Chambliss 1964; Hall
1952; Thompson 1975). It should not be surprising then that this process is replicated through
form-adhesive agreements. That is, institutions create forms in the first place to demonstrate
uniform treatment, and then permit individuals to escape from the oppressive waivers in a
demonstration of institutional leniency and good will (Hay 1980: 48-54; Thompson 1975: 265;
Vogel 1999: 162-66, 168-69).
The footnoted references cited above in support of the proposition that institutions create forms
to demonstrate uniform treatment and subsequently permit variable leniency are Thompson's
(1975) account of the Black Acts and Jerome Hall's (1952) account of the laws of property and
theft. These may be read as accounts of institutional renditions of malleable consent. Put
another way, individuals replicate what institutions do when contracts (which are embodiments
of state-institutional coercive authority and power) purport to bind them to action or inaction, in
ways inconsistent with their interests. The essential difference is not in the process, but in the
outcomes.
The frequently cited Carrier's Case, discussed in Jerome Hall's important work on the history of
theft, offers a perfect example of the sequence by which powerful social actors (wealthy,
property-rich elite) exhibit the institutional equivalent of malleable consent. In 1473, before
specific laws of theft were established to protect property, influential property-owners first tried
to adjust existing laws to comport with their interests as their needs and interests were not within
the intention or existing interpretations of established laws. In the Carrier's Case, existing law
suggested that goods not delivered as contracted were not "stolen" because through the act of
bailment, the carrier had established temporary property rights over the goods. When these
conventional understandings of bailment, property and theft proved problematic in a world of
increasing commercial exchange, the merchants and their lawyers strained to substantively
interpret the law to comport, in this case, via the idea of "breaking bulk," or opening the bails.
When that proved too difficult because the rules were insufficiently flexible to suit their needs,
new laws- whose letter comported directly with the merchants' and the King's commercial
interests, resulting in more harmonious accord for those compelled to be in compliance with the
law-were concocted. The transformed laws were then more easily relied upon to induce social
actors to comply therewith, resulting in more security for the already more powerful actors'
interests and wealth.
Following the same pattern, when individuals are faced with contracts that bind them in ways
they do not wish to be bound, first, they may alter their expectations of what the contracts
contain, either electing to ignore the agreements entirely, or to develop beliefs about their
contents not based on careful readings but on normative expectations. This is supported by the
data presented in this portion of the dissertation-only three out of thirty-seven subjects knew
that they signed an agreement binding them to resolve all employment disputes by arbitration in
lieu of adjudication. It is also supported by existing scholarship on reactions to boilerplate
(Eisenberg 1995: 240-44; Hillman and Rachlinski 2002: 446-54). Following this, actors may
strain to interpret existing agreements in substantive ways that differ from their apparent
intention, arguing that the way others must regard these things differs from what the contract
terms (institutional actor claims) purport to do. It is in this step that we may see actors'
expectations about the norms of exchange more saliently predicting variation in action-some
expect that their credit card late fees will be waived if they call and ask their lender to do so,
while others do not expect that this would happen, and pay the fine. The variation in malleable
consent documented in this Article supports the occurrence of this reaction.
The last step is perhaps the most interesting, for those on the receiving end of form-adhesive
agreements are axiomatically not the authoritative, powerful authors of the contracts empowered
to alter the terms of the agreements. So, how do less powerful social actors react to form-
adhesive agreements? What effect does exposure (for some, prolonged exposure) to these
agreements have on these individuals?
Individuals may respond in four non-mutually exclusive ways. First, exposure to form-adhesive
agreements may have no effect. That is, some individuals may sign these agreements and not
care whether their rights are affected or how. They could tolerate or accept the invasiveness of
the agreements and remain otherwise loyal to the organization(s) making them sign. Indeed, a
portion of the participants observed appear to fall into this category, at least in the short-run.
Second, actors could express "voice" about the agreements-complaining either to the
organizations themselves, or more likely, in public venues. No substantial evidence of "voice"
emerged in this study, but this does not mean that it is not a plausible or viable response. In fact,
evidence of voice in response to form-adhesive agreements exists in other settings (Sullivan
2007: 8-10).9 Third, they could "exit"-that is, refuse to sign the relevant forms, or find creative
ways of opting out, by actually refusing to sign, editing the document before signing, or
otherwise avoiding such exchanges. One could regard the existence of malleable consent itself
as evidence in support of this response. The act of mentally excusing oneself from an otherwise
binding contract (that one has indisputably signed without duress or fraud) is a creative way to
"exit" from the reality of an unpleasant situation.
Lastly, actors could seek retribution specifically against the organization that made them sign, or
more generally, against the institution requiring signatures on form-adhesive agreements,
9 See, also Posting of Angela Canterbury to Watchdog Blog,
http://citizen.typepad.com/watchdog_blog/2007/07/protect-your-ri.html (Jul. 13, 2007, 11:38 EST)
(explaining rights of Comcast customers to opt out of an "unfair and stealthy" arbitration agreement); The
Small Print Project, http://smallprint.netzoo.net/reag/l (last visited Sept. 11, 2008) (encouraging awareness
of form-adhesive agreements and compelling individuals to create their own boilerplate and to sneak it
into correspondence with institutions that force such agreements upon individuals).
embodied, perhaps, by large, well-known firms such as internet service providers and media
conglomerates. Examples of such exercises of coercive, punitive power might include neglect of
duties or other counterproductive work behavior if directed at a specific organization, or more
generally, increased disrespect for institutions' intellectual or material property rights. In the
literature on sociology of law and sociology of work, such a response is referred to as
"resistance" (Ewick and Silbey 2003; Garth and Sarat 1998; Hodgson 2005; Merry 1990).
This work does not offer evidence of the hypothesized general retributional response. That is,
no evidence is presented in support of the theory that those who feel bound by terms of form-
adhesive agreements (or those who do not feel that circumnavigation of such terms is an option)
are more likely to take negative, reciprocal action against other organizations by doing things
like stealing from them or disrespecting their intellectual property rights. However, in a second
study conducted of malleable consent in MBAs, preliminary evidence was uncovered in support
of the connection between views about enforceability of form-adhesive agreements and respect
for organizations' intellectual property rights. Specifically, MBA students (n=132) who said
they are "not bound by [terms in form agreements they have signed] because [they] don't have a
choice in signing" or who said they are "not bound by such terms because practically speaking,
it's usually the case that one can negotiate his/her way out of them" were significantly (p=.002)
more likely to agree or strongly agree that "acquiring music, movies or software (sold for a fee)
without paying for them is acceptable because [they] don't feel obligated to the organizations
that sell these things." Conversely, MBAs who said that they are always bound by form-
adhesive agreements or that they are bound by such terms because "practically speaking, an
individual is not as powerful as an institution," were significantly (p=.04) more likely to disagree
or strongly disagree with that statement.
Similarly, this work presents no direct evidence of specific retributional action taken against the
entity promulgating the form-adhesive agreements. It is unclear whether the subjects who
expressed the view that the form agreements they signed were not enforceable against them (high
malleable consent) actually exercised coercive power against their employer at a greater rate than
those who expressed the view that the form agreements were enforceable against them (low
malleable consent). However, the current study does present preliminary evidence of the
connection between malleable consent and what subjects reported they would do. Specifically,
actors who expressed the view that form-adhesive agreements they signed were not enforceable
against them (high malleable consent) were more likely to express views consistent with the
notion of the employment relationship as "transactional"-that is, as merely a market exchange,
devoid of loyalty or commitment.
Therefore this part of the dissertation first argues that studying interpretations of enforceability
of agreements as a construct in itself is worthwhile because such perceptions are useful to
understanding a contextualized form of legal consciousness, as well as trust in the state and other
regulatory institutions. The next part systematically examines the construct in an applied
context, first using malleable consent as an intervening variable to reveal otherwise obfuscated
interpretations of law across different socio-economic groups, and second as an independent
variable predicting employees' conception of their employment relationship as transactional or
relational.
Hypotheses
A. Malleable Consent and Differences Across Socio-Economic Status
As Richard Ely remarked, "[w]hen economic forces make possible oppression and deprivation of
liberty, oppression and deprivation of liberty express themselves in contract." (Kaufman 2003:
8). The literature on law as a differentiated resource posits that perceptions of law will be
different across socio-economic status groups such that higher SES actors will feel less
"oppressed" and "deprived of liberty" than lower SES actors. If this is the case, interpretations
of enforceability of form-adhesive agreements should reflect this distinction, revealing how
unlevel the playing field is, regardless of its appearance to the contrary. Put differently,
everyone has to sign these forms, but higher SES actors likely feel less bound by them than
lower SES actors. This leads to the first hypothesis:
(HI) Higher SES actors (those with greater educational attainment and more job
alternatives with lower dependence on their employers) are more likely to regard
form-adhesive agreements they have signed as unenforceable than lower SES
actors (those with lower educational attainment, fewer job alternatives and hence
greater dependence on their employers).
In other words, higher SES actors should exhibit more malleable consent and lower SES subjects
should exhibit less malleable consent. If supported, this hypothesis would strengthen the notion
that different social groups hold different views about law relative to their ability to
circumnavigate a contract purporting to bind them to terms contra their interests. Previous
research on legal consciousness has demonstrated that those who regard law as more
accessible-as a sword wieldable on their behalf-are often better-educated, with higher paying
jobs, and greater socio-economic status generally (Black 1983: 1-10, 34, 41-42; Ehrlich 1936).
Such individuals are represented by the MBA subjects in the second study reported in this work.
Those who regard law as a shield, protecting organizations from the ineffective slings and arrows
wielded by individuals, are often less educated, with lower paying jobs, and lower socio-
economic status generally. This group is represented by the employees in the first study reported
below. If malleable consent is a useful concept for understanding legal consciousness (derivative
of institutional-legal faith or fear), it should reflect this dichotomy.
B. Transactional-Relational Scaled Responses to Conflict
The formal right of a worker to enter into any contract whatsoever with any
employer whatsoever does not in practice represent for the employment seeker even
the slightest freedom in the determination of his own conditions of work, and it does
not guarantee him any influence on this process (Weber 1954: 188).
The next step is to explore the relationship between interpretations of enforceability (malleable
consent) and the way in which individuals exchange with the organizations requiring them to
sign these agreements. This was accomplished by developing a transactional-relational scale
based on Ian Macneil's (1985) influential work. Existing research shows important differences
between employees who view exchanges as relational and those who view exchanges as
transactional. Employees who view their relationship as "transactional" tend to regard the
employment exchange as primarily one of specific monetizable exchanges (pay for attendance)
over a specific time period (See, e.g.: Cavanaugh and Noe 1999; Rousseau 1990). Such a
transactional perspective focuses on the essential exchange of pay (high pay, merit pay and
advancement, for instance) for work, to the exclusion of other typically longer-term elements
(Robinson, Kraatz and Rousseau 1994). In contrast, those who view their employment as a
"relational" exchange have open-ended agreements to establish and maintain a relationship
involving non-monetizable elements like trust, loyalty, job security, career development, and
support with personal problems (Morrison and Robinson 1997; Rousseau and Parks 1993). In
"relationally-governed exchanges . . . enforcement of obligations, promises and expectations
occur[s] through . . . norms of flexibility, solidarity, and information exchange" (Poppo and
Zenger 2002: 710). This is not the case for transactionally-governed exchanges (Rousseau 1989;
Rousseau and Parks 1993).
One way to observe whether employees view their employment exchanges as transactional or
relational is to observe their responses to workplace conflicts of varying severity. Relational-
view employees tend to respond to conflicts at work with more loyalty, and less exit and neglect
(Coyle-Shapiro 2002; Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler 2000; Turnley and Feldman 1999). They are
more likely to resort to "voice" (Farrell 1983: 597-98; Hirschman 1970) and to afford their
employers the opportunity to restore order when problems arise, resorting to internal
organizational outlets such as human resources departments, instead of external ones like
lawyers or governmental agencies. On the other hand, transactional-view employees are more
likely to go outside of the organization, either exiting more quickly in response to conflicts, or
resorting to external means of redress. Similarly, research has found that psychological contract
breach has a greater negative impact in terms of decreased job satisfaction, role performance and
organizational citizenship behavior on relational-minded employees (Robinson 1996; Robinson
and Rousseau 1994; Turnley and Feldman 2000).
Table 1 depicts four types of common employment disputes and their associated predicted
transactional and relational views. The disputes range from mild to severe forms of breach of
psychological expectations-the first one involves the breach of the obligation to provide a
workplace free of co-worker to co-worker disputes; the second, the breach of the obligation to
comply with internal company rules about fairness of treatment; the third, a breach of the
obligation of the organization to comply with external legal constraints; and the fourth, a breach
of the obligation to provide fair treatment and to comply with external legal constraints with the
ultimate negative consequence of unilateral termination of the employment relationship.
Table 1: Transactional-relational comparative responses to employment conflicts
Type of Dispute Responses
Transactional Relational
4 Legal Dispute Pursue legal remedies Give Company a chance to correct the wrong
between against organization and restore the relationship
Individual &
Organization
(Unilateral
termination of
relationship)
Previous scholarship has mostly, if not all, but ignored interpretations of the law and,
specifically, the written contracts employees have signed in assessing how employees view this
exchange relationship and in predicting how transactionally or relationally they view their
employment relationships. In fact, at least one paper claimed that "formal stipulations
employers . . . contribute only slightly to general perceptions of contractual obligations"
(Rousseau 1990: 397). This portion of the dissertation tests the relationship between
interpretations of enforceability of contract and the transactional-relational scaled view of work.
The concept of malleable consent in the employment context is a function of how much
perceived (not actual) flexibility there is in a binding agreement one has signed that purportedly
limits legal remedial power against an employer. Subjects who view work transactionally are
more likely to care whether there is such flexibility, and are therefore more likely to report the
belief that such elasticity exists, because they are the ones most likely to resort to non-relational
responses described in Table 1. Conversely, subjects who regard the employment relationship as
more relationally oriented, are less likely to express concern about their ability to escape a clause
limiting their rights to sue their employers because (1) relationally-minded employees prefer to
exchange relationally instead of litigiously, (2) they do not believe that the formal, written
contract dominates their employment exchange anyway, and (3) to the extent that such subjects
believe that the formal written contract controls their employment relationship, they are more
likely to trust their employers to treat them fairly in the long run.
Thus, the second hypothesis emerges:
(H2) An inverse relationship exists between a relational view of exchange
and malleable consent.
This means that the more one regards his employment relationship as "relational," (and is thus
willing to trade loyalty and commitment for a promise of some future benefit such as fair
treatment, job security, etc.), the more likely one is to express the belief that the form-adhesive
agreement he signed as a condition of employment is enforceable against him. Conversely, the
more one regards his employment relationship as "transactional," the more likely one is to
express the belief that the form-adhesive agreement he signed is unenforceable against him. Put
differently, the current study presents preliminary evidence of the connection between malleable
consent and what subjects reported they would do in these conflict scenarios. Specifically, actors
who expressed the view that the form-adhesive agreement they signed were not enforceable
against them (high malleable consent) were more likely to express views consistent with the
notion of the employment relationship as "transactional"-that is, as merely a market exchange,
devoid of loyalty or commitment.
For instance, Subject 14, a forty-five-year-old African-American woman who had been working
for her current employer for over three years, reported that the form-adhesive agreement she
signed was "just a bunch of you-know .... " She reported further that, "I think they'd try to
enforce it, but basically, the way things are now, you can get a good lawyer, and they can get
around anything." This is an expression of high malleable consent because it is her opinion that
a contract into which she entered admittedly free of duress or fraud is nonetheless unenforceable
against her. She expressed a correspondingly high transactional view of work, demonstrated by
the consistent theme in her predictions of how she would respond to hypothetical workplace
conflicts. For instance, she would not trust management to resolve a hypothetical interpersonal
dispute between her and a co-worker, opting instead to handle the situation on her own. She
would not come in on her day off if requested to do so, saying, "I would just be like, 'I'm sorry, I
already made plans."' If she were sexually harassed, she reported that she would tell
management, "I guess you 're going to fire me, and I guess I'm going to consult my lawyer,"
without affording the organization an opportunity to address the situation. If she were
wrongfully terminated, she would 'find an attorney" without hesitation. In sum, her responses to
hypothetical conflicts at work evidence a tendency to view her exchange with her employer as
transactional, not relational, and with a corresponding high degree of malleable consent.
Methods
A. Study 1: "InnoTech" (Low Socio-Economic Status Sample)
The construct of malleable consent emerged from an inductive field study of a sample of thirty-
seven current employees ("sales associates") of a national electronics retailer (herein referred to
as "InnoTech," a pseudonym) in twelve locations in Southern California. InnoTech was selected
for study because of its policy requiring its sales associates to sign a mandatory arbitration
agreement upon hire. The locations were randomly chosen from a pool of thirty stores within a
forty-mile geographic proximity to one another. Informants were approached outside the retail
shops on their breaks, or before or after their shifts. Informants were offered five-dollar gift
cards for their participation in the study and were informed that all information provided would
be anonymous and confidential. To protect participants' anonymity, no personally identifying
information was gathered other than subjects' voices that were recorded upon receipt of consent.
Data gathered also consisted of the author's field notes of observations and unrecorded
conversations.
Informants were 84% men, with a mean age of 27 years10 and an average organizational tenure
of 21 months. 1 The median duration of employment was 14 months. Subjects were 51% white,
19% black, 19% Hispanic and 11% other. Based on observation of sales personnel in each
location, this sample closely approximated the population of sales associates employed in the
geographical region sampled.
Subjects were asked about their alternative job opportunities, work experience, education,
training on and off the job, what they signed when they started their jobs, how fairly they thought
their employer treated them overall, and whether they considered their current employment
situation a "job" or a "career." Only 19% (seven respondents) reported that this work was a
career. 12 Fifty-four percent of the participants reported having access to lawyers. The mean
rating of InnoTech's "overall fairness" of treatment on a 5-point Likert scale was 3.7.13 Based
on the researcher's observation of sales personnel in each location, this sample closely
0o Standard deviation = 5.12 years.
1 Standard deviation = 21 months.
12 Not surprisingly, this view correlates positively and significantly with job tenure (.338; p = .04).
13 Standard deviation = .91. The correlation between reported fair treatment by the organization and
subjects being black is, somewhat shockingly, highly negative and highly significant (-.596; p = .0001),
as was the correlation between subjects' age and fairness ratings (-.408; p = .001), indicating that older
and/or black workers reported significantly worse overall fair treatment.
approximated the population of sales associates employed in the geographical region sampled.
Table 2 is a correlation matrix of the salient descriptive demographic attributes of the sample.
Table 2: Correlation table of InnoTech respondents' demographic attributes
1.* 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1. Female
2. Black .162
3. Hispanic .162 -.065
4. Other -.153 -.048 -.048
5. Age .397*** .165 .070 -.019
6. Tenure .010 -.057 .193 -.040 .393***
7. Career' -.025 -.233 .120 .276* .056 .338**
8. Lawyer 2  .047 -.115 .113 -.211 -.267 -.148 .029
9. Fair 3 -.168 -.596*** -.018 .029 -.408*** -.205 .137 0
Note: ***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level.
* Numbers across the row correspond with variables down the first column: 1.=Female,
2=Black, etc.
1 This variable is an indicator variable coded "1" if subjects said that their current employment
was "career" as opposed to a "job."
2 This variable is coded "1" if subjects reported knowing a lawyer, and "0" otherwise.
3 This variable is a 5-point Likert-style rating of the overall fairness of treatment.
According to the subjects, they are highly substitutable; their jobs require little if any training.
Several subjects complained about the high rate of turn-over among associates. Additionally,
InnoTech subjects generally expressed the notion that their jobs are the "best they can get" and
that alternative work is not readily available. Almost all subjects completed one or two years of
college, having mostly attended local community college and dropped out either to join the
workforce or to have children. Other subjects were still attending college at the time of the
interviews. For these reasons, this sample was considered to have uniformly lower SES actors
than the MBA sample discussed in greater detail below.
Subjects were also asked about how they would respond to the four vignettes described in Table
3, designed to correspond with the types of disputes set forth in Table 1, in order to examine the
relationship between malleable consent and the transactional-relational view of the employment
exchange.
Table 3: Descriptions of vianettes
Subjects' coded responses to the four vignettes formed the bases for a scaled transactional-
relational measure. The more subjects responded in ways consistent with a relational view, the
higher they scored on the scale. The fewer relational points, the less relationally they were
estimated to view their work relationship. Subjects with zero points (who had exhibited no
relationally coded responses) were considered purely transactional. The six coded variables used
for the scale and their distribution across the two studies are listed in Table 4.
Table 4: Comparison of relational scale components across studies
Variable Name InnoTech MBAs Welch Diff of Means Test
Hypl_manager_only 60% 3.51% p <.001
Hypl_selfhelp 17.14% 4.39% p <.06
(rev. coded)
Hyp2_show_up 30.56% 60.23% p <.05
Hyp2_sub/alt 8.33% 25.69% p <.05
Hyp3_citizen 48.65% 33.04% p <.10
Hyp4_HR 39.39% 11.93% p < .05
Figure 1 below depicts the distribution of transactional-relational scores across the two studies.
Polychoric principle component analysis (PCA) and factor analysis each sufficiently confirms
the internal validity of the scale when the variables "Hypl_selfhelp" and "Hyp2_sub/alt" are
excluded. 14 Including these two variables renders the internal validation methodologically
problematic. 15 However, the two variables are included in the model because of their strong
facial validity and the fact that the results reported herein remain robust whether the two
variables are included or not.
14 Polychoric PCA of the 4-elements scale demonstrates ample support for scalar convergence on a single
element. The eigenvalue of the primary element is 1.85. The difference between this eigenvalue and the
next closest is 1.05. This result was replicated with factor analysis (principle eigenvalue = .56, with
difference between that and next closest as .62) for those uncomfortable with PCA, although it is the
author's opinion that PCA is the more appropriate tool for this analysis.
15 This is because the two variables excluded from the full model ("Hypl_self help" and "Hyp2_sub/alt")
are each mostly or entirely orthogonal to the included measures of responses to the respective vignettes
("Hypl manager only" from first vignette and "Hyp2_showup" from second). For instance, 98% of
subjects who said they would show up in response to the second vignette ("Hyp2_showup" = 1) did not
suggest that they would also try to find a substitute or alternative ("Hyp2 sub/alt" = 0). This makes
logical sense in the same way that it makes sense that those who said that they would take matters into
their own hands in response to the first vignette ("Hypl_self help" = 1) did not say that they would
exclusively report the matter to their manager ("Hypl_manageronly" = 0).
Figure 1: Transactional-relational scale scores (InnoTech: n=37; MBAs: n=114)
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The first variable, "Hypl_manager_only," is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) for subjects who
responded to the first vignette (an interpersonal dispute between co-workers) by saying that they
would bring the matter to the attention of their manager before or without addressing the
offending co-worker themselves. This action is consistent with the relational view because it
demonstrates a willingness to trust management with the resolution of non-legal disputes without
first attempting to resolve the matter on one's own. While the difference between subjects who
exclusively reported the issue to management and those who confronted the offending subject
first and then reported to management may not appear significant, using this measure offers a
more conservative and clearer divide between subjects. In other words, those who exclusively
trusted management with this situation are incrementally more relational than those who
attempted to resolve the situation on their own first.
The second variable, "Hyp l_self_help," is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) if subjects responded to the
first vignette by taking matters into their own hands, often literally threatening to resolve the
situation with violence or other means of self-help. It could also be considered "revenge" as it is
in other research (Aquino, Bies and Tripp 2001). This response is inconsistent with the
relational view because it demonstrates subjects' belief that they cannot rely on the organization
to resolve an interpersonal dispute. This variable is reverse-coded for the relational scale.
Similarly, subjects were considered more relational if they said that they would show up to work
in response to the second vignette (for example, they are scheduled for a day off, they have plans
with family or friends, but they are asked to come in anyway). The third variable,
"Hyp2_showup," is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) for subjects who said that they would show up to
work on a day they had scheduled off but were required to come in anyway. This is perhaps the
clearest and most traditional measure of a relational exchange view of work while the
employment relationship is intact. Specifically, these subjects are more likely to view the
exchange as ongoing and one in which loyalty is traded for security (or other measures).
The fourth variable, "Hyp2_sub/alt," is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) if subjects responded to the
second vignette by proposing that they secure a substitute for the work or suggesting that they
find an alternative way of accomplishing the work. Again, this measure is a fairly clear
demonstration of a relational view as opposed to a transactional view of work because it
indicates subjects' desire to exchange the above-and-beyond task of finding a way to accomplish
the organization's goals in exchange for some future hard-to-quantify measure like security.
The fifth variable composing the transactional-relational scale is "Hyp3_citizen." This variable
is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) for subjects who responded to the third vignette (they are sexually
harassed by a supervisor) by bringing the matter to the attention of Human Resources without
threatening to bring a lawsuit or contact an attorney. Again, this is classic organizational
citizenship behavior, and indicative of a relational view of work.
The sixth and final variable included in the full scale is "Hyp4_HR," which is coded 1 (and
otherwise 0) when subjects reported giving the organization a second chance even after their
employment was terminated for unlawful reasons described in the fourth vignette ("your
employment is terminated because of your gender, race, national origin or religion"). Subjects
who sought to appeal their termination within the firm were coded as incrementally more
relational than those who did not.
1. What Subjects Thought They Signed
Toward the conclusion of each interview, subjects were shown a copy of the actual mandatory
arbitration agreement that InnoTech requires all sales associates to sign and were asked to
identify the document. Most subjects positively identified the document as one that they had to
sign on their day of hire. The researcher then explained the clause in the arbitration agreement to
the subjects. Specifically, subjects were told that, if signers of the agreement wished to go to
court to sue the employer, this agreement purportedly prevented them from doing so (either
during the employment relationship or after it ended), requiring them instead to resort to
arbitration to resolve any and all disputes, even ones like those discussed earlier in the interview,
including the third and fourth vignettes. Subjects were asked if they were to try to bring a
lawsuit against InnoTech, whether InnoTech could in fact compel them to divert their claims to
arbitration instead of court as the document purports. Responses to this question formed the
basis for the measure of subjects' malleable consent.
Thirty-six of the thirty-seven subjects remembered signing something when they started their
jobs at InnoTech. Thirty-one of the thirty-six (86%) articulated what they remembered signing. 16
Sixty-nine percent mentioned signing something innocuous like tax forms or generic paperwork.
For instance, Subject 2 reported, ". . .just a lot of documents, you know, making sure that I'm
telling the truth about who I am and my person and everything. W-2 forms, that's about all I can
remember." Subject 7 reported, "All the tax forms, I think it was just the tax forms, yeah, they
made you fill out a whole bunch of stuff like name and address, we watched a bunch of videos,
like learning on the computers, we call it 'e-learning,' that's pretty much it." Another typical
16 Tenure on the job had no statistically significant relation to the ability to recall or the willingness to
report what the subjects signed (p = .7142), although everyone who had been on the job for less than
seven months (n = 6) was able to describe something about what they signed. The least time on the job of
someone unable to recall what they signed was seven months. Six individuals with the most tenure in the
study, (35, 36(x3), 48 and 120 months) were able to recall and describe what they remembered signing
when they were hired.
response was Subject 28's: "Just the general initial employment forms, like uh ... oh boy, I don't
even remember what they were specifically anymore."
Forty-two percent mentioned having to sign to consent to invasive terms like a drug test, a non-
competition agreement or an "at-will" employment policy. Examples of the second category are
as follows:
"I skimmed through them ... so ... [Do you have any recollection of what they
said?] I know there's a sexual harassment one ... ." (Subj. 2).
"... drug test, and no competition clause, you know, you can't work for any other
[descriptive term deleted] company ... ." (Subj. 3).
"There was a non-competition agreement stating that I would not work at the same
time on any project that [InnoTech] currently offers, there were a couple of other
agreements, mainly, the contract saying that I would work for [InnoTech] and get
paid, but the non-competition agreement is the most important of the multiple
restrictions. [Anything else that you recall?] Basically, like what my duties would
be and stuff like that." (Subj. 10).
"It's like a contract between store and employee. We have to do certain things, and
we have our certain rights, but they can fire us whenever." (Subj. 16).
"Employment,... what do you call it, you know, the whole, they can fire you for
whatever reason . . . the employment sheet. [What's your understanding of that?]
They can fire you for almost whatever reason, pretty much, as long as they have a
valid reason. [They get to fire you? That's what it says?] That's pretty much what
it is." (Subj. 17).
". .. a paper that said that they're an open employer, which means that they can fire
you at any time for any reason, that it was ok to drug test me." (Subj. 21).
"A whole bunch of release papers basically saying that [InnoTech] is not held liable
for a whole bunch of stuff. [Anything else?] Not to my knowledge." (Subj. 33).
Only 17% reported signing either a mandatory arbitration agreement or the waiver of the right to
sue the employer. The following are examples of responses in this last group:
"Tax papers, and arbitration in case of dispute with the company, and later on they
put in some security thing we had to sign for, regarding the work environment and
stuff like that, and insurance papers, that came out later. [The second thing you
mentioned was an arbitration form, do you know what that was?] Yeah, basically,
it's to protect [InnoTech] in case we want to sue them in case anything happens.
Basically, what the arbitration form said was that in case we had any dispute
regarding labor issues or in case there was a wrongful termination lawsuit or
anything like that, we wouldn't go to court, we will have to resort to arbitration, and
arbitration only. [How do you feel about that?] I don't think it's fair. [Why not?] I
don't think it's fair because it's dragging. It's not something you can go in and get
out. It doesn't give you the options of-They're protected regardless, no matter
what. Because if the two parties don't agree, you're stuck in arbitration forever, so
at some point you have to settle--I think they get you over time, because you're
going to get tired of going to arbitration. Because you sign an agreement that says
that you can't go to court, that you have to stay in arbitration. [So, why did you sign
it if you think it's unfair?] Well, I needed a job. Most people do need a job, half the
people don't know what it is, and when you need a job, you say, 'what's the worst
that could happen here?' You know? Worst scenario, I quit. So, you're like, 'ok."'
(Subj. 13).
"[A] don't sue us kind of thing, where, you know, where if, something happens here,
and it's not, it wasn't through workman's comp or anything like that, that I can't sue
them or anything like that. ... If something happened to the point where I either got
hurt and I wanted to pursue it further than workman's comp, that wouldn't be
possible after I signed the proper paperwork to not allow me to ... and then also, if
something else happened, and [InnoTech] took care of it, but I wanted to take it
further, one, they would try to talk me out of it, and two, they'd probably have me
sign something that says I couldn't do it anyways. [And that's OK with you?] Well,
nothing really happens, as long as you keep your nose clean and don't screw with the
girls, you'll be cool." (Subj. 3).
"Basically things that I won't sue them, that I'll go within the company, legal issues,
nothing life threatening, nothing that you wouldn't sign at any other job, nothing
that doesn't protect the company. [What do you mean by, 'protect the company?']
Basically saying, that like, for example, if you have issues with a manager or
something, you're not going to a lawyer and sue the company, you're going to go
within it; there's a word, I can't remember the word now, that you basically do all
legal issues within the company, that, and of course, the 'U word' is more or less
illegal. [What's the U word?] The union. [Did you sign something that said that
you couldn't join a union?] No, but, .. . no .. . but . . there's nothing there that
says that you can join a union, you know. .. ." (Subj. 18).
It may be worth noting the forms that InnoTech actually gives to new hires. It is my
understanding based on information available to the public that in addition to the mandatory
arbitration agreement, InnoTech gives all new hires an I-9 list of acceptable documents (to
confirm an employee's identity), a W-4 form, a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) form
notifying employees that the company may run a background check on them, and a form
notifying employees of InnoTech's drug testing policy (employees are required to consent on
demand). Employees are also required to acknowledge with their signature receipt of
InnoTech's policy forbidding illegal forms of harassment, including but not limited to sexual
harassment. These policies have been in place long enough to cover all respondents in this study
with the possible exception of Subject 23, who has been with the company for ten years.
2. Subjects' Malleability of Consent
Participants were asked to identify the arbitration agreement that, according to the organization,
all employees are required to sign.' 7 Sixty-seven percent of subjects positively identified the
document. This percentage is interesting considering the low number of participants who knew
they had signed an agreement waiving their right to a jury trial, requiring them instead to resolve
all disputes by final and binding arbitration. Thus, most subjects recognized the form they
signed when shown the actual piece of paper, but did not know to what it was they had agreed.
Consistent with the legal realist scholarship exploring the relationship between law as
experienced and law as written, this makes the participants' interpretations of this document an
even more salient predictor of future behavior than the document's terms themselves.
17 After being asked if they recognized InnoTech's arbitration agreement, three provisions of the
agreement were pointed out to them in the text of the document. First, the provision that specifies that
InnoTech and the signer agree to "settle any and all" disputes or controversies arising out of the
employment relationship by "final and binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator;" with the examples
as specified in the form of claims covered, including ones like sexual harassment (vignette three) and
terminations because of race, religion or national origin (vignette four). Second, the provision that states
that the signer understands that if he does file a lawsuit, InnoTech "may use this Agreement in support of
its request to the court to dismiss the lawsuit and require me instead to use arbitration." Third, the
provision that states that signers have three days from the date of signature to notify InnoTech's Human
Resources Department that they have withdrawn their consent to the agreement, but doing so will render
them ineligible for employment with InnoTech.
Participants were then asked to reflect on whether InnoTech could stop them from bringing a
lawsuit and require them instead to bring such claims to arbitration as the document purports.
Their responses were varied, but for the most part, subjects either expressed the belief that they
would be "stuck" with the agreement if they signed it, or that the agreement was unenforceable
even though they signed it. Their responses formed the basis of the subjects' malleable consent.
Thirty-one percent of the subjects expressed the view that the agreement was unenforceable
against them, even if they signed away the right to bring a lawsuit against the company in court.
Their explanations were predominated by the notion that the law protects individuals against
institutions such as InnoTech. They recognized that InnoTech could require them to sign
whatever it desired at the outset of their employment, but that the law, embodied by the
employment-plaintiff's bar, in their view championed for individuals' rights, and would
therefore permit circumnavigation of bothersome contract provisions. The views of those who
formed this group in the InnoTech sample echoed sentiments expressed in Ewick and Silbey's
classic study, The Common Place of Law, in which they characterized responses as perceiving
law as a commodity in which being able to "get" a lawyer or "afford" a good lawyer "exerted a
profound effect on their decisions in regard to disputes and grievances" (Ewick and Silbey 1998:
152-55; Ewick and Silbey 1999). Two exemplary high malleable consent views are as follows:
"I think it's [the agreement] stupid. [Subject laughs.] [Why?] Because
nowadays, you can go around that and still get a lawyer, and still go to trial. [So you
think that the arbitration agreement isn't enforceable?] Yeah, I think it's just a
bunch of you-know. [What makes you think that it's not enforceable?] Well, I
think they'd try to enforce it, but basically, the way things are now, you can get a
good lawyer, and they can get around anything." (Subj. 14).
"Ultimately, you can sign anything you want, but you pay enough for the right
lawyer, and it doesn't matter what you've signed. [Meaning, you don't think it's an
enforceable agreement?] No. [Why not?] It's ... there's always a loophole, there's
always a way, and if you have the money and the time, and you have a lawyer that's
greedy enough and says, 'I'll get a cut of this,' I guarantee you, there's somebody
who is going to find a way to get you out of this agreement." (Subj. 19).
B. Study 2: MBA Students (High Socio-Economic Status Sample)
The second study consisted of 115 students from a prestigious East Coast business school.
Primarily second-year MBA students were asked to complete a larger online survey as part of a
class.1 8  Completing the survey was a requirement in the class, so the response rate was
approximately 100%. Subjects were 62% male; approximately 65% of the subjects were native
English-speakers, and 65% were also partially or fully U.S. nationals. Sixty-one percent
reported having direct access to a lawyer. The mean self-reported score of knowledge and
experience with American law was 2.819 on a 7-point Likert scale where "0" is no knowledge or
experience and "7" is extensive knowledge or experience. The inter-correlations of the
demographic variables are reported in Table 5.
is It is unfortunate that the MBAs were not surveyed on their first jobs-they were all current students, on
the job market and mostly negotiating with employers for their first post-MBA jobs, but not currently
employed. It is uncertain what would change in these data if the MBAs were on their first jobs, but this
limitation is recognized nonetheless.
19 Standard deviation = 1.2.
Table 5: Correlation table of MBAs' descriptive variables
2. 3. 4.
1. Female
2. Native1  .180**
3. Nationality2  .124 .516***
4. Lawyer3  .081 .061 .088
5.Know law4  -.031 .187** .111 .389***
Note: ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10%
level.
* Numbers across the row correspond with variables down the first column: 1.=Female,
2=Native, etc.
'The variable "native" is coded "1" if English was the reported native language and "0"
otherwise.
2This variable is coded "1" for those who listed the United States as their partial or full
nationality, and "0" otherwise.
3This variable is coded "1" for those who did report knowing a lawyer, and "0" otherwise.
4This represents subjects' self-reported assessment of their knowledge and experience with
American law based on a 7-point scale.
Most of these subjects were highly sought after by prestigious firms, and were considering
multiple competing job offers. Without exception, the MBA subjects have greater educational
attainment than the InnoTech subjects, making them less replaceable in their future jobs. The
mean starting salary of the class in which the majority of MBA subjects surveyed was
approximately $84,000 per year. 20 Sixty-seven percent of the MBA class of 2007 went into
service industries, of which consulting (25.3%) and investment banking (17.5%) composed the
greatest shares. Not surprisingly, the most prestigious, high-status employers recruit these
students every year and the students who composed this sample were no exception. For these
reasons, this sample was considered uniformly higher SES actors than the InnoTech sample.
20 This figure is based on the MBA graduates from the class of 2007. Eighty-three percent of this class
obtained jobs in the United States. The mean starting salary of students who worked outside of the
United States was $81,800. These figures are based on information obtained by the author from the
school's career services office.
As part of the online survey, the MBA students were asked to respond to the same four vignettes
as the InnoTech employees by writing their responses in open-ended text boxes. They were also
asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with the following statement, on a 5-point Likert-
style scale:
If I sign a contract with my employer that indicates that in return for being hired, I
agree to waive my right to sue my employer in court, and instead have to resort to a
process called "arbitration" to resolve any and all disputes that arise, that contract is
enforceable, and I would not be allowed to go to court.
The results are displayed in Figure 2. Thirty percent of the MBA subjects exhibited low
malleable consent because they either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. Fifty-one
percent exhibited high malleable consent-that is, they either disagreed or strongly disagreed
with the statement.21 This distribution was replicated in a second study involving 138 MBA
students in which 35% exhibited low malleable consent and 50% exhibited high malleable
consent.22
21 Roughly nineteen percent selected option three, "Neutral or Unable to Decide." These participants
were considered as exhibiting neither high nor low malleable consent.
22 It is also worth noting that the MBA data is used to evaluate the convergent, discriminant and predictive
validity of the construct of malleable consent. As part of the much larger survey that subjects completed,
many psychometric tests were administered measuring such things as emotional intelligence ("EQ"),
Machiavellianism, positive/negative affect, self-esteem, distributive self-interest and the NEO-5 factor
inventory.
Figure 2: Malleable consent of the MBAs (n=114)
Research Findings
A. Malleable Consent and Socio-Economic Status
Hypothesis 1 states that actors with greater educational attainment and more job alternatives that
posses relatively lower dependence on their employers are more likely to regard the form-
adhesive agreements they sign as unenforceable when compared to actors with lower educational
attainment, fewer job alternatives, and greater dependence on their employers. In other words,
InnoTech subjects are more likely to exhibit lower malleable consent than the MBAs. To test
this hypothesis, the mean malleability of consent of the InnoTech subjects is compared with that
of the MBAs. Table 6, depicting the statistically different mean malleable consent scores of the
two samples, demonstrates support for this hypothesis. It appears that the MBA subjects are
more likely than the InnoTech subjects to report that an agreement they signed purporting to
prevent them from suing their employers (resorting instead to arbitration) is unenforceable. The
mean MBA malleable consent score (MC) was .63 (SD = .485) as compared with .31 (SD =
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.467) for the InnoTech sample (where MC of one is equal to the view that the agreement is
unenforceable and MC of zero is equal to the view that it is enforceable).
Table 6: Comparison of malleable consent levels across samples
Welch Test of
InnoTech MBAs Difference of
Means
High 31% 51%
Malleable Low 69% 30%Consent
n 36 92
Mean/std. .305 .630 p=.000
dev.
(.467) (.485)
B. Malleable Consent and the Transactional Versus Relational View of Work
The second hypothesis is that viewing the form agreement as enforceable (low malleable
consent) is associated with an increased likelihood of viewing the employment relationship as
relational. Conversely, expressing the view that the agreement is unenforceable (high malleable
consent) is associated with an increased likelihood of viewing the employment relationship as
transactional. To test this hypothesis, a proportional odds model for ordinal logistic regression
was applied. This appeared to be the most appropriately fitting model. The p value for the Brant
test of the proportionality assumption was .53 for the MBA sample and .01 for the InnoTech
sample. This means that the proportionality assumption is valid for the MBAs but not
necessarily so for the InnoTech subjects. The most likely reason for this is the relatively small
InnoTech sample size (Brant 1990). It is unlikely to be cause for concern given the construction
of the transactional-relational scale. Additionally, the results are robust when ordinary least
squares regression is applied.
Tables 7 and 8 present the ordinal logistic regression results of the role of malleable consent in
explaining subjects' transactional-relational scale scores for InnoTech and MBA subjects
respectively.23 The results demonstrate consistent support for the second hypothesis across both
samples. In both cases, high malleable consent corresponds negatively and significantly with
subjects' relational view of employment. As an example, holding other variables constant at
their means, there is a 26.5% probability that a white, male InnoTech participant of average
sample age (twenty-three) who expressed the belief that the agreement was unenforceable would
score a zero on the relational scale (scored as "transactional"). This probability drops to 0.06%
that the same individual would score a six on the relational scale. 24
23 The full 6-element scale is used in these analyses. The salient results remain significant when the 4-
element relational scale is used as well--dropping the two coded variables that were excluded from the
principle component analysis and factor analysis as discussed above.
24 Interestingly, being a minority employee at InnoTech corresponds negatively with viewing the
employment exchange relationally. It appears that minorities are more likely to view their employment
relationships as transactional. This was borne out in analyzing the qualitative responses of subjects.
Indeed, several of the minority subjects spoke "off the record," insisting on shutting off the recorder,
about their belief that InnoTech discriminated against them based on their race. It is not surprising that
such conditions, or at least the perception of such conditions, stymies relational exchange. Also
unsurprisingly, employees who viewed their work as a career as opposed to a job were significantly more
likely to view the exchange relationally. The gender of subjects did not seem to have any significant role
in explaining transactional-relational scores of InnoTech subjects, but it was significantly positively
correlated with expression of a relational view for MBAs. Women in the InnoTech sample were no more
or less likely to view their employment as more relational, but women in the MBA sample were
significantly more likely than men to view the employment relationship as more relational.
Table 7: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results: The Role of Malleable Consent in Explaining
Transactional-Relational View of Work (Inno Tech Subjects)
Change in Predicted Probabilitiesa
Indep. Ordered Transactional Relational
Variables Logit Est.b
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Malleable -1.730** .26 .11 .14 -.33 -.20 -.13 -.02
Consent (.03)
Female -8.13 .12 .06 .02 -.02 -.10 -.06 -.01
(.423)
Black -1.140 .17 .08 .01 -.25 -.14 -.08 -.12
(.175)
Hispanic -1.910* .33 .09 -.05 -.44 -.21 -.11 -.16
(.056)
Other -1.780* .32 .09 -.06 -.04 -.19 -.10 -.01
(.079)
Age .028 -.08 -.05 -.05 .01 .09 .08 .01
(.716)
Career 2.560** -.19 -.13 -.22 -.02 .13 .34 .09
(.008)
Note: sample size=36; chi squared (df=7)=17.28; pseudo r squared=.39
aChange in the predicted probabilities of holding each scaled valence for an increase from the
minimum to the maximum value of each independent variable, while holding all other
independent variables constant at their means.
bThe top entries are ordered logit coefficients.
P values are in parenthesis.
***Significant at the l%level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level
Table 8: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results: The Role of Malleable Consent in
Explaining Transactional-Relational View of Work (MBA Subjects)
Change in Predicted Probabilitiesa
Indep. Ordered Logit Transactional Relational
Variables Est.b
0 1 2 3 4
Malleable -1.023** .01 .12 .09 -.16 -.52
Consent (.02)
Female 1.490*** -.01 -.17 -.12 .22 .08
(.001)
Nationality .340 .00 -.04 -.02 .05 .01
(.435)
Note: sample size=91; chi squared (df=3)=19.00; pseudo r squared=.21
aChange in the predicted probabilities of holding each scaled valence for an increase from the
minimum to the maximum value of each independent variable, while holding all other
independent variables constant at their means.
bThe top entries are ordered logit coefficients.
P values are in parenthesis.
***Significant at the l%level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level
Figure 3: Comparative Lowess Graphs of Mean Malleable Consent by Relational Scores Across
Samples
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Figure 3 is a graphical representation of the two salient quantitative results of this Article-it
shows a comparison of the Lowess-smoothed mean malleable consent scores for the MBAs and
InnoTech subjects by subjects' transactional-relational scale scores. The hypothesized inverse
relationship is present in both samples (supporting the second hypothesis), and the malleable
consent of the MBAs remains consistently higher than the InnoTech subjects (supporting the first
hypothesis).
Implications
Through their interpretations of contracts, actors instantiate their relationships with the state;
they do so, it appears, on the basis of their socio-economic status, opportunities and constraints
of employment, and power and potential to redress wrongs. From the vantage of individual
signers, increased exposure to form-adhesive agreements is tantamount to increased loss of
control over contracting capacity, a classical institutional symbol of capitalism and economic
freedom (Beime and Quinney 1982). As Weber noted, "the present day significance of contract
is primarily the result of the high degree to which our economic system is market-oriented"
(1954: 105). This loss of control over such an obvious icon of economic freedom begs the
question of whether greater exposure to form-adhesive agreements has lead to increased social
levels of malleable consent, and consequently, perhaps, less resort to institutional (legal) means
of redress when persons' experiences suggest breach of contract (which are not read or
understood).
Malleable consent may be one critical indicator of how individuals respond to this loss of
control. Form-adhesive agreements may be a necessary means of expedient dealing for modern
times. But like other modern "necessary" conveniences, they may nonetheless produce
significant negative externalities. Such phenomena need to be studied, not only normatively or
in terms of their legality, but from a sociological vantage-seeking to understand their causes
and effects and how these vary by social class.
This research presents very preliminary evidence to support the theory that occupationally
advantaged actors respond to these contracts differently than the less advantaged, which, in turn,
results in different conceptions of self relative to employers and the state. By exploring these
differences across two distinguishable groups, malleable consent is shown to be a useful
construct for revealing otherwise unobserved differences between the groups' subjective
construction of law and social status, and hence citizenship. It therefore seems that
understanding malleable consent and related behaviors surrounding form-adhesive contracts may
lead to further clarification of otherwise obscured social stratification on important features of
citizenship-specifically, the ability to make claims against others or the state and the ability to
mediate one's relationships through the law.
These findings might have been otherwise obfuscated, or at least more difficult to discern,
without measuring malleable consent. Indeed, no statistically significant differences were
observed between InnoTech employees and the MBAs in terms of the rates at which subjects
reported wanting to resort to law to redress the hypothetical wrongs-even in the vignettes in
which they imagined being sexually harassed and losing their jobs because of illegal
discrimination.25 Without a measure of malleable consent, the two groups would have appeared
to have equally considered the law to be a viable option in their arsenal. Research has previously
demonstrated that power-disadvantaged actors are constrained from taking action to redress
injustices (Ewick and Silbey 1999; Zelditch and Ford 1994). In the employment context,
malleable consent could be thought of as a cost that the advantaged perceive as avoidable more
often than the disadvantaged.
This research also offers initial support for the theory that there is a connection between
interpretations of enforceability of form-adhesive agreements and exchange relationships
between the drafters and signers of such contracts. Individuals who regard the form-adhesive
25 The numbers illustrated sixty-six percent for InnoTech and seventy-five percent for MBAs. This
finding is consistent with prior research. See, e.g., EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 21 (finding many people
claim that they will resort to law if they experience denial of rights, but simultaneously describe how they
cannot afford a lawyer to help secure their rights).
agreements they must sign as a condition of employment (in this case, a mandatory arbitration
agreement) as unenforceable (high malleable consent) are more likely to view their jobs as an
instrumental transaction-as simply a market financial exchange, and hence less likely to give
their employers the opportunity to resolve disputes internally. When actors are more likely to
regard form-adhesive agreements as enforceable (low malleable consent) they are more likely to
interpret their employment as an exchange of obligations as well as rewards, imbued with a
substantive, moral relationship, what industrial relations scholars often refer to as a "social
contract," 26 or a "relational exchange." In other words, when actors view form-adhesive
agreements as unenforceable, there is less perceived trust in the employment relationship, and
hence in the employer's ability to resolve disputes as well. This is an important finding as it is
an indication of the class divide so often overlooked or ignored in recent descriptions of
American social life. The measure of trust in the employer's capacity to handle disputes and the
link between this measure and citizenship therefore seems worthy of future discussion and
research.
Methodological limitations notwithstanding, 27 these results appear to hold across diverse
populations. One potential implication of this specific preliminary finding is the connection
between the overwhelming loss of control over contract, a symbol of a democratic, capitalistic
free-market economic ideal, and increased resort to non-legal forms of redress when contracts
are perceived to be breached.
At the beginning of this part of the dissertation, a feedback loop was described in which social
constructions of law create contract, and contract in turn creates socially construed forms of
private law, backed by the state. There is a fundamental discrepancy between this subjectively
driven form of contract and the traditional objective theory of contract. This fundamental
discrepancy becomes most apparent when examining form-adhesive agreements in which
26 See sources cited supra note 20.
27 There are clear limitations, particularly when comparing across the two studies. For instance, the
MBAs were asked to imagine that they had agreed to terms that the InnoTech employees had actually
signed. As mentioned earlier, and described in more detail in the section below, this Article presents
preliminary support for the hypotheses generated. In spite of its limitations, this Article hopes to establish
some preliminary comparisons in order to provoke discussion in these theoretically important areas.
"freedom of contract" is a function of great imbalance of mutual dependency and "meeting of the
minds" is fictional at best. Courts have clearly struggled with this discrepancy in deciding when
to enforce boilerplate of varying adhesiveness and one-sidedness. Perhaps malleable consent is
evidence in support of the feedback loop, in which individual interpretation of these unique and
ubiquitous contracts trickles up at the same time as the law on the books (demonstrated in part,
by courts' and commentators' strain to apply objective theory of contract to form-adhesive
contracts) trickles down.28
Limitations
This portion of the dissertation is intended as grounded theory based on the limited evidence
currently available. This part represents the first step in this line of research; the construct of
malleable consent was born from an inductive study about exchange and conflict at the
workplace. It offers preliminary evidence of the construct's existence and an argument for its
inclusion- in the panoply of ways we study how law emerges. Moreover, it takes form and
evolves in our collective conscious, along with its potential variation across structural
constraints, social strata and individual level constructions. The hope is to generate hypotheses
and provoke further discussion, in part from some of the questions raised but not answered
herein. The second part of the dissertation therefore picks up where this part leaves off. For
instance, this part of the work does not explain when actors form beliefs about enforceability or
whether these beliefs are mutable in the short term (for the instant transaction) or the long term,
such that they carry over from one transaction to another. Similarly, this part raises several
additional questions, some discussed below.
Other questions raised include: What effect does malleable consent play in negotiations,
particularly in repeated transaction relationships?; does variation in malleable consent reveal
28 This notion was suggested to the author in a conversation with Stewart Macaulay. Courts too, could be
said to have some malleableness in rulings on enforceability of form-adhesive agreements. This portion
of the dissertation begs the question of the extent to which individuals' malleable consent jives with that
of the courts, and the extent to which courts influence individuals and vice-versa.
differences in actions and outcomes even when actors have not signed form-adhesive
agreements?; and how does malleable consent affect litigant decision making, and how does the
construct affect judicial decision making and legislation? If the feedback loop described at the
outset of this Article is valid, and the law is informed by norms of exchange and vice versa, laws
and judicial decisions should accord increased levels of malleability of consent. More research
examining the prevalence of this theorized phenomenon is warranted.
Four limitations of this part of the work exist. First, this part offers only proposed hypothetical
relationships and offers evidence in support of component parts of these relationships. Much
remains to be seen as to whether malleable consent carries with it the extent of negative
repercussions it is theorized to carry.
Second, it is unclear at what point interpretations of contract enforceability are formed. This
presents some difficulty for two reasons: one, the responses to the vignettes are measured before
malleable consent; and two, it weakens the ability to draw comparisons across the InnoTech and
MBA groups. There are some obvious apples-to-oranges problems comparing across the two
groups, a clear limitation of this research. For example, the MBAs are asked about a contract
they imagine signing at a future job, while the InnoTech subjects are asked about a contract they
have actually signed as a condition of their current employment. Understanding when malleable
consent is formed may help to account for the socio-economic differences described in this part.
Future research measuring the construct over time could lead to useful causal findings indicating
what experiences affect these interpretations and whether actors' views of malleable consent are
mutable-a measure of the malleability of malleableness, if you will.
Third, this part of the dissertation lacks a basis for determining the effect on actual behavior of
being "right" or "wrong" about the enforceability of the agreement. As mentioned earlier,
InnoTech fully enforces the agreement in question, and agreements to arbitrate such as the one
hypothesized in the MBA survey are mostly enforceable legally; most of the time that
organizations implement such agreements, it is because they fully intend to use them to reduce
the costs of employment litigation. They are loath to make exceptions for fear of setting an
undesirable precedent. What happens to the MBAs with high malleable consent who attempt to
sue? Do they behave differently than those with low malleable consent who assume the worst
about their employers? How so? How does this experience alter their behavior with respect to
form-adhesive agreements in the future, if at all?
Fourth, and unexplored in this part, but with potentially important implications, is the effect of
malleable consent on signing habits. That is, what if malleable consent beliefs carry over from
one contract area to another, leading one to believe that form-adhesive agreements are not
binding when they are? For instance, if one learns to have high malleable consent from
interacting with credit card companies that routinely grant leniency on late payments, over time
this person will believe that all form-adhesive agreements, like credit card "Terms of
Agreement," are really unenforceable, and will become less concerned about signing forms, even
if they contain unfair terms. To continue the hypothetical, this person then signs up with a
private military company like Blackwater, which similarly requires new hires to sign a form-
adhesive agreement that purports to release Blackwater and all of its agents, officers and
shareholders from "any liability whatsoever" even when death or injury is "caused in whole or in
part by the negligence" of the company (Eviatar 2007: 74-75), the signer thinks this form is no
different from an American Express contract, and signs without worry over the enforcement of
the draconian provisions that may lurk within. Blackwater relies on this form-adhesive
agreement to prevent the huge number of injured and dead from suing them. Understanding how
malleable consent carries over across contexts, and otherwise affects signing habits, may
contribute to a decrease in the abuse of such forms, or may inform policy in ways not explored
before this research.
Conclusion
Apparently, the devil is in the details. And, it has been said that "[t]here are no honorable
bargains involving exchange of qualitative merchandise like souls for quantitative merchandise
like time and money."29 But what happens when we do not realize that we have traded our souls
29 William S. Burroughs, Words of Advice for Young People,
http://www.jjjwebdevelopment.com/306sites/burroughs/burroughs.shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
away until it is too late? The hope of this line of research is to illuminate one subtle, yet
ubiquitous exchange and its effects. This part of the dissertation highlights the difference
between law on the books (embodied by what the forms purport to do) and law in action (how
signers experience and interpret the forms) and explores the gap between the two. The point,
however, is that this gap is a "space, not a vacuum" (Ewick and Silbey 1999: 1040). It is not
enough that we recognize this space, but that we seek to understand what fills it, and how what
fills it in turn affects the law and our interpretations of ourselves relative to others as actors
bound by laws and normative constraints. Through such work, we hope to gain a better
understanding of citizenship across socio-economic boundaries. As has been done in other areas,
this classic socio-legal approach may open doors to explain this space to inform policy and
future research.
Part 3: The Performance Puzzle: When and Why Individuals
Comply with Form-Adhesive Contracts They Have Signed
Introduction
The amount of time individuals spend negotiating in the traditional "arms'-length" sense of the
word, where parties exchange positions, discuss options and alternatives integratively or
distributively, and otherwise seek to advance their interests in accord or in opposition to another
party or group of parties, before reaching agreement has likely diminished over time (Ben-
Shahar 2007; Slawson 1971). This is particularly true if one subcategorizes all exchanges to
those occurring between individuals and organizations. Anyone who has received medical
services, a loan or mortgage, used a credit card or cell phone or downloaded media or software
will likely agree that they spent almost no time negotiating such exchanges prior to reaching
agreement on the terms. Even in exchanges in which traditional negotiations occur such as
salary discussions or buying a car, more often than not, such negotiations are limited to the terms
of the primary exchange, and not the secondary terms governing that exchange. That is, we
might haggle for hours or days over the price of a new car, but how often do we negotiate over
the terms in the form-purchase agreement invariably proffered by the auto dealership once the
price is settled upon? We might sign these contracts, which often dictate important terms
including changes in price, penalty fees, interest rates, what the organization can do with
confidential information of ours, and dispute resolution clauses, without reading or
understanding them.
The second part of this work seeks to establish the connection among how individuals experience
and interpret the rule of law, how they experience and interpret form-adhesive contracts, and
how these things are connected to the relationship underwriting the particular kind of contract at
issue -in this case, the relationship between employer and employees. In exploring these
connections, the second part of this dissertation supports existing scholarship's assertion that
there is a nexus between perceptions of the rule of law and socio-economic status by positing
evidence of higher socio-economic actors' higher malleable consent.
Left unexplored, however, are several critical components. First, the second part only examined
individuals' reported attitudes about enforceability of form-adhesive contracts. No measure was
observed of individuals' behavior with respect to enforceability of form-adhesive contracts.
Also, while the employment relationship is an extremely important one in which to observe and
study these concepts, there are several problems with relying solely on this relationship to
articulate the type of contractual theory intended. This is because the employment relationship
involves many elements that may distort or confound the observations made about how
individuals regard form-adhesive contracts per say. First, employment is an ongoing
relationship. Subjects' reported attitudes might be colored by this fact. In fact, there is evidence
to suggest that this could be the case. Subjects often contemplate elements like reciprocity more
saliently in repeated transaction settings, as opposed to one-shot interactions. As Posner notes,
"when people have repeated interactions with each other, they have an incentive not to breach or
"cheat" in one interaction, because then people will not trust them in later transactions....As long
as both parties value future payoffs to a sufficient degree and as long as the value of breach is
never too high, it is possible (as a matter of theory) and likely (as a matter of common sense) that
they will not breach in any round" (1999: 15). What is needed to overcome this shortcoming of
the first set of studies then is a single-shot interaction governed by a form-adhesive contract.
Second, the first set of studies report on something for which there are relatively few alternatives
to exchange, or at a minimum, there are significant costs associated with terminating the
exchange. That is, employees of InnoTech had few alternative job opportunities, and even the
MBA students with many alternative job opportunities would acknowledge that there are some
costs associated with changing jobs. What is needed is a setting involving many low cost or no
cost readily available alternatives to the exchange for the object of the form-contract. This is the
optimum way to try to answer the question, is there variation in how subjects interpret
enforceability of form-adhesive contracts when there are numerous alternatives to the exchange
at low or no cost to the individual signers?
Third, the first set of studies examined the construct in a non-anonymous setting. I mean this in
two ways-first, subjects were aware of the fact that they were being asked about the
enforceability of a contract. This might lend some to feel more pressure to respond in an
honorable way-however they view honor. It might also lend some to feel more pressure to
respond by demonstrating that they are not na've-they might be more likely to posture as if they
would try to escape from the contract, when they really would not. In either event, there may
have been a tendency for the presence of the interviewer to impact how subjects responded.
Second, subjects were interviewed or surveyed about an employment setting in which they were
presented with a contract by an individual (an HR representative). Subjects' views about
employment generally, particularly the moral obligation or social expectation to be a productive
member of society, could have interfered with subjects' reported attitudes about enforceability of
contract. For instance, David Hume proposed that the external sanction of public shame, or loss
of reputation for honesty, which is attached to promise-breaking, is internalized and likely the
underlying explanations for moral behavior, which necessarily exists in an observed setting
(Fried 1981: 15; Hume 1888). What is needed then, is a relatively anonymous setting in which
individual signers of a contract are less likely to be affected by social, normative of moral
suasion.
Fourth, the first paper explored only a setting with a constant degree of adhesiveness of the
setting in which subjects consented to the contract. That is, subjects were not offered any
opportunity to provide input into any terms to which they consented. As discussed in greater
detail below, negotiation scholarship suggests that varying the adhesiveness of the setting in
which subjects enter into a contract might affect the perceived enforceability of the contract's
terms. What is needed then, is variation in the adhesiveness of the setting in which individuals
are given the opportunity to consent to the form-adhesive agreement to determine if the relative
adhesiveness is an important situational factor influencing contract performance.
As such, the primary goal of this component of the dissertation is to empirically observe how
individuals behave (not just their reported intent to behave) with respect to a form-adhesive
contract they have signed in a relatively anonymous setting, where the contract governs a single-
shot transaction (not a repeated exchange situation), and there are numerous free or low-cost
alternatives available for signers to obtain the sought-after benefit of the bargain. It is also the
goal to observe if variation in the degree of adhesiveness of the setting in which individuals are
given the opportunity to consent to the contract impacts perceived enforceability and
performance.
What follows are descriptions of two categories of hypotheses to be evaluated in exactly this
experimental setting. That is, given a relatively anonymous, one-shot exchange involving
something that is easily available at low/no cost to signers, and variation of the adhesiveness of
the form-contract, how do individuals behave consistently or inconsistently with a contract term
to which they have consented? Further, to ensure consistent measurability and to optimize the
interpretability of the findings, it is important for the contract and communications about the
contract to be objectively measurable, and for the behavior to be objectively measurable and as
continuous as possible. The first category of hypotheses described below is about the degree of
adhesiveness in the consent stage of contracting and the impact on post-agreement performance.
The second category is about varying prompts used to convince contract-signers to continue to
perform following their attempted breach and the impact of these prompts on performance
following attempts to breach. The theoretical bases for the two categories of hypotheses are
articulated below as well.
Hypotheses
A. Predicting Adherence to Contract Terms Based on Pre-Agreement Conditions
Existing literature has much to say about how individuals behave in traditional negotiation
settings. It is the hope of this section to construct hypotheses about predicting when and why
individuals adhere to form-contracts they have signed by extending some of the ideas
represented by this rich body of scholarship. By a "traditional negotiation setting" I mean one in
which parties exchange proposals and then finalize their agreement by signing a contract that
memorializes their understanding of how each party will behave in the future. The resulting
contract is a set of bilateral commitments. In the form-adhesive setting, this is not how it most
often works. In this setting, the organization drafts a contract intended for many signers. The
resulting contract is less likely perceived by signers as a "set of bilateral commitments" and is
perhaps better described as offers to commit to terms conceived and drafted unilaterally. Signers
elect to accept the unilateral terms or not in order to receive the benefit of the exchange. If they
want the job, the medical care, the cellular telephone service, the rental car, gym membership, in
some instances, the mortgage, or other benefit of the bargain, they sign the contract as is.
Some might construe this exchange narrowly as the absence of negotiation, but in line with
others (see, e.g.: Curhan, Elfenbein and Xu 2006; Pruitt 1983), I take a somewhat broader view.
First, it can be said that some form of traditional bargaining takes place prior to agreement-
there is an offer and acceptance after all-the two critical predecessors of traditional contract
formation. Second, it would seem that the social context in which form-adhesive agreements
arise tends to shift the opportunity for traditional bargaining from pre-agreement to post-
agreement, if such an opportunity is perceived at all.30
Pre-agreement based research on the behavior of negotiators may shed light on post-agreement
behaviors. It might also be that form-adhesive agreements are a useful context in which to
adjudicate among behavioral theories about how such pre-agreement negotiation behavior carries
over into the post-agreement phase. Decades of research on behavior of parties in negotiations
prior to reaching agreement has shown that individuals systematically deviate from rational
behavior for many reasons (see, e.g.: Neale and Bazerman 1991). It might be the case that
heuristics in effect prior to reaching agreement do not turn off because an agreement has been
struck. In fact, if not all parties uniformly regard agreements as enforceable, it could be not only
the case that heuristics remain at play in the post-agreement period, but are extremely important
in understanding behavior. For instance, the theory of escalation of commitment (Brockner
1992; Staw 1976; Staw 1981; Staw and Ross 1987) posits that commitment to a failed course of
action is likely to escalate in spite of negative feedback about the consequences of such
commitment because one feels responsible for the choice he has made and has justified his
30 The notion of variation in perceived opportunities to initiate negotiation parallels another stream of
research in negotiations focused on gender differences in the propensity to initiate negotiations. Babcock,
Linda C., and Sara Laschever. 2003. Women Don't Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press.
actions accordingly. It would seem then, that this theory would predict a greater degree of
commitment to negotiated agreements when the signer of the agreement learns that the contract
contains terms not in his interest. Interestingly, the magnitude of the escalation of commitment
would theoretically be inversely proportional with the degree of control over the negotiation
process that brought the actor to enter into the contract. That is, the more form-adhesive the
agreement, the greater the theorized perceived unenforceability of the agreement. 3 1
Understanding how variation in perceived enforceability interacts with such heuristics may be
the key to explaining when and why individuals comply with contract terms to which they have
consented.
Interestingly, in evaluating the possible extension of decision-making heuristics studied in the
pre-agreement phase to the post-agreement phase, it becomes clear that some theories contradict
one another. Dissonance theory, for instance, may conflict with the predictions for behavior
made by escalation of commitment theory. Dissonance theory asserts that individuals try to
reduce cognitive dissonance, the state of psychological uneasiness brought on when actors freely
choose to perform a behavior that does not jive with their preexisting attitudes, which could
induce an aversive event or block one's self-interests (Cooper and Worchel 1970; Festinger
1957; Festinger and Carlsmith 1959). This theory predicts that in order to reduce dissonance
experienced by signing form-adhesive agreements with terms adverse to their interests, signers
would feel more bound by the terms. 32 The greater the dissonance experienced due to the worse
the choice is (the more oppressive the terms in the form-adhesive agreement), the greater the
theorized perceived enforceability of the agreement.
31 This jives with Law and Society literature on individuals' perceptions of law and contract Ellickson,
Robert C. 1991. Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge and London: Harvard
University Press, Ewick, Patricia, and Susan S. Silbey. 2003. "Narrating Social Structure: Stories of
Resistance to Legal Authority." American Journal of Sociology 6:1328-1372..
32 To the extent that signing a form-adhesive agreement appears to be a choice between two unattractive
options, dissonance theory predicts that this would result in an inflated valuation of the selected option's
perceived desirability. (Bendersky, Corinne, and Jared R. Curhan. Under Review. "Cognitive Dissonance
in Negotiation: Free Choice or Counter-Attitudinal Justification.", Shultz, Thomas R., Elene Leveill6,
and Mark R. Lepper. 1999. "Free Choice and Cognitive Dissonance Revisited: Choosing "Lesser Evils"
Versus "Greater Goods"." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 25:40-48.) To the extent that
signing appears to be a choice between two relatively attractive options, the theory predicts a resulting
deflation in valuation of the rejected alternative.
The two theories seem to be at odds in predicting behavior in the post-agreement phase.
Escalation of commitment would likely posit that the more form-adhesive the agreement is, and
hence the less control over the process of negotiating, the less is the individual's perceived
enforceability of that agreement. Dissonance theory, however, might theorize that the more
form-adhesive the agreement, the greater the dissonance reduction required, and hence the
greater the likelihood of perceived enforceability.
Closely related to these theories and their application to post-agreement behavior is the question
of the existence of a relationship between perceived control over the consent-phase of the
process and post-agreement contract performance. In the broadest sense, numerous studies,
mostly in psychology, have repeatedly demonstrated that inflating subjects' feelings of efficacy
or control (even when illusory) improves their sense of well-being and everyday functioning
(Bandura 1977; Langer 1975). Much closer in application to the instant research is the work by
Tyler and Lind demonstrating the connection between perceived control over a decision-making
process and the positive impression that one has been treated fairly (Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler
1997; Tyler 2006). Similarly, in research on job satisfaction and labor-management relations,
numerous studies have shown the nexus between increased perceived control over the process of
work and employees' work and job-satisfaction, performance and other positive metrics (Folger
and Konovsky 1989; Rusbult et al. 1988; Thibaut and Walker 1975; Turnley and Feldman 2000).
The ultimate question then is what effect, if any, does the degree of adhesiveness in the consent
phase of contracting have on the degree of commitment to perform the contract's terms in the
performance phase? It would seem in adjudicating among competing theories on this front, that
it is more likely that less adhesiveness would result in greater commitment and hence more
performance. The first hypothesis is therefore as follows:
(HI) Individuals given a choice between two contract terms (i.e.: a less adhesive
presentation than the traditional take-it-or-leave-it format) in the consent phase
will commit and adhere to the terms of the contract they signed more than
individuals not offered such a choice.
Similarly, research on the pre-agreement phase of negotiations has identified how individuals
deviate from what would otherwise be in their rational best interest by altering their valuation of
offers they propose ("preference inflation") or that they turn down ("reactive devaluation"). This
research has demonstrated how people tend to overvalue things they choose and devalue options
they forego or turn down. Researchers have varied the degree of the relative attractiveness of the
options between which individuals choose, and then observe how cognitive dissonance is
reduced. For instance, Shultz, Leveill6 and Lepper (1999) found that when subjects choose
between equally attractive options, dissonance is mostly reduced by devaluing the foregone
option. But, where subjects choose between two relatively equal unattractive options,
dissonance is mostly reduced by augmenting the value ascribed to the selected option (Shultz and
Lepper 1996; Shultz, Leveillk and Lepper 1999). The overall thrust of this research is that the
act of choosing among options is the key action that affects how dissonance generated by the
choice is reduced.
In contrast, other researchers evaluating the pre-agreement negotiation phase consider the fact
that subjects are forced to somehow publicly justify their choices (typically to fellow-subjects or
the researchers). In this line of research, the act of justification is the key behavior that affects
how dissonance generated is reduced. This is the so-called "justification method," or "forced
compliance," (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959). 33 As Bendersky and Curhan aptly summarize this
research, "cognitive dissonance is induced when people's counter-attitudinal behavior is done
voluntarily, cannot be attributed to external causes, and could produce and adverse event.
Dissonance is alleviated when people revise their attitudes to be more consistent with their
behavior." ((Under Review): 7).
Most previous research confounds choice and public justification (Bobocel and Meyer 1994). In
seeking to adjudicate between the two competing bases for dissonance reduction, Bobocel and
Meyer find that the act of justifying a choice, whether publicly or privately significantly
increases subjects' propensity to escalate their commitment to the justified option, but that choice
33 Bendersky and Curhan note that it is also referred to as: "insufficient justification" (Shultz & Lepper,
1996) or "induced compliance" (Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Cooper & Worchel, 1970).
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alone did not have a significant effect. Curhan et al. (2004) have conducted additional
experimental research in this area demonstrating how situational changes in the negotiation
setting induces dynamic valuation of proposals or offers. In a set of additional experiments,
Bendersky and Curhan found that "dissonance induced by choosing between unattractive offers
is alleviated primarily by inflating one's valuation of the selected offer" (in press: 25).
This set of research highlights the importance of the relationship between choice and justification
and resulting reduction of dissonance vis-a-vis escalation of commitment to a course of action.
But this research is all based on pre-agreement negotiations. One question begged is whether
these effects carry over to post-agreement behavior. More specifically, in the context of form-
adhesive contracts, does selection of one of two relatively unattractive contract terms in the pre-
agreement phase result in greater adherence to perform the chosen contract term in the post-
agreement phase? Thus, the second hypothesis is:
(H2) Individuals who choose a contract term from two options to be included in a
final contract they sign will commit and adhere to perform that contract term more
than individuals not given such a choice, and, more than those given a choice
between two other contract terms unrelated to performance.
Lastly, there are a number of opinions about the effects of form-adhesive contracts broadly (Ben-
Shahar 2004; Ben-Shahar 2007; Hillman 2007; Marotta-Wurgler 2007a), but less empirical
evidence on their effects. Indeed, it would be very difficult to study their effects as rigorously as
one would like because of their ubiquity. As Silbey observed, it is akin to studying the effects of
exposure to violence in popular media. If anything, form-adhesive contracts are more
unavoidable than violence on television, movies and advertising. I am not in a position to offer
direct empirical evidence on the broad effects of exposure to form-adhesive contracts; this is
beyond the scope of this work. However, as I argue in the first part of this work, one theorized
effect of constant and repeated exposure to form-adhesive contracts is a dilution of respect for
the rule of law. I also assert that in the wake of contract's death, we have returned not to "status"
as some have suggested, but rather to extra-legal bases of authority independent of the rule of
law. While it is an admittedly imperfect and incomplete test of these theories, it would offer
partial and incremental evidence in support thereof if signers of a form-adhesive agreement
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purporting to require them to perform in some way were no more likely to perform in that way as
individuals who were not asked to sign a form-adhesive contract memorializing the parties'
mutual obligations to perform. Hence, hypothesis three is as follows:
(H3) Individuals who sign a form-adhesive contract binding them to perform a task
will be no more or less likely to perform that task than those who did not sign any
contract purporting to bind them to perform.
To test these three hypotheses, four pre-agreement settings need to be fabricated: (1) a standard
boilerplate condition in which subjects are presented with a form-adhesive contract in the typical
manner-without any opportunity afforded the signers to affect the terms, (2) a choice condition
in which subjects choose between two relatively equally unattractive terms to be included in the
contract they will sign, but neither of the choices impact contract performance as measured; (3) a
second choice condition in which subjects choose between one term that will be used to measure
contract performance directly and a second term of no consequence; and, (4) a fourth condition
that operates as a control in which subjects are not asked to sign any contract at all. Comparing
the choice condition to the standard boilerplate condition will directly test the first hypothesis.
Comparing the choice condition in which subjects select to include in the contract the term that
will measure performance directly with the plain choice condition as well as the standard
boilerplate condition will directly test the second hypothesis. The third hypothesis requires a
comparison between the standard boilerplate condition and the control condition in which
subjects are not asked to sign any contract at all.
B. Predicting Continued Contract Performance Based on Legal and Extra-Legal
Appeals
The prior section articulates several theories' predictions of how the setting in which the contract
is signed-how consent is initially given-affects contract performance. This section addresses
theories predicting how individual signers of form-adhesive contracts respond to prompts to
continue performing after they attempt to breach, where the prompts vary according to
theoretically disparate bases for contract performance. When do individual signers conform to
the request or threat and discontinue breaching, and continue performing? How likely are
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individuals to listen to a request or threat and continue performing? Is one basis for contractual
authority more persuasive than other bases? Does a request to perform the same task where no
contract has been signed yield the same rate of performance as when individuals are
contractually bound to perform? These are the questions addressed in this section.
A starting point for this discussion is a brief reflection on the qualitative data from the previous
part of this work. In reviewing the qualitative data from the first set of studies, it appeared clear
that there are different ways in which individuals think about and discuss enforceability of
contract. Recall that subjects were not asked about the "enforceability" of contracts per say.
They were asked a much more rudimentary question-specifically, if they signed a document
that contained a provision with the form, "if X happens, then Y happens," where Y was
something that could be construed as limiting their ability to act if they had not signed the
contract. In the specific case of the first set of studies, X was equal to an employment related
dispute arising in the course of their work, and Y was equal to an obligation to bring such claims
to final and binding arbitration in lieu of court. I proposed the hypothetical situation that X
happened and asked them whether Y would follow.
Deconstruction of the qualitative responses revealed that this open-ended structure produced an
array of ways of contemplating the ultimate question of contractual enforceability. Subjects
thought about the same question of the "legal" enforcement of the contract they had signed (a
constant) along very different lines. Careful evaluation of the data revealed that the mechanisms
underlying the responses seemed to align according to four distinct categories: (1) legal, (2)
moral, (3) social, and (4) instrumental concerns. How subjects thought about whether Y would
happen given X varied substantially along these dimensions. Subjects often mentioned more
than one-the categories were not mutually exclusive of each other in how subjects responded.
Indeed, there is substantial room for overlap. However, the nice thing about the form of the
question to which subjects responded is the reductive effect of needing to ultimately state
whether Y would happen or not, and the ultimate reason for this. For instance, individuals may
contemplate moral reasons why the contract is enforceable (i.e.: "signing a contract is like
making a promise, and it's the morally correct thing to do to live up to one's word"), but may
ultimately decide that he contract is unenforceable because it is illegal (many subjects thought,
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incorrectly, that the law prohibited employers from requiring employees to waive their right to a
jury trial as a condition of employment). Similarly, subjects could regard the enforceability of
the contract along social terms (i.e.: "everyone has to sign these things, so everyone probably has
to go along with them...") and instrumental concerns (i.e.: "I couldn't afford to try to get around
it..."). Thus, there is empirical support for dividing the bases for contractual performance up
into the four categories identified above (legal, moral, social and instrumental).
What follows is a brief explanation of the theoretical support for each of these categories. Much
research has already been conducted on optimizing the likelihood of successfully eliciting
cooperation or obedience (Deutsch et al. 1967; Milgram 1965; Tyler 2006). This research
focuses on the pre-agreement phase of negotiations, and adjudicates among competing strategic
approaches in a dyadic or triadic exchange relationships. In the four sections below, I develop
hypotheses regarding the application of the wide range of research on these areas to the post-
agreement performance phase of contractual relationships between organizations and
individuals.
1. Legal Threat
All contracts, including the "civil contract," create legal obligations for signers (McIntyre 1994:
20). As McIntyre notes, the word "obligation" comes from the Latin, "obligato," which
originally referred to a "sealed bond." How much of a legal obligation is created by contract is
difficult to discern and likely varies to a great extent depending on the circumstances, the parties
and the kind of contract entered into. It should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the
history of contract law in the United States that early opinions went out of their way to decry
extra-legal bases for contractual enforcement, insisting instead that contracts be upheld only on
legal grounds vis-a-vis application of existing case law. In accord with the theories of
contractual evolution articulated in the introduction to this dissertation, this is apparent in many
opinions, including watershed early Supreme Court decisions such as Ogden v. Saunders. In that
case the court grappled with the ultimate authority underlying enforceability of contracts. The
court noted first the existence of a "universal law of all civilized nations, which declares that
men shall perform that to which they have agreed" (1827). The majority opinion went on to
write that "[w]hile I admit...that this common law of nations... may form in part the obligation
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of a contract, I must unhesitatingly insist, that this law is to be taken in strict subordination to the
municipal laws of the land where the contract is made, or is to be executed." That is, contracts
are to be enforced when the law of the land requires it, not when universally accepted principles
or norms so dictate. This 1827 opinion represents the tip of the iceberg on this point. Courts
have repeatedly and consistently adhered to this principle.
The question is whether social actors follow the courts. Do individuals think that contracts they
sign are enforceable because, in positivist terms, the law requires it, independent of economic
constraints, moral concerns or social settings? In a properly functioning trickle-down model,
where social views of law emanate from court opinions (the model often assumed to exist), this
would be the case. But this is not the entire picture. Perceptions of law come from other sources
than the courts. Views of law come about indirectly. For instance, some have shown how law
influences individuals' behaviors indirectly, as what some have called "expressive law" (Nadler
2005; Sunstein 1996). This is the notion that independent of law's function of imposing
punishment and setting specific guidelines for civil obedience, that the law symbolically
transmits "statements" to citizens that "strengthens desirable norms and weakens undesirable
ones" (Nadler 2005: 1402). The question of the extent to which the values that law expresses
can induce compliance, independently from sanctions and threats, is an important one, to which
a substantial amount of attention has been paid (Bohnet, Frey and Huck 2001; Huang and Wu
1994; McAdams 1997). It seems that some individuals find a "natural duty" arises because one
is a member of society to obey the law (Greenawalt 1985). Greenwalt distinguishes this natural
duty to obey the law from moral constraints like the obligation to keep one's promise, because in
the latter case, individuals voluntarily subject themselves to the obligations (1985: 4).
As articulated in the previous two parts of this work, consistent with the behavioral theory of
contract is the diminished positivistic regard for the rule of law, or the "natural" derivation of the
rule of law, particularly with respect to contract enforceability. The forth hypothesis, below,
reflects this. Threatening legal sanctions (independent of economic sanctions, social pressure or
moral suasion) will be as effective at compelling performance as when individuals who have not
signed any contract are merely asked to perform.
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(H4) Threatening individuals who have attempted to breach a form-adhesive
contract by warning them that they are in breach of contract will be no more
effective at inducing performance than requesting individuals who have not signed
a contract to continue performing the same task after they have attempted to
discontinue performing it.
2. Moral Appeal
As discussed in the first part of this work, there is much discussion by philosophers, legal
historians and contract scholars regarding the moral basis for contract. For some, embedded in
the "morality of the negotiation relation" as the "foundation of orthodox contract" is the
expectation that one may not retract from something that she agreed to do (Ben-Shahar 2004;
Markovits 2004: 1913). Indeed, this notion of "keeping one's promise" has origins in the bible:
"[i]f a man...takes an oath to bind himself...he shall not violate his word" (Numbers 30:2). The
first part of this dissertation took pains to trace the origin of contract as an embedded form of
promise-keeping in line with several notable scholars' work (Atiyah 1979; Fried 1981; Friedman
1965). As described in greater detail there, promise and doctrinal contract have clearly
intertwined roots, but there is little empirical evidence of how social actors interpret the promise
implicitly made by signing a contract, and less evidence (to my knowledge) of the perceived
relationship between promise making and form-adhesive contracts. Durkheim (1933) argued
that contracts could not exist without a preexisting set of institutionalized moral agreements. As
Sutton describes, "in effect, contract law-that defines the nature of contractual obligations and
invokes a transcendent authority to ensure that they will be enforced" (2001: 33).
Craswell (1989) offers a detailed account of how philosophers have sought to explain the moral
basis of living up to promises made. He groups previous efforts to do so into two categories.
First are explanations that argue that obligations created by a promise can only be explained by
"positing that individual promisors possess 'norm-creating powers' under which they are
authorized to create new moral obligations merely by agreeing to do so" (1989: 496-97). Second
are those who argued that no such powers are necessary and that the "moral obligation to keep a
promise is merely a particular instance of a more general obligation, such as the obligation not to
cause harm to others or the obligation to tell the truth" (1989: 497). In either case, the effect of
a moral framing of promise would likely augment the chances of contractual adherence. But,
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neither offers a fully satisfactory explanation of how individuals respond to a prompt to perform
as contractually obligated with a promissory framing for form-adhesive contract to which they
may have consented without knowing what the underlying thing to be performed is.
How do individuals respond to a moral appeal to perform a form-adhesive contract? Even if
subjects do not initially regard the contract they signed in moral terms-they might not even
have read the contract itself, so do not even know for sure what the contract requires them to
do--how well does an appeal to the morality in the procedure of consent? That is, does signing
something mean "giving one's word"? And, does giving one's word to do something make one
more likely to do it? This feeling is likely related to the social contract-which could be thought
of as a promise individuals make to obey the law. It is possible that some individuals feel
obligated "by virtue" to obey, instead of feeling legally bound for the sake of obeying the law
(Raz 1981: 104). A promise is different from consent. With a promissory framing of a request to
perform a contract to which an individual consented comes a very different set of associated
perceived rights, responsibilities and perceived obligations (Raz 1981: 120-122). This is one
reason why a morally grounded framing of a request to perform would yield a greater likelihood
of contractual performance. Compounding this theorized effect of such a framing on contractual
performance is the Rawlsian (1955) approach to promises. All else being equal, once someone
has promised to do something, it is no longer an option for that person to not do that which he as
promised to do on the grounds that it is something he prefers not to do, all things considered.
That is, promising to do something increases the marginal moral cost associated with refusing to
perform the task at issue. This too, adds to the theoretical effectiveness of a moral framing of an
obligation to perform as contractually obligated.
Consistent with Atiyah, (1979) Fried (1981) and others, the theory advanced by this work is that
even when it is a form-adhesive contract, individuals will respond more favorably to framing a
request to comply with the contract in moral terms. Hence, hypothesis five is as follows:
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(H5) Appealing to universally held moral standards of living up to one's promise
and keeping one's word will effectively induce continued contract performance
following attempted breach of contract as compared to other methods of
communicating the same intended result.
3. Social Pressure
Conformance with social norms has repeatedly proven to be a powerful motivator for a wide
gamut of behaviors (Cialdini 2001; Ellickson 1991; McAdams 1997; Troyer and Younts 1997).
By "social norms," I mean to refer to the set of informal social guidelines for behavior to which
individuals tend to feel obligated to conform due to an internalized sense of duty, or because of
the fear of a socially-imposed sanction. This scholarship evaluates how and when norms of
social interaction explain behavior more realistically the effect of legal rules. Sometimes social
norms govern behavior regardless of the legal rule, rendering the construction of the codified
version of the formal rule obsolete (McAdams 1997: 340). As McAdams notes,
...sometimes legal rules facilitate or impede the enforcement of a norm, and the
selection of the formal rule matters in entirely new ways, the exact consequence
depending on whether the formal rule strengthens or weakens a desirable or
undesirable norm. Indeed, in some cases, new norms arise in the presence of
different legal rules, making the relevant policy choice one between two or more
law-norm combinations (1997:340).
Troyer and Younts explain that the social cues that often dictate how we behave are based on
two determining categories of expectations: first order expectations, which are the expectations
an actor holds for herself, and second order expectations, which are the expectations an actor
believes others hold for her (1997: 693). They argue that interaction is assumed to be guided by
three motives: contributing to group performance, preserving status, and facilitating interaction.
Essentially, as this applies to the behavior around contracting, individuals would theoretically
adhere to contracts when doing so conforms to expectations about how they should behave given
their set of beliefs about who they are, and when doing so conforms to the expectations they
believe others hold for them. They will be motivated primarily by preserving status and
facilitating interaction, likely to a lesser degree, contributing to group performance. Contracts,
particularly form-adhesive contracts, are interesting indicia of social status. They signal that the
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drafter has the power to unilaterally impose its will on signers. They also send a signal that the
document and text are unimportant, that terms are merelyfine print, and that any hold-up caused
by the signers would retard the primary exchange instead of facilitating it. The message a typical
form-contract sends could be summarized as follows: "This company does a lot of business and
has sufficient legal power and control over resources many demand that it can dictate terms of a
contract to which, you, the signer, have to agree in order to receive the benefit of the bargain.
But, don't worry about the terms of the agreement. You are not alone. Everyone signs, and you
are expected to behave like everyone else. That is the optimum way to ensure that you get the
benefit of the primary exchange, and thus, help contribute to the smooth running economy.
Lastly, this company has a team of lawyers that draft these forms. We don't really fully
understand all the legalese, nor should you expect to be able to understand it-the best thing to
do is to do what everyone else does and just sign." As such, appealing to this propensity to
conform to first and second order social expectations for behavior would likely have a strong,
positive effect on inducing contract performance. Hypothesis six summarizes this prediction.
(H6) Appealing to the common tendency to desire to conform to social norms of
behavior will effectively induce continued contract performance following
attempted breach of contract as compared to other methods of communicating the
same intended result.
4. Instrumental Appeal
Within liberal theory, the clearest main competitor to a social contract theory explanation of
when individuals are more likely to perform pursuant to contracts they have signed has been
utilitarianism (Greenawalt 1985: 5). Numerous scholars have studied the relationship between
norms of contractual exchange on the one hand and power-dependency over contracted-for
resources on the other (Blau and Richardson 1973; Thibaut 1968). Other scholars have carefully
evaluated the notion of efficiency in contractual enforceability (Bebchuk and Posner 2006; Ben-
Shahar 2004; Jolls 1997; Schwartz and Scott 2003; Williamson 1985). Cotterrell describes this
approach as "law's relation to instrumental community is one of promoting efficiency, reliability
and predictability; facilitating the rational pursuit by each contracting party of his or her self-
interest" (2000: 22). Parties contract for efficiency reasons-they evaluate their available
alternatives and enter into the contract that maximizes the likelihood that they will receive a
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marginal rate of return greater than the next best alternative to the sought-after exchange.
Contracts are breached for efficiency's sake in this model, where the costs associated with
breach are outweighed by the anticipated benefits. In this way, all are encouraged to cooperate in
the economic sphere by "defining the terms of a valid economic exchange and enforcing
penalties against parties to a contract who fail to honor their obligations" (Sutton 2001: 40).
Under this model, individuals sign form-adhesive contracts in order to receive the benefit of the
bargain-they need a job or they want the goods being sold. If later, they are prompted to
continue to perform as the contract obligates them, the sole criteria on which signers base their
decisions to comply is this efficiency calculus.
However, there is a good deal of evidence undermining the behavioral assumptions underlying
this model, particularly when it comes to contracts. Williamson summarizes the argument
against the efficiency approach to contract behavior as follows:
I have previously argued that contracting man is distinguished from the orthodox
conception of maximizing man in two respects. First, his ability to receive, store,
retrieve, and process information is strictly limited. Second, contracting man is
given to self-interest seeking of a deeper and more troublesome kind than his
economic man predecessor (1985: 180).
This lament is echoed by others who similarly argue that the rational-actor model in modern
economics is typically lacking emotional or other cognitive motivation. When such extra-
rational motivations and heuristics are recognized, they are often regarded as sustaining behavior
motivated not by rationality but by compliance with social norms (Huang and Wu 1994: 401). It
seems that the orthodox utilitarian perspective would discount the role played by the alternative
prompts evaluated in this study-morality, social constraints or even the role of the law in the
positivistic sense or the "natural" sense, to borrow Greenawalt's (1985) terminology. However,
based on the evidence that instrumental concerns are not as salient as others in evaluating notions
of reciprocal exchange and ideal of justice and fair treatment, it is likely the case that appeals to
instrumentality will not work as well as other methods of prompting continued contractual
performance. Hence, hypothesis seven is as follows:
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(H7) Appealing to instrumental concerns will not effectively induce continued
contract performance following attempted breach of contract as compared to other
methods of communicating the same intended result.
Methods
The experiment ran for 46 days, from October 1, 2008 through November 15, 2008. Subjects
were recruited to participate in the experiment via three methods: (1) pop-under advertising34 via
two centralized internet-based advertising companies, (2) key-word search advertising on
popular web-based search engines, and, (3) direct advertisements placed on various websites
such as facebook.com and myspace.com. The method by which subjects were solicited to
participate does not seem to have a significant effect on the results. These methods, combined,
yielded 1,860 participants, all of whom resided in the United States and were at least 18 years
old. Table 1 reflects descriptive statistics of participants including their reported gender, annual
household income and highest level of educational attainment. Figure 1 demonstrates the
distribution of participants' reported age. The mean age was 31 years old, (std. dev. = 10.7
years). The minimum age was 18, and the oldest participant was 68.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of all participants
Cateorv n Percentage
Female 1,035 56.40%
Education
Less than High School 37 2.03%
34 "Pop-under" advertising is a webpage containing an advertisement that displays in a new browser
window behind or underneath the current browser window. This type of web-advertising is reputedly
more effective than "pop-up" advertising that appears on top of the current browser. The latter is more
likely to be closed before the content is fully loaded, while the latter is able to load undetected while users
browse the web in their current window. When they close it, they see the pop-under advertisement. In
both instances, the advertising is triggered by the user visiting a target website or clicking on a link.
111
High School 877 48.08%
Junior College 370 20.29%
Bachelor's Degree 430 23.57%
Graduate Degree 110 6.03%
Household Income
Less than $10,000 77 5.03%
$10,000 to $19,999 172 11.24%
$20,000 to $39,999 356 23.27%
$40,000 to $59,999 284 18.56%
$60,000 to $99,999 246 16.08%
$100,000 or more 142 9.28%
Prefer not to answer 109 7.12%
Don't know 144 9.41%
Employment Status
Working full time 534 36.25%
In school 334 22.67%
Working part time 242 16.43%
Home maker 140 9.50%
Temporarily not working 84 5.70%
Unemployed or laid off 65 4.41%
Other 31 2.10%
Retired 26 1.77%
Prefer not to answer 17 1.15%
Marital Status
Never married 798 59.24%
Married 420 31.18%
Divorced 72 5.35%
Separated 22 1.63%
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Figure 1: Age of all participants (n=1860)
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Widowed 12 .89%
Prefer not to answer 23 1.71%
Race/Ethnicity
White 1,064 81.22%
Asian or Pacific Islander 64 4.89%
Black 52 3.97%
Hispanic, Chicano or Latino 45 3.44%
American Indian or Alaskan native 19 1.45%
Middle Eastern 6 .46%
Don't know 7 .53%
Prefer not to answer 32 2.44%
Web-based experiments involve less control over participant solicitation and behavior than in
laboratory experiments (Skitka and Sargis 2006). To compensate for this, I took several steps to
maximize the likelihood of ensuring exclusion of dubious data, and to increase the likelihood
that subjects from diverse socio-economic backgrounds participate. Specifically, several system-
gaming prevention measures were put in place on the front-end such as using numerous timed,
coded URLs that changed daily, and designing the experiment to load and run only once on any
given IP address. On the back-end, every participant's activity and response data are carefully
screened to include only instances where no server errors or other activity that is of questionable
interpretation occurred. Additionally, the advertisements targeted a wide swatch of potential
participants, borne out by the relatively normal distribution of income and other related
measures.
Subjects were solicited to participate in a survey about work and employment issues in exchange
for which they were allowed to select a DVD from the thirty titles available. Figure 2 is the pop-
under advertisement soliciting participation in the survey. It depicts some of the DVD titles
available for subjects to select.
114
When subjects clicked to take the survey, they were sent to a page that first checked to ensure
that pop-ups were enabled in their browsers.3 5 If their browsers were not set to accept pop-ups,
they were instructed on how to do this. Following this check, which was likely experienced as a
slight pause in the loading of the next page for most subjects, the introduction page was loaded.
Figure 3 is this introduction page.
35 The experiment was designed and tested to ensure
Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox and Safari.
functionality in the most popular web browsers-
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Are you male or female?
What is the highest level of education you
O male
O female
have completed?
Conue * required
National Science Foundation I ; SSACHLSES
TECHNOLOYG
Subjects answered these three demographic questions (date of birth, gender and educational
attainment) before proceeding. If subjects entered a birthday indicating an age less than eighteen
years old, they received a message indicating that they were not able to participate in the survey
at this time, and the IP address from which they attempted to take the survey was locked out-
preventing any future access to the site via any URL at any future time.
Unbeknownst to the other subjects over eighteen who clicked the "continue" button on the
Introduction page, everyone else was then randomly assigned to one of four experimental
conditions. For ease of reference, these conditions are: (1) conventional boilerplate, (2) non-
substantive choice, (3) substantive choice, and (4) control condition. These will each be
described in greater detail below.
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Subjects randomly assigned to the first condition were sent to a page intended to simulate
conventional on-line boilerplate form-adhesive "terms and conditions". Figure 4 is a screen-shot
of this condition. Subjects are instructed to "please carefully read and agree to the Terms &
Conditions before proceeding to the survey and the DVD selection page." There is a scroll
window in the middle of the screen with a scroll bar on the right-side of the window. Nested
inside the window is a seven paragraph contract entitled, "CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH," and subtitled, "Survey about Work, Employment and Unions
in America."
I ii MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY National Science Foundaon
The full text of the nested contract is as follows:
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
Survey about Work, Employment and Unions in America
Introduction & Purpose of the Study
117
These "Terms & Conditions" govern the contractual relationship between
the Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
("Researchers") and you ("Participant"). The purpose of the study is to
understand how individuals experience and interpret common features of
contemporary consumer and employment transactions as well as issues
pertaining to labor and employment law and unions. By clicking to agree to
these Terms & Conditions, you agree to participate in this research study
pursuant to the terms described herein. You should read the information
below before deciding whether or not to agree to participate.
Confidentiality
No personal information gathered in this study will be disclosed and no data
you may contribute will be published unless your anonymity is maintained,
or your permission for the publication is obtained beforehand. To insure
confidentiality of the information derived from your responses, a subject
number will be assigned to you and all information will be stored under this
number. At the conclusion of the study, your name will be removed from
our files. All research data and related records associated with this study
shall be coded and stored on a secure server to prevent access by any
unauthorized personnel and shall remain in the possession or control of the
Researchers or their agents throughout the process.
Pursuant to these restrictions and assurances, Participant agrees to permit
Researchers full license to use any of Participant's responses and comments
for any purpose, in perpetuity, so long as those responses are not associated
or identifiable as the participant's. Specifically, as an example, Participant
agrees to permit Researchers to use Participant's responses and comments as
the basis of any research intended to be published and disseminated as
widely as Researchers desire, in their sole and unilateral discretion and
judgment, again, without identifying or associating the information with the
participant's name.
Payment for Participation
Participant will be allowed to select one of the DVDs from the titles that are
available. The selected DVD will be mailed to Participant after the study is
completed, which may be four to seven weeks from the time that Participant
completed the survey. Participant agrees that the physical address he or she
provides for the purpose of mailing the selected DVD is accurate. DVDs
will only be shipped to physical addresses (no PO boxes) in the United
States. No returns or exchanges of DVDs will be permitted. Further,
Participant agrees to use the DVD for personal, home-use only and to
comply fully with any and all license agreements associated with the DVD.
No additional compensation will be proffered in exchange for Participant's
participation in this study. After mailing the DVD, the participant's name
and address will be removed from the research data.
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Participation & Withdrawal
Participant is free to choose whether to be in this study or not. Participant
agrees to only complete the survey one time. Researchers may withdraw
Participant from this study if circumstances arise that warrant doing so.
Participant acknowledges and agrees that it is in all of our collective interest
and hence our collective obligation to the social sciences to advance the
state of knowledge about the relationship(s), in whole or in relevant part,
among law, citizenship and civil liability, employment and consumer
transactions, on the one hand and our social positions and other institutional
relationships, on the other. Therefore, if Participant elects to be in this
study, he/she agrees to complete the survey in its entirety, and in so doing,
to respond to all questions as honestly and carefully as possible, and to
participate to the best of Participant's ability. This is a material term of
these Terms & Conditions.
Identification of Investigators
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to
contact Susan Silbey, the Faculty Sponsor of this research or Zev Eigen, the
co-investigator at surveyresearch@mit.edu.
Rights of Research Subjects
These Terms & Conditions shall be governed by, construed and enforced in
accordance with the laws of the State of Massachusetts. In the event that
any covenant, condition or other provision herein contained is held to be
invalid, void or illegal by any court of competent jurisdiction, the same
shall be deemed to be severable from the remainder of these Terms &
Conditions and shall in no way affect, impair or invalidate any other
covenant, condition or other provision contained. If such condition,
covenant or other provision shall be invalid due to its scope or breadth, such
covenant, condition or other provision shall be deemed valid to the extent of
the scope or breadth permitted by law. You are not waiving any legal
claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research
study. If you feel you have been treated unfairly, or you have questions
regarding your rights as a research subject, you may contact the Chairman
of the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects, M.I.T.,
Room E25-143B, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, phone
617.253.6787.
I recorded the total number of seconds subjects spent on this page. The total number of seconds
spent scrolling through the contract was measured as well. The size of the scroll window and the
paragraph spacing were calibrated such that it was relatively easy to gauge the number of
seconds subjects spent by paragraph. Subjects had to click the box indicating their agreement
with the Terms and Conditions above, in order to proceed to the survey. If subjects did not
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check the box agreeing ot the contract, but tried to click the continue button, this incidence was
recorded (although this only happened twice), and subjects were issued a notice asking them to
please read the terms and conditions and then click the box indicating their agreement before
proceeding.
Subjects randomly assigned to the second condition, "non-substantive choice," were shown the
screen-shot depicted in Figure 6. They were instructed to pick one of the two terms listed. The
one that subjects pick will "become part of the contract between you and the researchers
conducting this survey." Subjects choose between permitting the researchers to email them with
follow-up questions or feedback about their responses to the survey, OR agreeing to allow the
researchers to send them mail offers to participate in future research. They have to pick one
before clicking the "OK" box at the bottom of the screen.
re 6: Condition 2: non-sub
This condition is called "non-substantive choice" because it does not matter (from the
researchers perspective) which of these two choices subjects select. No matter which one they
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pick, after clicking the box labeled "OK" they are then sent to a page depicted in Figure 8.
Whichever of the two terms subjects picked appears under the heading, "you have selected the
following term to be added to the 'Terms & Conditions':"
Subjects randomly assigned to the third condition, "substantive choice," were shown the screen-
shot depicted in Figure 7. They were instructed to pick one of the two terms listed. The one that
subjects pick will "become part of the contract between you and the researchers conducting this
survey." Subjects choose between agreeing to complete the survey in its entirety, and to answer
all questions carefully, honestly and completely to the best of their ability, OR agreeing to give
up their choice of which of the thirty DVDs they'll receive. They have to pick one before
clicking the "OK" box at the bottom of the screen.
Subjects who picked the option of giving up their choice of DVDs received a message saying
that they were dropped from the survey. 26 subjects, or six percent of those assigned to the third
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condition, selected this option. The other ninety-four percent (n=413) of subjects in the third
condition36 selected the first option (of completing the survey in its entirety), and were then
directed to the selection confirmation page depicted in Figure 8.
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As in the first condition (conventional boilerplate), whether subjects scroll through the contract,
and how many seconds they spend scrolling are recorded for those in the second and third
conditions as well. Subjects randomly assigned to the fourth "control" condition were not asked
to review and sign anything. After they completed the three questions on the introduction page,
they were directed immediately into the survey itself. Table 2 lists the four conditions and the
associated numbers of participants.
36 Fifteen subjects picked neither option and elected instead to discontinue their participation in the survey
after being randomly assigned to the third condition. By comparison, twenty-three subjects selected
neither option in the non-substantive choice condition.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by conditional assignment
Condition n Percentage
1. Conventional 484 26.02%Boilerplate
2. Non-substantive
choice458 24.62%
3. Substantive choice 454 24.41%
4. Control (no contract) 464 24.95%
Total: 1,860 100%
All subjects except for those randomly assigned to the fourth condition (control) entered the
survey having agreed to do the whole survey as accurately and honestly as possible to the best of
their ability. Those in the first condition (conventional boilerplate) and those in the second
condition (non-substantive choice) have only had the opportunity to see this term as it appeared
at the end of the fifth paragraph of the contract (entitled "Participation and Withdrawal") nested
in the scroll window. That is, they may or may not have seen it or read it. Those in the third
condition (substantive choice) chose this term and are therefore much more likely to have seen it
and read it.
All participants then enter the survey. The survey is 480 questions long, spread out over 480
individual pages. There is no indication given to participants at any point in the experiment of
the length of the survey or the estimated time it takes to complete it. Each question appears in a
new browser window with no navigation buttons. The only way to navigate to the next question
from any survey question window is to click the "CONTINUE" button at the bottom of the
question. Figure 9 is a screen-shot of one page of the survey.
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Figure 9: Example otsun' uestion ae
1http://www.surveoboutwork.com/dvd/survey? pogeid3562
How do you feel about the following statement: "Work
is not about having a 'relationship,' it's just a way to
make money." *
O 1. Strongly disagree
O 2. Somewhat disagree
O 3. Neither agree nor disagree
O 4. Somewhat agree
O 5. Strongly agree
O Prefer not to answer
O Not applicable
Continue Exit
SMASSRCHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Naional Scice Founion
The survey windows are designed to limit the ability of subjects to exit or go-back. Subjects are
able to exit the survey in one of three ways: (1) closing the tab by clicking the red X in the upper
right-hand corner of the question window, (2) closing the browser, or (3) clicking the "EXIT"
button at the bottom of the question window. There is a four-second delay that is programmed
into the survey in between every survey question such that clicking the "CONTINUE" button
triggers this four-second delay before the next survey question loads.
Appendix 1 contains a list of all 480 questions in the survey. 321 of the 480 questions, or sixty-
seven percent, are multiple choice questions like the one depicted in Figure 9. Of these, most are
likert-style. The remaining 159 (33%) require subjects to answer the questions by typing in text
in the text-boxes provided. The mean number of words per question is 35.75 (std. dev. = 14.33).
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Figure 10 shows the word-count for each question in the survey. The red line represents the
mean.
Figure 10: Word count of each survey question
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Survey Questions 1 through 480
Each survey question's reading ease score was measured along six dimensions: (1) Flesch
Reading Ease Score, (2) Automated Readability Index, (3) Flesch-Kincaid grade level, (4)
Coleman-Liau Index, (5) Gunning-Fog Index, and, (6) the SMOG Index (Flesch 1951; Harrison
1977; Klare 1974-75). These measures account for things like the word-count, syllables per
word, number of letters per word, number of sentences, and number of "complex" words. Figure
11 depicts the scatter plots of these six measures across all 480 survey questions. The horizontal
red lines depict the means. For the most part, these readability measures seem to have little, if
any effect on how much of the survey subjects complete, or the question on which subjects try to
quit.
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Figure 11: Scatter plots of six readability metrics of all 480 survey questions
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Survey Questions 1 through 480
Demographic questions appear at the beginning of the survey for obvious reasons. The
remainder of the survey is mostly devoted to questions about employment and unions. Many of
the questions come from pre-existing surveys. For instance, all of the questions from Robinson
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and Rousseau's (1994) article about the psychological contract at work were included (see
Appendix 1, questions 23, 53, 105, 460, 107, 108, 109 among others. Other sources of questions
include the General Social Survey, Coyle-Shapiro's (2002) article about the psychological
contract at work, Eisenberger, Cotterell and Marvel's (1987) article examining the incidence of
use of reciprocity for self-gain, Folger and Konovsky's (1989) article evaluating the impact of
distributive and procedural justice on the reaction of employees to decision about pay raises,
Moorman's (1991) article assessing the relationship between perceptions of fairness and
organizational citizenship at work as well as questions from other sources including earlier
research by the author. Questions that could tip the hand of what is ultimately being measured
were excluded.
As the survey is specifically engineered to induce participants to try to quit, it is not surprising
that almost all of the participants did attempt to quit doing the survey at some point, which, in the
case of subjects assigned to conditions 1 through 3, constituted breach of the contract (because
the contract required them to complete the survey in its entirety as honestly and accurately as
possible). There were a total of forty-seven subjects who completed all 480 questions without
trying to quit even once. Interestingly, and perhaps as a pseudo-check on the randomness of the
distribution of subjects across the conditions, these forty-seven individuals with the fortitude,
patience, tolerance and perhaps strong desire to obtain a free DVD were nearly uniformly
distributed across the conditions: thirteen in conditions 1, 2 and 4, and eight in condition 3.
When subjects attempt to exit the survey in any way possible--by closing the tab or browser or
by clicking the "EXIT" button-they are randomly assigned to receive a prompt that asks them
to return and finish the survey. For subjects in conditions 1 through 3, there are four possible
prompts: (1) legal, (2) moral, (3) instrumental, or (4) social. For subjects assigned to condition 4
(control), there is only one "generic" prompt available. The legal, moral, social and instrumental
prompts all remind subjects that they clicked to sign a contract that requires them to complete the
survey in its entirety as accurately and honestly as possible. They all quote the same sentence
from the contract purporting to bind subjects to do so. They all ask the subjects to return and
complete the remainder of the survey. The prompts vary in the basis on which this appeal is
made. As their names suggest, the legal prompt bases its plea to complete the survey on legal
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grounds-suggesting that subjects who do not complete the survey are in "breach of contract."
The moral prompt grounds its authority for the request to finish the survey and comply with the
agreement in moral terms-suggesting that subjects made a "binding promise" by signing and
that they should therefore "live up to their word" to finish the survey as the contract requires.
The instrumental prompt grounds its authority to return and complete the survey strictly on the
desire to receive a free DVD of the subjects' choice. The social prompt lends the impression that
a high percentage of subjects have complied with the contract and that this subject was one of
very few who did not comply. As subjects in the fourth condition did not enter into a contract
obliging them to complete the whole survey, when these participants attempt to quit, they receive
a generic prompt simply asking them to return and complete the remainder of the survey. In all
instances, no indication is given to subjects of the percentage of the survey completed or
remaining. All five the prompts are depicted in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Screen shots ofprompts
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Table 3 lists the descriptive statistics regarding random prompt assignment.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of prompt ass ignment
Prompt n Percentage
Legal 315 21.36%
Moral 234 15.86%
Instrumental 257 17.42%
Social 258 17.49%
Generic 411 27.86%
Total: 1,475 100%
After participants receive one of the prompts, they can either continue answering survey
questions, or they terminate their participation. Either way, the second time subjects try to exit
the survey, they are immediately directed to a "debrief page," (Figure 12) that informs them that
they will still receive a DVD of their choice when they enter in their shipping information on the
following web page. The debrief page also asks participants to rank-order the reasons why they
kept going with the survey. After subjects answer this question and click on the "CONTINUE"
button at the bottom of the screen, they are immediately directed to a page where they fill out
their address information and select one of the DVDs3 7 to be shipped to them free of charge.
37 The list of DVD titles available from which participants could select is as follows: The Abyss (special
edition), Big Mama's House, Cast Away (2 disc special edition), Cheaper by the Dozen 2, The
Commitments (2 disc special edition), Daredevil, Die Hard (special edition), Dodgeball, Down with Love,
Epic Movie, Fantastic 4, Fever Pitch (special edition), Fight Club, The French Connection (special
edition), Full Monty (special edition), A Good Year, I Heart Huckabees, In Her Shoes, Kingdom of
Heaven, Lake Placid, Mr. & Mrs. Smith, Napoleon Dynamite, Nine to Five, Office Space, Pathfinder,
Point Break, The Sentinel, Sideways, Thank You for Smoking, and, Unfaithful. The DVDs
(approximately 30 copies of each title listed above) were generously donated by Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corporation.
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Research Findings
A. Adherence to Contract Terms Based on Pre-Agreement Conditions
The first three hypotheses involve assessments of the effects, if any, of the pre-agreement
conditions under which subjects enter form-adhesive contracts on subjects' subsequent
performance of a contract term. The first hypothesis states that having some choice in the pre-
agreement phase will induce greater contract performance than when contract signers have no
choice at all. Testing this hypothesis requires a comparison of the contract performance of
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subjects randomly assigned to the conventional boilerplate condition to subjects in the non-
substantive choice condition. The second hypothesis states that choosing the salient contract
term will correspond with greater performance of that contract term than the other conditions.
Testing this hypothesis requires a comparison of the contract performance of subjects assigned to
the substantive choice condition to subjects in the non-substantive choice condition and to the
conventional boilerplate condition. The third hypothesis states that subjects with bound by a
form-adhesive contract with no choice will not perform under the contract any differently than
subjects who asked to perform who had not entered into any contract at all. Testing this
hypothesis requires a comparison of contract performance across the boilerplate condition and
the control condition.
Two dependent variable measures of contract performance were used: (1) the number of pre-
prompt survey questions answered (that is, the number of questions subjects answered before
they tried to quit the survey), and (2) the total number of survey questions answered. As a
reminder, all subjects except for those assigned to the control condition had consented to finish
the entire survey, answering all questions as accurately and honestly as possible, so both of these
dependent variables are offered as relatively continuous, behavioral measures of contract
performance.
ANOVA results showed that the condition to which subjects were randomly assigned
significantly affected the degree to which subjects performed under the contract. (F3,1349= 4.07; p
< .007 for pre-prompt questions, and F3,1396 = 3.86; p < .009 for total questions). However, mean
contract performance as measured by pre-prompt questions answered and total questions
answered is not significantly different for those assigned to the conventional boilerplate
condition from the contract performance of those assigned to the non-substantive choice
condition. Table 4 sets forth the relevant statistics. There is therefore insufficient evidence to
support the first hypothesis.
133
Table 4: Contract performance across conditions
Pre-Prompt Questions Total Questions
Answered Answered
n mean sd n mean Sd
Condition
1. Conventional 381 82.4 112.1 394 124 148.1
Boilerplate (no choice)
2. Non-substantive Choice 322 91.9 103.2 335 132 138.9
3. Substantive Choice 266 106.8 116.7 274 150.3 145.6
4. Control 384 78.1 109.9 397 112.6 144.8
In evaluating the second hypothesis, the mean pre-prompt questions for subjects assigned to the
substantive choice condition (106.8; s.d. = 116.7) is significantly different from the mean
number of pre-prompt questions answered by subjects assigned to the conventional boilerplate
condition (82.4; s.d. = 112.1) (p < .008). The mean total questions answered by subjects from
the substantive choice condition (150.3; s.d. = 145.6) is also statistically significantly different
from the mean total survey questions answered by subjects randomly assigned to the
conventional boilerplate condition (124; s.d. = 148.1) (p < .02). This supports the second
hypothesis.
In evaluating the third hypothesis, neither the mean pre-prompt questions answered nor the mean
total questions answered of the conventional boilerplate condition is significantly distinguishable
(p = .59 for pre-prompt questions; p = .27 for total questions) from the control condition (no
contract). Figures 13 and 14 are graphical representations of the means of the pre-prompt
questions and total questions respectively for the four conditions. The horizontal lines represent
95% confidence intervals around the means, a more conservative estimation than may be
necessary. The graphs demonstrate two key points. First, there is no significant difference in the
contract performance of individuals who signed a form-adhesive contract purporting to legally
obligate them to take a survey versus individuals who signed no contract at all. Second, there is
some, but only slight evidence to support the "choice" model influencing post-agreement
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contract performance. Third, the most profound effect is the effect of selecting the salient term
(the substantive choice condition).
Figure 14: Pre-prompt contract performance (questions answered) across conditions
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Figure 15: Total questions answered across conditions
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B. Continued Contract Performance Based on Legal and Extra-Legal Appeals
The second set of four hypotheses addresses participants' behavior when they try to quit the
survey. All but forty-seven subjects try to quit at some point. When they do try to quit,
subjects in all conditions except for the control are randomly assigned to receive one of the four
prompts described above: legal, moral, instrumental and social. Subjects assigned to the control
condition (no contract) were all prompted with the "generic" prompt (See figure 12). For ease
of reference, please refer to table 5. Hypothesis four states that the legal prompt will not elicit
greater contract performance than the generic prompt. On table 5, this corresponds with
comparing 1L, 2L and 3L to 4G. Hypothesis five states that the moral prompt will do better in
this respect. Again, on table 5, this corresponds with comparing IM, 2M and 3M to the other
prompts (1L-3L, 11-31, 1S-3S and 4G). Hypothesis six states that the instrumental prompt will
not fare as well as the other means of communication. On table 5, this entails a comparison of
1I, 21 and 31 with the other prompts (1L-3L, IM-3M, 1S-3S and 4G). Hypothesis seven states
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that the social prompt will elicit better contract performance than the other means of
communication. On table 5, this entails a comparison of 1S, 2S and 3S with the other prompts.
Table 5: Experimental design overview
Promptsl Legal Moral Instrumental Social Generic
ConditionsV
1.Conventional boilerplate 1L 1M 11 1S
2. Non-substantive choice 2L 2M 21 2S
3. Substantive choice 3L 3M 31 3S
4. Control (no contract) 4G
Two measures are used to test this set of hypotheses. The first is a continuous measure of
contract performance following receipt of any of the prompts. The total number of post-prompt
questions ranges from zero to 479. It would be zero if a subject received a prompt and answered
no additional survey questions. The second measure reported below is a dichotomous variable
indicating whether subjects went back to do at least one additional question following receipt of
a prompt. This variable takes the value zero if subjects do zero questions following receipt of
the prompt, and takes the value one if subjects answer at least one question following receipt of a
prompt. This latter variable could be thought of as a contract recidivism rate, independent of a
measure of the quantity of performance, while the former variable is a measure of the quantity of
contract performance following receipt of a prompt. In tandem, both measures offer a useful
picture of how subjects behave following receipt of the prompts. Below, hypotheses four
through seven are evaluated first based on a comparison of the number of post-prompt questions
answered, and then based on a comparison of the percent of subjects assigned to each prompt
who returned to do at least one question following receipt of a prompt.
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1. Post-prompt survey questions answered
ANOVA results showed that the prompt subjects were randomly assigned to receive significantly
affected the degree to which subjects' performed under the contract following attempted breach
(F 4,1347= 5.96; p < .001 for post-prompt questions). Table 6 sets forth the relevant statistics.
Table 6: Post-prompt questions answered by prompt
Prompt n Mean sd
Legal 285 18.1 41.5
Moral 200 47.7 100.2
Instrumental 252 28 74
Social 231 29.5 72.4
Generic 384 22.1 66.2
Hypothesis four is supported as there is no significant difference (p=.17) between the post-
prompt contract performance for those legally threatened (m=18.1; sd=41.5) versus those who
were assigned to the generic prompt (m=22.1; sd=66.2), which requested that they return and
finish the survey where no contract was signed or referenced in the prompt (see Figure 12).
Hypothesis five receives the most support of all the hypotheses. Those assigned to the moral
prompt did significantly more post-prompt questions (m=47.7; sd=100.2) than each and every
group of subjects assigned to the other prompts (legal: m=18.1; sd=41.5; p<.0001, instrumental:
m=28; sd=74; p<.01, social: m=29.5; sd=72.4; p<.02, and generic: m=22.1; sd=66.2; p<.001).
Table 7 lays out the significance level of the Welch estimations of t-test scores of all of the
relevant comparisons.
There is mixed support for hypothesis six. There is no significant difference (p=. 15) between the
post-prompt contract performance of subjects randomly assigned to receive the instrumental
prompt (m=28; sd=74) versus those who received the generic prompt (m=22.1; sd=66.2). There
is also no significant difference (p=.41) between the post-prompt performance of the
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instrumental group as compared with the social prompt group (m=29.5; sd=72.4). However,
those assigned to the instrumental prompt did significantly more post-prompt questions than
those assigned to the legal prompt (p<.03), but significantly fewer questions than those assigned
to the moral prompt (p<. 01).
Hypothesis seven also receives mixed support. Those randomly assigned to the social prompt
(m=29.5; sd=72.4) did significantly more questions than those assigned to the legal prompt
(p<.02), but significantly fewer questions than those assigned to the moral prompt (p<.02). The
post-prompt performance of those assigned the social prompt is only marginally different from
the performance of the generic prompt (p=.10), and not significantly different from the post-
prompt performance of the instrumental prompt group (p=.41).
Table 7: One-sided t-test significance
prompt
levels for post-prompt questions answered by
Figure 16 is provided as a visual comparison of the data. It is a more conservative estimate, as it
depicts 95% confidence intervals around the means.
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Legal Moral Instrumental Social
Legal
Moral p<.0001
Instrumental p<.03 p<.01 --
Social p<.02 p<.02 ns --
Generic ns p<.001 ns p<.10
Figure 16: Post-prompt contract performance across prompts
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2. Percent of subjects who return to do at least one survey question following receipt
of a prompt
A chi-square test is applied to test for the existence of a relationship between random prompt
assignment and whether subjects returned after receipt of a prompt to answer at least one more
question. The results indicate that there is a highly statistically significant relationship between
prompt assignment and whether subjects go back (chi-square with four degrees of freedom =
46.3; p < .0001). Also, for each prompt, a one sample binomial test is applied to test whether the
percentage of subjects assigned significantly differs from fifty and one-half percent, which is the
rate at which subjects returned who were assigned to the generic prompt. Table 8 sets out all of
the return rates for the five prompts and the p values for the binomial tests against the control.
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Table 8: Percent who return to do at least one question following receipt ofprompt
p value for 2-sided
binomial test against
Prompt n return % return generic (50.5 %)
Legal 285 131 46.0% p =.14
Moral 200 141 70.5% p < .0001
Instrumental 252 108 42.9% p = .02
Social 231 139 60.2% p = .004
Generic 384 194 50.5%
Total 1,352 713 52.7%
In support of the fourth hypothesis, the recidivism rate for subjects assigned to the legal prompt
(46%) is the only prompt that does not differ significantly (p = .14) from the rate for those
assigned to the generic prompt (50.5%) in terms of the rate at which subjects returned following
receipt of the prompt to do at least one more survey question. That is, the post-attempted-breach
likelihood of compliance of those prompted to continue taking the survey by being threatened by
a legally valenced warning not to breach the contract is statistically indistinguishable from the
likelihood of compliance of subjects who took the survey without first entering into a contract
purporting to require them to take the whole survey when generically asked to return to finish
taking the survey.
Again, the fifth hypothesis (that the legal prompt would do the best job at inducing contract
performance), received the most support. Seventy and one half percent of those assigned to the
legal prompt returned following receipt of the prompt. This is highly, significantly different
from the post-prompt recidivism rate of each of the other prompt groups (legal: p < .0001;
instrumental: p < .0001; social: p < .001; generic: p < .0001). Table 9 sets forth the p-values for
the two-sided binomial tests among the various prompt groups.
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Table 9: 2-sided binomial test significance levels for post-prompt return rate by prompt
Legal Moral Instrumental Social
Legal --
Moral p < .0001
Instrumental ns (p = .34) p < .0001
Social p <.0001 p <.001 p <.0001 --
Generic ns (p = .14) p < .0001 p < .05 p < .01
The sixth hypothesis (that the instrumental prompt would not do better than the other groups) is
supported. At only a forty-three percent return rate following prompt receipt, the instrumental
prompt is the least effective at inducing subjects to return to do at least one more question. This
makes sense assuming that all participants taking the survey are doing so (at least in part) to
receive the offered incentive-a free DVD of their choice. Presumably, subjects' individual
levels of tolerance for taking an online survey in order to receive a free DVD was maxed out
when they first attempted to quit. If they then received a reminder telling them that if they do not
continue, they won't receive a free DVD, it is not surprising that less than half of them do not do
any additional questions. They already reached their maximum threshold for survey taking and
had tried to quit for the very reason that the instrumental prompt reminds them.
The seventh hypothesis (the social prompt will do well compared to the other prompts at
inducing post-attempted-breach performance) received substantial support vis-A-vis the rate of
return. Approximately sixty percent of those assigned to the social prompt returned following
receipt of the prompt. This is highly, significantly different from the post-prompt recidivism rate
of each of the other prompt groups (legal: p < .0001; moral: p < .0001 (although, legal is the only
prompt that does better than social at inducing performance); instrumental: p < .0001; generic: p
< .01). Figure 17 provides a graphical, conservative representation of the recidivism rates by
prompt, with the associated 95% confidence intervals around the means.
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Figure 17: Percent of subjects returning to the survey following receipt of prompt across
Prompts
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Additional Findings
In addition to the hypotheses and results discussed above, it is worth noting several additional
findings emergent from this experiment. First, I discuss the likelihood of subjects taking time to
scroll through and possibly read the contract into which they are entering and the relationship
between the conditions and the amount of time spent reading. Second, and closely related to
this, I then discuss the relationship between how much time subjects spend scrolling through the
contract and contract performance (survey questions answered). Third, it is worth exploring the
effects of several demographic characteristics including age and gender on dependent variables
of interest.
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A. When are Contract-Signers More or Less Likely to Scroll (Read) the Contract?
As mentioned in the Methods section, I measured how many seconds per line subjects spend
scrolling through the contract embedded in the scroll window for all subjects in all conditions
except for the control condition, where subjects were not exposed to a contract at all. Figure 5
shows the contract embedded in the scroll window as experienced by subjects in the
conventional boilerplate condition, and Figure 8 shows the contract in the scroll window for
subjects in the non-substantive choice and the substantive choice conditions. One assumption
often made in the literature on form-adhesive agreements is that signers often do not bother to
read these agreements (Ben-Shahar 2004; Eisenberg 1995)38 . As with the first part of this work,
examining the actual behavior of individuals confronted with a form-adhesive agreement has
unveiled information that calls into question the uniformity of this assumption. Perhaps, as with
perceptions of enforceability of form-adhesive contracts explored in the first part, different
conditions affect the likelihood of signers reading the contract before consenting to it, and
perhaps this variation is at least in part, systematic and observable.
As it turns out, there seems to be some systematic difference in the amount of time subjects in
the experiment spent scrolling based on conditional assignment. Subjects in the conventional
boilerplate condition spent 92.1 seconds scrolling (sd = 587.8) versus 38.3 for the non-
substantive choice subjects (sd = 82.0) and 30.2 (sd = 79.0) for those randomly assigned to the
substantive choice condition (Table 10).
Table 10: Seconds spent scrolling through contract by condition
Condition n mean sd
1. Conventional boilerplate 394 92.1 587.8
2. Non-substantive choice 335 38.3 82.0
3. Substantive choice 274 30.2 79.0
38 A recent New York Times article cited Greg Lastowka, an associate professor at the Rutgers School of
Law as saying, "most web sites today offer terms of service that are designed to protect and further the
interests of the company writing the terms, and most people simply agree to terms without reading them."
Stelter, Brian. 2009. "Facebook's Users Ask Who Owns Information." in The New York Times. New
York.
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The difference between the conventional boilerplate time spent and the non-substantive choice
time is only marginally significant at a 90% level (p = .07), but the difference between the
conventional boilerplate condition and the substantive choice condition is significant at the 95%
level (p = .04). There seems to be some inverse effect of amount of information provided
upfront in big, bold font on the likelihood of spending time reading the "fine print" nested in a
scroll window. Figure 18 is included as a visual, more conservative (95% confidence intervals)
representation of this effect.
Figure 18: Seconds spent scrolling through the contract by condition
B. The Relationship Between Scrolling through the Contract and Contract
Performance
Does it make a difference whether contract signers spend zero seconds (as most assume they do),
thirty seconds (as they seem to do in the choice conditions) or three times that amount (as they
seem to do in the conventional boilerplate condition)? This section tests the relationship (if any)
between time spent scrolling and contract performance. For the sake of simplicity, I compare
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only the boilerplate condition and the substantive choice condition. I subdivide the standard
boilerplate condition subjects into eight categories according to the number of seconds spent
scrolling: 1. zero seconds; 2. greater than zero and less than fifteen seconds; 3. greater than or
equal to fifteen seconds and less than thirty seconds; 4. greater than or equal to thirty seconds
and less than sixty seconds; 5. greater than or equal to sixty seconds and less than ninety
seconds; 6. greater than or equal to ninety seconds and less than one-hundred and eighty seconds;
7. greater than one-hundred and eighty seconds and less than two-hundred and forty seconds; and
8. equal to or greater than two-hundred and forty seconds. The number of questions these
subjects answer before first trying to quit (pre-prompt questions) is compared to the number of
pre-prompt questions answered by all subjects assigned to the substantive choice condition. This
comparison is made because all subjects in the substantive choice condition saw and chose the
salient term of interest-to complete the whole survey as accurately and honestly as possible.
So, this is a useful comparison between reading the contract and those who saw and chose the
critical term, in terms of contract performance. The contract performance of those who spent
time scrolling in the conventional boilerplate condition is roughly indistinguishable from the
contract performance of those in the substantive choice condition. As demonstrated by Table 11,
the mean for all subjects in the substantive choice condition was 106.8 pre-prompt questions
answered (sd = 116.7). The mean pre-prompt questions answered for all subjects in the
conventional boilerplate condition was 82.4 (sd = 112.1). While this difference is statistically
significant (p < .008), the difference between the substantive choice's group's contract
performance is not statistically significantly distinct from subjects contract performance in the
conventional boilerplate condition who had spent some time scrolling through the terms and
conditions at the consent phase. Table 11 lists the means and two-sided t-test p values
comparing the eight subgroups of the conventional boilerplate condition with the substantive
choice condition.
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Table 11: Pre-prompt questions answered by seconds spent scrolling through contract
2-sided t test p
Time spent valuesCondition n Mean sd
scrolling compared to
subst. choice
Conventional boilerplate 0 seconds 114 26.80 63.8 p < .0001
0 < t < 15 141 87.5 106.6 90% (p = .09)
15 < t < 30 25 118.52 140.0 ns (p = .69)
30 t < 60 25 116.6 116.6 ns (p = .70)
60 < t 90 19 120.6 117.0 ns (p = .62)
90 < t 5 180 33 125.8 140.0 ns (p = .46)
180 5 t 240 13 142.5 166.2 ns (p = .46)
t _> 240 11 166.0 96.6 90% (p = .07)
Substantive choice all times 266 106.8 116.7 --
As this comparison demonstrates, those who read the contract or at least make an effort to scroll
through it, seem to perform the contract like those in the substantive choice condition who had
read and chose the condition. This lends support to the theory that the act of choosing the
contract term is perhaps not as important as knowing that the term is there. In short, it is the
surprise aspect of the form-adhesive contract that seems to have the most detrimental impact on
contract performance, perhaps less so than the adhesive nature of the contract. Figure 19 is
included below as a graphical representation of the data comparative results described herein.
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Figure 19: Pre-prompt contract performance by seconds spent scrolling through the contract
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C. Effects of Age and Gender on Contract Performance
A thorough investigation of all demographic characteristics collected is beyond the scope of this
work, but it is worth discussing briefly two of these traits and their effects on contract
performance. It appears that both age and being female have a negative effect on contract
performance as measured by both pre-prompt questions and total questions answered. Both are
negatively correlated with performance (-.15 for both age and being female for pre-prompt
questions; p < .0001; and -.12 for age and -.18 for being female; p < .0001). Interestingly, there
is no correlation between age and the likelihood of returning after being prompted to do so (p =
.57), but there women are slightly more likely to return (p = .06). Table 12 contains the relevant
statistics.
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Table 12: Correlations between age and gender and contract performance
Pre-prompt questions Total questions Post-prompt return
age -.15 -.12 .02
(p < .0001) (p < .0001) ns (p = .57)
female -.15 -.18 .05
(p < .0001) (p < .0001) (p < .10)
These effects are quite robust. Fitting the data to several models including various other
independent variables reproduces these results, in some instances with greater magnitude and
significance. For instance, in applying a logistic regression of the likelihood of post-prompt
return on subjects' age, gender, education and income, controlling for the other included
characteristics, the odds of a woman returning to do at least one more question following receipt
of a prompt is 129% greater than the odds of a male returning to do at least one more question (n
= 1,086; chi2(4) = 7.03; p < .05; std error = .16). In short, older subjects and female subjects are
each apparently less willing to spend their time taking the survey to receive a free DVD, but
women are significantly more likely to return to do at least one more question when prompted to
do so. This finding appears consistent with research on the relationship between gender and the
propensity to initiate negotiations (Babcock and Laschever 2003; Babcock et al. 2006) that tends
to find that women are less likely than men to initiate negotiations.
Implications
This portion of the dissertation contributes important behavioral evidence to the discussion about
the place of form-adhesive contracts in contemporary life. It also advances the behavioral theory
of contract in significant ways by documenting how form-adhesive contracts are experienced and
interpreted, and how, in turn, this set of observed behaviors relates to perceived contract
enforceability and contract performance. In the broadest sense, this part of the work offers
evidence supporting the theory about the bifurcated reciprocal relationship articulated in the first
part of this work. Individuals reciprocate contractual treatment with the organizations that
mediate the relationship between the state and citizens (see Figure 2 in Part 1). They do this
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based in part on their experiences with how the organization treats them. The evidence of the
substantive choice condition eliciting greater contract performance than the other conditions
supports this-so does the lack of difference between the conventional boilerplate condition and
the no-contract control condition. Evidence presented in this part also broadly supports the
notion that individual social actors also reciprocate with the state with a diminished respect for
the rule of law, turning "law" in the expressive sense into a prism, reflecting the light of other
extra-legal sources of authority (see Figure 2 in Part 1). The various prompts are like twists of
the prism, through which the light of these extra-legal sources effectively shines. Consistent
with prior research, the moral prompt shines the brightest.
More specifically, the findings lend support for several noteworthy effects. First, this study
demonstrates support for the connection between how individuals experience the consent phase
of contracting and their post-agreement behavior vis-A-vis the contract's terms. When subjects
see and actively select the contract term, they are significantly more likely to perform that
contract term's requirements than when they have no such choice or input into the process.
Indeed, even when subjects have no choice, as in the conventional boilerplate condition, but they
spend some time scrolling (reading) the contract, they are more likely to adhere to the contract's
terms. This could be regarded as an extension of other findings by Ward, et al. (2006; 2008) of
the positive effects of acknowledging negative elements of proposals in negotiations. That work
shows that in traditional pre-agreement dyadic negotiations, the effect of acknowledging a
negative proposal results in a greater likelihood of a positive reception of that proposal. Perhaps,
the evidence from this study demonstrates that subjects who see and choose the terms, thereby
participating, even only marginally in the "negotiation" process, are less likely to feel duped later
when they are expected to perform according to the term that was presented to them up-front.
Second, this study demonstrates, ceteris paribus, the most support for the moral prompting of
contract performance, as compared to a legal threat, an instrumental reminder or social pressure.
Those randomly assigned to receive the moral prompt-reminding them that they had made a
binding promise to do something and that they should therefore live up to their word and do it-
answered more questions than those assigned to the other groups, and were more likely to return
and do at least one question when prompted. Perhaps this result supports theories that suggest
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that the rule of law is enhanced to the degree that it bends to morality, particularly in the context
of power-imbalanced exchanges like those invariably underlying form-adhesive contracting
between organizations and individual signers.
There was mixed support for the effects of the social prompt. Those receiving the social prompt
were significantly more likely to return to do at least one more question, but their contract
performance in terms of number of questions answered was not significantly different from the
instrumental prompt, and was only marginally statistically distinct at the ninety percent level
from the generic group where no contract was signed requiring them to answer the whole survey.
That said, the social prompt group still answered significantly more questions than those who
received the legal prompt. In all, it seems that these results are indicative of the need to conduct
more research on the relationship between social pressures and constraints and contract
performance.
Third, this study reveals some clear carryover from the pre-agreement phase to the post-
agreement phase of several important relationships between demographics and contract
performance including age and gender. This too seems worthy of additional study, as the
findings are consistent with several theories. The post-agreement phase of negotiations could
prove a further useful testing ground for adjudicating among competing theories.
Lastly, it is worth noting the following example of how these effects studied in this experiment
come to bear in the real world. Recently, the most popular on-line social networking site with
almost 175 million active users worldwide, "Facebook," received media attention when some
consumer groups pointed out that the form-adhesive agreement Facebook has all of its
participants digitally sign contained provisions allegedly "unknown to many users" according to
the New York Times, that give "broad power to the Web site operators" (Stelter 2009). The issue
came to light when a blog, "Consumerist," part of the advocacy group "Consumers Union,"
interpreted changes Facebook made to its "Terms & Conditions" that all Facebook users signed
to mean that "anything you upload to Facebook can be used by Facebook in any way they deem
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fit, forever, no matter what you do later."39 This blog post received approximately 300,000
views (Stelter 2009). Facebook responded by saying that in spite of the contract's clear language
allowing this, "that people own their information and control who they share it with has
remained constant." But the company did not change the language in the Terms and Conditions
to reflect this. As the New York Times article on the subject noted, Sasha Frere-Jones, a writer
for The New Yorker observed that "Zuckerberg's response to protest is just the modem version of
'ignore the fine print, ma'am, just sign here"' (Stelter 2009). Ms. Frere-Jones goes on to say,
"why would anyone trust a company with his or her personal information, especially when that
company's explicit legal language claims eternal rights to exploit that information, and there is
good reason to expect that they will?" (Stelter 2009). Her response is a good example of the
reciprocal response theorized by the behavioral theory of contract. In the model depicted in
Figure 2 of the first part of this work, her response is represented by the upwards arrow from the
"individuals" box pointing towards the "corporations" box.
The progression described above is not uncommon. Indeed, something very similar happened
when Myspace changed its form-adhesive license agreement with artists posting their content on
Myspace's website. A company drafts a contract, revises its terms unilaterally, attempting to
sneak in provisions clearly in its interest and against the interest of the individual signers. When
the terms come to light, then and only then does the company claim not to have intended to
enforce the agreement's clear and unambiguously broad language against its customers. Lastly,
the response theorized and observed in part by this study is encapsulated by Ms. Frere-Jones'
comment. The first and foremost reaction is a negative reciprocal reaction to the drafting
organization-"why would anyone trust a company with his or her personal information...".
Second is the implicit reciprocal relationship with the state: "there is good reason to expect that
they will [claim eternal rights to exploit personal information]." The law stands idly by,
enabling the power-imbalanced contractual exchange to permit Facebook to exploit unwary
individual signers to forfeit "legal rights". It is not the law, or the expressive nature of the law
that is dictating how individual signers behave, nor is it the law that drives how Facebook
responds, nor is it the law that determines the extent to which Facebook or individual signers
39 See http://consumerist.com/5154745/facebook-clarifies-terms-of-service-we-do-not-own-your-stuff-
forever (last visited April 12, 2009).
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will be bound by the contract. Rather, extra-legal sources of authority dictate behavior at each
and every step.
But this is not the end of Facebook's terms and conditions revision saga. The story has a happy
ending (maybe). The company's experience led it to believe in the importance of transparent and
fair contracting. Over a thiry-day period ending on April 16, 2009, Facebook solicited
comments from "users and experts" on revisions to its "Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities." 40  From April 16 through April 23, Facebook is allowing users to vote on
which version of this document would go into effect-the existing version drafted unilaterally by
the company, or the revised version based on users comments. Here is the text of Facebook's
communication about this vote that is prominently displayed in a text box when users log onto
the site:
About the Vote
On February 26, Facebook announced plans to make site governance more
transparent and democratic. Since that time, users and experts around the world
have been providing comments on the new documents Facebook proposed to
govern the site and replace the existing Terms of Service - the Statement of
Rights and Responsibilities and Facebook Principles. Facebook has read the
comments on these documents and has revised the documents based on this
feedback. Now, please vote to let Facebook know which documents you think
should govern the site.
To be notified about future proposed changes to the documents governing
Facebook, please become a Fan of the Facebook Site Governance Page.41
At the very least, this move by Facebook to respond to the previous bad press on its unilateral
amendments to its terms and conditions offers some hope that organizations will pay attention
and respond when employees, consumers, and citizens generally voice their concern over
40
http://apps.facebook.com/fbsitevote/contests/208/entries/new? fb fromhash=38a3f23685clf65f7cfe9115
a4a3ee3c is a link to Facebook's page on which users may vote. Additional information is available from
this site as well on the content of the proposed revisions to the agreement (last visited on April 15, 2009).
41
http://apps.facebook.com/fbsitevote/contests/208? fb fromhash=38a3f23685clf65f7cfe9115a4a3ee3c
(last visited on April 17, 2009).
153
contractual freedom. What is even more interesting in this example is how marginal the services
provided by Facebook are relative to other organizations. Facebook provides a template for
users to freely upload pictures and other information about themselves and enables them to
search for others on the site. It is a social networking site. It provides a free service in exchange
for the slight inconvenience of exposure to advertisements on the side of the screen. Facebook
provides no essential goods or services. It does not employ site users, it does not provide them
medical treatment, nor does it even sell them goods or services. Site users are customers only as
viewers of advertisements. As such, the company controls no resource that its users need. This
point is significant because of the theorized relationship between the power and resource
dependence of the drafting organization and the individual signers. Facebook is at a polar
opposite position on this sliding scale of needs from InnoTech. Does this make the entity less
likely or more likely to reduce the adhesiveness of its form-contracting practices? It would seem
to make it more likely to do so because of the available alternatives to Facebook, or the potential
for available alternatives and costs associated with switching. It is more costly for someone to
quit a job when labor supply exceeds demand, especially a job that is easily substitutable, than it
is for someone to cancel her account on Facebook.
It can also be said that the results of this experiment lend empirical support for the behavioral
theory of contract in the following ways: First, speaking to the story of contract's "death" as told
by Macaulay, Friedman and Gilmore, contract is only as "alive" as the signers perceive it to be.
Doctrinal contract law and the associated freedom of contract cannot be resurrected by legal
doctrine or by amending the Uniform Commercial Code or other laws as much as it can be
brought back to life by returning contract to its common law roots-as something that comes out
of the parties' concepts of fair exchange, as opposed to something that comes from the law's
institutional power. Second, capitalism needs contract to enable free market exchange by not
imposing substantive limitations on the parties. But, to the extent that principles of contract are
at odds with notions of fairness and norms of morality, contract does indeed "die"--that is,
there's somewhat of a paradox: more morality and less law lead to more perceived legal
enforceability. Lastly, if contract evolved out of status towards an embodiment of economic
freedom, these marginal contracts represent the next step of that evolution where trust for
enforceability shifts away from the state, towards extra-legal sources of authority. It is not the
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case that we have regressed back to status as the dominant basis for contractual authority, as
some have suggested, but rather, that we have so diluted contract's legal authority, that contracts
become transparent instruments, through which the light of these other forces readily shine.
Limitations
First, I will address the methodological limitations, followed by the theoretical, substantive
limitations. As several scholars have noted, internet-based experimentation is a relatively new,
untapped forum in which to study a wide range of behavior (Reips 2002; Skitka and Sargis
2006). As Reips (2002) notes, the internet offers many tradeoffs and associated advantages and
disadvantages methodologically. It is worth briefly mentioning some of the advantages of
internet experimentation before addressing the limitations. Just like the choice of any forum for
experimental methodology, the internet needs to be assessed for viability on a case-by-case basis.
The internet offers a relatively productive forum in which to study individual behavior with
respect to form-adhesive contracts; it is likely less well-suited to studying face-to-face social
interactions or behavior (Buchanan 2002). The internet offers ease of access to a large number
of demographic categories. There is therefore the advantage of increased generalizabilty through
a wider dispersion of non-local sampling with a wider distribution of demographic characteristics
(Krantz and Dalal 2000). Similarly, there is a greater likelihood of "ecological validity" with
web experiments like this one (Reips 2002). This means that participants' behavior is less
influenced by the physical setting because they typically participate on their computers at home
or at work-in their chosen environments (natural habitats) as opposed to a laboratory, where the
physical environment and social context associated therewith potentially diminish the likelihood
that behaviors exhibited are really reflective of how subjects behave outside of the laboratory
setting. In the current instance, the internet is well-suited for the purpose because the behavior
observed is ecologically dependent. Individuals would likely behave quite differently if they
came into a laboratory and were asked to complete a survey. They might feel more obligated to
read the fine print. Although, the evidence from the first part of this work offers evidence to the
contrary.
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Related to the higher potential for ecological validity associated with web experimentation is a
greater degree of voluntariness. As Reips explains,
[b]ecause there are fewer constraints on the decisions to participate and to continue
participation, the behaviors observed in Internet-based experiments can be
generalized to a larger set of situations. ... Voluntariness refers to the voluntary
motivational nature of a person's participation, during the initial decision to
participate and during the course of the experiment session. It is influenced by
external factors, for example, the setting, the experimenter, and institutional
regulations (2002: 247).
The enhanced voluntariness and ecological validity may come at a price. There is a risk of
multiple submissions, collusion among participants, and otherwise "gaming the system." As
described earlier in this paper, numerous precautions were taken to reduce or eliminate the
likelihood of these methodological limitations. For instance, time-stamps were checked to ensure
no page-skipping or other oddities that may indicate non-legitimate behavior. IP addresses were
tracked and locked out after a single entrance into the experiment. The links to the experiment
were coded (for instance: "http://www.surveyaboutwork.com/4dwdqv30a"), and timed to expire
shortly after being promulgated (the average time period was less than twenty-four hours per
coded URL). Numerous such links were used across various advertising portals. Further, to
receive a DVD, subjects had to enter a physical address. We made it clear that only one DVD
would be shipped to one address, and this further deterred the likelihood of multiple submissions.
Even with all of these safeguards and precautions on the front end (to reduce the likelihood of
subjects entering the experiment more than once or system-gaming), and on the back end
(carefully reviewing all available data to exclude even questionable data in the analyses), it is
impossible to rule out the possibility of subjects tricking the system and somehow avoiding
detection. While I took great pains to review all of the data carefully for any possible oddities,
and excluded any and all data that could not definitively be construed as legitimate, it is possible
that the safeguards were not perfect. Although, I note that even in laboratory experiments, there
is a similar risk of system-gaming or collusion, (perhaps not multiple submissions), in that
subjects leaving the experiment may talk to their friends and tell them to participate, perhaps also
revealing the part of the experiment that they should not reveal. In fact, there is an argument that
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due to the wider, non-local geographic dispersion of the subjects in a web-experiment like this
one, there might be less of an effect of these issues on the results. Lastly, these problems are not
as big of a concern because, if present, they would diminish the effects' magnitude across all
conditions and prompts, not introduce bias. This is because of the double-random assignment to
conditions and prompts.
A related disadvantage commonly lamented in web-experimentation generally is the diminished
capacity for successful experimental control (Reips 2002: 245; Skitka and Sargis 2006). This is
not as important in this study because of the between-subject design with random distribution of
participants to experimental conditions.
Another methodological limitation has to do with the external validity of the results. This boils
down to a matter of degrees of removal from the experimental population. That is, the subjects
who took participated all responded to an advertisement on the internet soliciting participation in
a survey about work (by MIT and funded by the National Science Foundation) in exchange for a
DVD of their choice. It could be argued that this is a special category of individual,
generalization of the results beyond which is unwarranted. These people might be more gullible
("who would click on an ad on the internet?" as one person in the audience inquired when I
presented these findings several months ago) than others, and hence the results might only be
generalizable to the millions of U.S. citizens with internet access gullible enough to click on this
type of advertisement. Still, this is a valid concern, as innate trust of internet sources may
weaken the external validity of the results. Still, it is key to remember that the salient results
reported are comparisons between groups of individuals randomly assigned from the same
population pool. Venturing one further degree away from this group would include the
population of individuals with internet access, excluding those without access to the internet. A
Neilsen report from 2004 estimated that 75% of American households have some form of
internet connection. 42 More recent statistics estimate this number to be higher.
42 See http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0403/, http://www.nielsen-online.com/, and
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/html/Chapterl.htm# ftnref2 (last visited on April 17, 2009).
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Next, the substantive limitations. One limitation is the fact that the experiment measures
performance of a contract term, not non-performance. In the second part of the work, the
contract term at issue was a mandatory arbitration clause purporting to prevent employees from
suing their employers. It would be difficult to create an experimental situation in which subjects
are contractually obligated not to do something, and then their non-performance, or refusal to
adhere to the contract term is measured. It could very well be that the extra-legal mechanisms
underlying non-performance differ from those measured in this experiment. A second limitation
is the extent to which the instrumental prompt paralleled the underlying motivation for all
subjects, who presumably entered the experiment in the first place in order to receive a free DVD
of their choice. As noted earlier, this would reduce the marginal effectiveness of the prompt as
compared to some other instrumental concerns, which may be present and even strong, but
difficult to measure. A third substantive limitation has to do with the social prompt. It is
possible that the effect of social forces is under-estimated by these results. It is very difficult to
signal the necessary social evidence that has been demonstrated in other studies to compel
performance (Troyer and Younts 1997). The social prompt informs subjects of the "social
proof' (Cialdini 2001) that many others ("98%!!") have completed the survey, but it does not
show them this. Seeing others finishing the survey would have a stronger effect. Social proof
telling individuals to conform because others do so abounds in advertising, and has been
demonstrated as an effective means of compelling performance. However, showing is better
than telling. Also, it might be the case that subjects interpreted the social prompt to imply that
they should keep going in the survey because they are almost at the end. This might explain the
higher recidivism rate for the social prompt group (60%), even though they did fewer post-
prompt questions (29.5) than those assigned to the moral prompt.
Conclusion
The devil may not be in the details after all. Contract terms are important, but the way that
individuals interpret the terms of the exchange seems to be in part a function of the conditions
under which terms are presented and experienced, and the framing of the authority prompting
adherence to them. The conclusion one might draw from this is that it is insufficient to study
doctrinal contract without regard to the context in which contracts arise. This is particularly true
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if one cares at all about how contract "lives"-that is, what practical effects contract has on the
lives of the signers. It is likely the case that a doctrinal approach without the kinds of
information discussed in this part of the dissertation would be at best incomplete and at worst,
dead wrong when it came to predicting how and why individuals behave the way they do with
respect to form-contracts or even more broadly, contracts in general. Courts and contracting
parties alike are influenced by the interaction between the framing of the agreement, social and
economic constraints in the pre-agreement phase and the performance phase on the one hand,
and the contract's actual terms on the other. To borrow Suchman's (2003) term again, contract
as artifact, as a critical element of law's "expressive" function (Sunstein 1996) must be
evaluated along-side contract's doctrinal elements. This is the only way to continue to develop
contract theory that matters.
A second important conclusion from this portion of the work is that promise is different from
consent. The former creates obligations and the latter sets limits on rights foregone. This is why
framing a request to adhere to a contract in terms of living up to a promise generates more
contractual performance, more law, than does a legal threat. The reminder that the law requires
adherence to contract terms, on its own, without the instrumental force of a threat of damages or
the likelihood of getting caught due to the relative anonymity of the experimental design, is
about as effective, perhaps even less-so, than a request to perform the same task where no
contract was signed at all. This is the limit of consent to rights foregone. The evidence
presented to this effect lends support for the behavioral theory of contract's model of contractual
exchange and the notion of the importance of studying the interconnectedness of individuals'
experiences with and interpretations of contract and trust in the rule of law. However, more
questions may have been raised than answers provided about the overall effects of form-adhesive
contracts on the range of exchange relationships between organizations and individuals in
contemporary life. For instance, is there a difference between performance (or non-performance)
of contracts purporting to restrict action versus contracts purporting to bind actors to perform in
some way? To what extent do the results of this experiment change if the organization drafting
the contract changes? The drafter in this instance was MIT and the National Science Foundation.
What if the drafter were a social networking site? Or AIG or a wall-street banking firm? Further
research is necessary to explore these questions and others.
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Part 4: Conclusion
Concluding Remarks
Charles Fried concluded his book, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation, in
a chapter entitled, "The Importance of Being Right" by arguing that contract is rooted in "right
and wrong," so-called, "primitive principles" that determine "the terms on which free men and
women may stand apart from or combine with each other" (1981: 132). He ended with the
words, "these are indeed the laws of freedom." But this is clearly an incomplete picture,
divorced from the realities of contemporary life and the context in which individuals experience
the bulk of the contracts into which we enter. Contract law is less about freedom and more about
oppression. This is the classic socio-legal view of how more powerful actors exploit the law to
reduce the freedom enjoyed by individuals and is a view incorporated in part into the behavioral
theory of contract. The second part of this dissertation offered empirical evidence supporting
this view. It is perhaps a little ironic then, that in the third part of this work, that the moral
prompt-the one that Fried would likely root for the strongest-seemed to win out as a basis for
contractual authority.
The behavioral theory of contract may reduce any dissonance experienced as a result of this
seeming contradiction. Promise-keeping as a strong, lively basis for contractual performance
prevails. This is a part of Fried's argument with which I agree, and believe to have presented
empirical evidence in support thereof. However, it is not the case that the moral basis of
contractual authority is tantamount to imbuing law with freedom. Individuals are less free the
more they see a form-adhesive agreement they signed in terms of a promise made and
necessarily kept. This is precisely the problem with how form-adhesive agreements fit into the
historical evolution of contract. Because the extra-legal basis for performance (morality) is still
very much alive and well, but because the consent component (the real freedom of contract) is on
its deathbed, the law of contract actually stymies the progression envisioned by Nonet and
Selznick from Autonomous Law to Responsive Law (1978). Instead, it seems that we are
marching in the wrong direction.
As Nadler observes, "[w]hen a person evaluates particular legal rules, decisions, or practices as
unjust, the diminished respect for the legal system that follows can destabilize otherwise law-
abiding behavior" (2005: 1401). This is the fear I have of form-adhesive contracts-that their
termite-like gnawing away at our collective respect for the rule of law destabilizes otherwise
law-abiding behavior. It seems fitting that something as subtle and relatively unnoticed as form-
adhesive contracts would accomplish this, considering how consistently over history and
political systems, powerful actors have used law to subtly and covertly shore up their power and
ensure continued legitimized protection of their accumulated wealth.
However, there is hope. Simple awareness of the issue can reduce the scope and danger
associated with the problem. The Facebook example cited above is one instance of an
organization realizing the importance of contractual freedom. Hopefully, with continued work in
this area, and continued attention given to form-contracting by consumer groups, in time, trust in
the rule of law and the associated social contract will be restored.
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONS
O# Ouestion
1 In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall
last year before taxes? *
2 Which best describes your current employment status? *
3 Were you born in the United States?
4 Which best describes your current marital status? *
5 Which best describes your race or ethnicity? *
6 What would you say that you do for a living? (i.e.: carpenter, doctor, cashier,
etc...) *
7 Have you ever been a member of a union?
8 If you have been a member of a union, please list the name(s) of all unions of
which you are or have been a member?
9 Some of the questions in this survey assume that YOU (the person answering
the questions) are an EMPLOYEE. If you are self-employed, unemployed or
otherwise don't think of yourself as an "EMPLOYEE", please think about
your MOST RECENT JOB where you were an EMPLOYEE in answering
these questions. Please select "yes" to indicate that you've read this. *
10 If you are NOT considering your CURRENT job in answering the questions
in this survey, how long ago was the job that you are thinking about?
11 How much would you say you enjoy your work? *
12 How likely are you to recommend your job to your friend? *
13 What one word would you use to describe your job?*
14 In general, do you think your employer treats you well? *
15 How likely are you to do extra work assignments beyond your job description
if your employer asked you to? *
16 To what extent do you do things during working hours that you know that you
are NOT supposed to be doing? *
17 How frequently do you download movies longer than 15 minutes from the
internet? *
18 How would you describe your experience using the internet? *
19 How many on-line surveys have you done in the past six months? *
O# Question
20 How frequently do you download music from the internet? *
21 Is it ever justified for an employee to use work time for personal, non-work
things like phone calls or chatting with friends on-line?
22 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I consider
my current job part of my career." *
23 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with this statement: "I am not sure
I fully trust my employer." *
24 How likely is it that you will be working for the same company one year from
now? *
25 Which of these is the BEST reason NOT to download music, movies or
software (that are being sold for money) without paying for these things? *
26 Please rate how you feel about this statement: "It is OK for people to
download music, movies or software (that are being sold for money) without
paying for these things." *
27 Which of these would convince you to download a copy of a movie you really
want to see (that is being sold for money) without paying for it? *
28 Which of these is the BEST reason TO download music, movies or software
(that are being sold for money) without paying for these things? *
29 Do you think that downloading music, movies or software (that are being sold
for money) without paying for these things is the same as shoplifting a CD or
DVD from a store at a mall? *
30 Please share with us your opinion generally on downloading music, movies or
other media (that is being sold for money) without paying for these things in
the text box provided.
31 Please rate how positively or negatively you feel towards the movie studio
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation? *
32 Is how you feel about FOX approximately the same as you feel towards other
large movie studios? *
33 How would you rate your negotiation skills generally? *
34 Have you ever negotiated your pay with an employer? *
35 How likely are you to initiate a negotiation with your employer about your
pay? *
36 Do you know any lawyers you could call for help with a problem at work? *
37 How likely are you to call a lawyer for help with a problem at work? *
38 What is your opinion generally on employment law in the US? *
39 How important is it to you that your rights in the workplace are safeguarded?
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40 In general, to what extent can lawyers be trusted? *
41 What would you do if a coworker bothered you to the point that it made it
hard for you to do your job? *
42 What would you do if your supervisor told you to come in to work on a day
that you had already scheduled off and you had plans to be with family or
friends? *
43 What would you do if your supervisor at work told you that if you didn't sleep
with him/her that you would be fired? *
44 What would you do if you were fired from your job, and you were sure that
the reason you were fired was because of your gender, race, national origin or
religion? *
45 In response to this question, please pick "Something else." *
46 Which of the following would you most want to receive from your employer
in return for being a loyal employee? *
47 How likely is it that your employer would reward your loyalty with what you
picked for the last question? *
48 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with this statement: "Work is not
about having a 'relationship,' it's just a way to make money." *
49 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with this statement: "My
supervisor takes steps to deal with me in a truthful manner."
50 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with this statement: "Negotiating
with an employer over pay is usually pointless."
51 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with this statement: "Working
where I work is very satisfying to me." *
52 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with this statement: "I am not sure
I fully trust my employer." *
53 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with this statement: "My
employer is open and upfront with me." *
54 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with this statement: "My
supervisor is friendly and considerate towards me."
55 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with this statement: "My
supervisor seems genuinely concerned for my rights." *
56 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with this statement: "The law
should allow unions to freely and easily access employees so that the unions
are able to tell employees why they should sign up with the unions." *
57 To what extent do you feel obligated to your employer to work extra hours if
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asked? *
58 To what extent do you feel obligated to your employer to be loyal? *
59 To what extent do you feel obligated to your employer to volunteer to do non-
required tasks on the job? *
60 To what extent do you feel obligated to your employer to give advance notice
if taking a job elsewhere?
61 To what extent do you feel obligated to your employer to accept a transfer to a
different location?
62 To what extent do you feel obligated to your employer to refuse to support the
employer's competitors? *
63 To what extent do you feel obligated to your employer to protect the
employer's secret, proprietary information?
64 To what extent do you feel obligated to your employer to work there for a
minimum of two years? *
65 To what extent do you feel obligated to your employer not to take things home
from work that you are not supposed to take?
66 In response to this question, please ignore the other choices and select, Not
sure. *
67 Please briefly describe, in your own words, how you feel about your
relationship with your employer, or your most recent employer. Use as many
descriptive terms as possible. *
68 How important is it to you that your workplace be free of sexism? *
69 How important is it to you that your workplace be free of age discrimination?
*
70 How important is it to you that your workplace reward seniority? *
71 How important is it to you that your workplace reward performance? *
72 How much do you agree or disagree that employers in the US are LESS
generous with vacation time than employers in Europe. *
73 Please rate how you feel about this statement: "Employers have a legal
obligation to keep their promises to their employees." *
74 Please rate how you feel about this statement: "I would expect my employer to
treat me fairly." *
75 Please rate how you feel about this statement: "It is reasonable for my
employer to expect me not to do anything that conflicts with my employer's
interests." *
76 Please rate how you feel about this statement: "I would expect my employer to
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reward me for my loyalty." *
77 Please rate how you feel about this statement: "If my employer fired me, I
would want to talk to a lawyer to see if there were anything I could do about
it."
78 Please briefly describe the most recent employment lawsuit that comes to
mind. This could be a publicly well-known case or it could be something from
your personal life. *
79 In general, do you think that when employees sue their employers for RACE
discrimination in the U.S. that they end up getting too much, too little or about
the right amount of money? *
80 In general, do you think that when employees sue their employers for
GENDER discrimination in the U.S. that they end up getting too much, too
little or about the right amount of money? *
81 Please rate how much you would like to voluntarily resign from your current
job? *
82 Please rate how easy or difficult it would be for you to find another job in the
same field as you are in now if you had to do so tomorrow? *
83 How likely are you to try to negotiate for more if your employer offered you a
pay raise that was MUCH less than you thought was fair? *
84 How important is it to you that your current employer treat you with respect
and dignity?
85 What things do you expect from your employer (ie: what is your employer
obligated to do for you?) *
86 Has or had your employer ever failed to meet the obligation(s) that were
promised to you? *
87 Which obligation(s) did your employer fail to meet? (if not applicable, simply
write "not applicable" below) *
88 Please rate how much you would like to change careers-- (go into a different
field entirely) *
89 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: "If
someone does something for you, you should do something of greater value
for them." *
90 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: "If
someone does you a favor, you should do even more in return." *
91 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: "If
someone goes out of their way to help me, I feel as though I should do more
for them than merely return the favor."
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92 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: "If
a person does you a favor, it's a good idea to repay that person with a greater
favor." *
93 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: "It's
not necessary to return favors quickly." *
94 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: "As
a rule, I don't accept a favor if I can't return the favor." *
95 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: "If
you frequent a certain restaurant, you should leave large tips to ensure good
service." *
96 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: "If
a stranger helped you start your stalled car, you would not feel obligated to
return the favor." *
97 To what extent do you believe that your employer is obligated to promote
you? *
98 To what extent do you believe that your employer owes you high pay?
99 To what extent do you believe that your employer is obligated to pay you
based on your current level of performance? *
100 To what extent do you believe that your employer is obligated to provide you
with training? *
101 To what extent do you believe that your employer owes you long-term job
security? *
102 To what extent do you believe that your employer owes you a fair process to
resolve disputes at work?
103 Please describe a situation in which you would demand that your employer do
what it is obligated to do (if the employer wasn't doing that thing in the first
place): *
104 Please describe a situation in which you would quit your job if your employer
refused to do what it is obligated to do: *
105 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I believe my
employer has high integrity."
106 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "In general, I
believe my employer's motives and intentions are good." *
107 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "My
employer is not always honest and truthful." *
108 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I don't think
my employer treats me fairly." *
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109 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I can expect
my employer to treat me in a consistent and predictable fashion." *
110 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "Employers
like mine only care about profits, not their employees' well-being." *
111 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I define
myself through my 'occupational identity.' That is, I identify myself mostly by
what I do." *
112 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "If I could get
away with it, I would do as little as possible at my current job to avoid getting
fired." *
113 How important is it to you that your employer promote you? *
114 How important is it to you that your employer pays you well? *
115 How important is it to you that your employer pay you based on your current
level of performance? *
116 How important is it to you that your employer provide you with on-the-job
training?
117 How important is it to you that your employer provide you with long-term job
security? *
118 What is the MOST important thing that you feel your employer is obligated to
do for you or provide for you at work? *
119 Would you join a union if you had 100% certainty that the union could make
sure that your employer would provide this for you? *
120 Would you join a union if you knew that the union would fight to make sure
that your employer would provide this for you, but you didn't know how likely
it is that the union would succeed? *
121 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "My
supervisor considers my viewpoint." *
122 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "My
supervisor is able to suppress personal biases."
123 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "My
supervisor provides me with timely feedback about decisions and their
implications." *
124 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "My
supervisor treats me with kindness and consideration." *
125 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "My
supervisor shows concern for my rights as an employee." *
126 If someone at a party asked you to describe your supervisor (or your most
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recent supervisor if not currently supervised), what would you say? *
127 Have you ever deliberately refused to do something that your supervisor told
you do? *
128 Have you ever deliberately slowed down the pace of your work in order to
make a point? *
129 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I took my
current job as a stepping stone to a better job somewhere else." *
130 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I expect to
work for a variety of different places in my career." *
131 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I do NOT
expect to change jobs often during my career." *
132 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "There are
many career opportunities I expect to explore after I leave my present job." *
133 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I am really
looking for a job where I can spend my entire career." *
134 Have you ever responded to an advertisement saying that you could work
from home? *
135 What would you do if your current (or most recent) employer asked you to
shred corporate documents? *
136 What do you think your employer would do if you quit and started a business
of your own that competed with hers? *
137 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "At work, I
am fairly rewarded considering my responsibilities." *
138 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "At work, I
am fairly rewarded in view of the amount of experience I have." *
139 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "At work, I
am fairly rewarded for the amount of effort I put forth." *
140 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "At work, I
am fairly rewarded for the work I have done well." *
141 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "At work, I
am fairly rewarded for the stresses and strains of my job."
142 If you felt that you were not rewarded fairly for the amount of work that you
do, what would you do, if anything?*
143 Do you feel that a LAWYER could help you if you were not paid fairly for the
work that you did? How so? *
144 Do you feel that a UNION could help you if you were not paid fairly for the
work that you did? How so? *
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145 To what extent would you say that you use your professional judgment to
assess what is right/wrong for the organization where you work?
146 To what extent do you make creative work-related suggestions to co-workers?
147 To what extent do you make innovative suggestions to improve the
functioning of the department where you work? *
148 To what extent do you help others at work? *
149 To what extent would you say that you waste time while at work on personal
matters? *
150 If you were passed over for a promotion you thought you deserved, and you
were sure that the reason you were passed over was illegal, what would you
do? *
151 Do you think employees in the U.S. sue their employers too much, too little or
about the right amount? *
152 Do you think that employers in the U.S. discipline their employees too much,
too little or about the right amount? *
153 To what extent does your supervisor take steps to deal with you in an open
and honest manner? *
154 To what extent does your supervisor treat you fairly, overall? *
155 To what extent does your supervisor give you adequate explanations for
decisions taken?
156 To what extent can your employer be trusted to make sensible decisions for
the future of the business? *
157 How do you feel about this statement: "My employer would be quite prepared
to gain advantage by deceiving employees." *
158 How important is it to you that your employer provide healthcare benefits? *
159 How important is it to you that your employer provide access to varied lunch
options? *
160 How important is it to you that your employer provide a 401(k) retirement
investment program? *
161 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I would
expect my employer to allow me to use the company's e-mail system for
personal use, as long as I did so within reason."
162 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I would
expect my employer to allow me to take time off from work without penalty if
I needed to help out a close friend." *
163 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "I would
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expect my employer to respect my privacy and not monitor my e-mails at
work." *
164 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "Employers
should expect employees not to bad-mouth them in public." *
165 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "Employers
should expect employees to go "above and beyond" their job descriptions." *
166 What would you do if your employer told you that you had to work through
the weekend, but you had told your employer two weeks earlier that you had
plans to go to a party in Las Vegas for your best friend? *
167 How frequently would you say that you fantasize about finding a different
job? *
168 Do you think your current employer monitors your e-mail correspondence? *
169 To what extent do you believe that your employer is obligated to assist you in
your career development? *
170 To what extent do you believe that your employer is obligated to support you
with personal problems? *
171 Do you think that all in all, one can live well in America?
172 Do you think that employers are generally greedy? *
173 Do you think that unions are good for the U.S. economy? *
174 Please elaborate on your opinion of unions in the space provided below: *
175 To what extent do you agree or disagree that you would be better off doing the
same work you do now, but in Europe? *
176 Do you think that European employers treat their employees better than how
U.S. employers treat their employees, on average? *
177 Please rate how you feel about this statement: "Employers have a moral
obligation to keep their promises to employees." *
178 Please rate how you feel about this statement: "If employers don't keep their
promises, employees are justified to take revenge by doing things the
employer definitely wouldn't want them to do. (ie: work less hard, come in
late, etc.)" *
179 Please rate how you feel about this statement: "Employees have a moral
obligation to keep their promises to employers." *
180 Please rate how you feel about this statement: "If an employer doesn't keep a
promise it made to an employee, the employee should quit."
181 Please rate how you feel about this statement: "If an employer doesn't keep a
promise it made to an employee, that employee should resort to the law to
remedy the situation." *
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182 What would you do if you noticed that your employer was not properly
disposing of chemicals that could be hazardous to your health, and to the
health of your coworkers? *
183 Have you ever felt that your employer tried to bribe you in any way?
184 Do you agree or disagree that it's fair for an employer to pay less than
minimum wage to illegal immigrants? *
185 How do you feel about the following statement: "Sometimes, it is OK for an
employee to steal things from work." *
186 How do you feel about the following statement: "If an employee is given 'sick
days' that are lost if not used, it is OK for that employee to use a 'sick day'
even when he isn't sick." *
187 How do you feel about the following statement: "Using 'sick days' even when
not sick, or stealing small things from work are acceptable responses to unfair
treatment at work." *
188 How do you feel about the following statement: "Work is not about having a
'relationship,' it's just a way to make money."
189 How do you feel about the following statement: "Most big companies do
everything in their power to make sure that employees have no opportunity to
voice their concerns in the workplace."
190 What should an employee do if she notices a health-code violation at work
that could be pretty serious if left un-fixed? *
191 What should someone do if he finds documents at work that prove that the
CEO of the company is involved in fraud?
192 What do you think someone should do if she notices that she was paid
incorrectly in her last paycheck (after she voluntarily resigned from the
company)? Should she should keep quiet about it or bring it to the Company's
attention, or something else? *
193 Would you recommend your current job to your best friend? *
194 How many steps of reporting are there between you and the CEO of the
company where you work? (If you are the CEO, then your response should be
zero, if you report directly to the CEO, then your response should be one, etc.
etc.) *
195 Please rate your level of frustration with your current employment situation. *
196 If you had a choice, which would you prefer as a means of addressing and
resolving employment disputes at your current workplace?
197 To what extent are you satisfied with your current job? (Please refer to your
last job if not currently employed.) *
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198 What would you do (if anything) if your employer posted a notice saying that
it had installed surveillance cameras in all common areas and break rooms? *
199 Do you agree or disagree that employees should be allowed to sue their
employers for same-sex sexual harassment (that is, when the harassment is
done by someone of the same gender)? *
200 Do you agree or disagree that unions should be allowed to promise employees
anything (no matter how unlikely they are to happen) in order to get them to
sign up? *
201 How long do you expect to remain with your current employer in the specific
job or position for which you were hired? *
202 How likely is it that you will be working for the same company one year from
now? *
203 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "On the
whole, I get along well with others at work." *
204 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "I feel
good about my work on the job."
205 How likely is it that you will be working for the same company 5 years from
now? *
206 How likely do you think it is that you will lose your job or be laid off in the
next six months? *
207 Please describe, in your own words, your opinion on the current economic
crisis in the U.S. *
208 What is the likelihood that the current economic crisis in the U.S. will have a
NEGATIVE impact on your employment situation? *
209 Please rate how much confidence you have in ORGANIZED RELIGION on
the following 1-7 scale:
210 Please rate how much confidence you have in the U.S. CONGRESS on the
following 1-7 scale: *
211 Please rate how much confidence you have in the POLICE on the following 1-
7 scale: *
212 Please rate how much confidence you have in U.S. SUPREME COURT on
the following 1-7 scale: *
213 Please rate how much confidence you have in MAJOR COMPANIES on the
following 1-7 scale: *
214 In general, how would you describe your attitude towards BIG employers in
the U.S., like Wal-Mart, McDonalds or General Electric?
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215 Google is frequently ranked among the top 5 "best companies to work for" in
the U.S. One of the reasons for this is its flexibility and responsiveness to
employee needs. To what extent do you think that flexibility and
responsiveness to employees' needs make an employer a great company to
work for? *
216 Do you agree or disagree with this statement: "When workers are given the
opportunity to offer their input to improve the company's business, the
company will likely do better financially."
217 Please rate how much confidence you have in UNIONS on the following 1-7
scale: *
218 Please rate how much confidence you have in the CURRENT U.S.
PRESIDENT on the following 1-7 scale:
219 In response to this question, please ignore the other choices and select
"Other". *
220 How important is it to you that your employer treat you with dignity and
respect? *
221 How do you feel about this statement: "In today's economy, employees are
wise to try to get away with whatever they can, so long as it doesn't get them
in trouble or fired." *
222 What would you do if a fellow employee verbally harassed you making it
really difficult for you to do your job effectively? *
223 Should people who are in the U.S. illegally be allowed to sue their employers
in court? *
224 Should unions in the U.S. should be allowed to represent workers who are in
the U.S. illegally ("illegal immigrants")? *
225 How important is the following element in your current job? (If not employed,
please answer this question in general): INCOME *
226 How important is the following element in your current job? (If not employed,
please answer this question in general): NO DANGER OF BEING FIRED *
227 How important is the following element in your current job? (If not employed,
please answer this question in general): WORKING HOURS ARE SHORT,
LOTS OF FREE TIME *
228 How important is the following element in your current job? (If not employed,
please answer this question in general): CHANCES OF ADVANCEMENT *
229 How important is the following element in your current job? (If not employed,
please answer this question in general): WORK IMPORTANT AND GIVES
A FEELING OF ACCOMPLISHMENT
230 If you could change one thing about your current (or most recent job where
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you were an employee), what would it be? *
231 If Barak Obama is elected the next president of the United States, to what
extent do you think that there will be more jobs available? *
232 If John McCain is elected the next president of the United States, to what
extent do you think that there will be more jobs available? *
233 Have you ever threatened to initiate litigation against someone or something
(such as a company, the state, etc.) in the U.S.? *
234 Please rate your knowledge and experience with Civil Law in the United
States. *
235 Have you ever brought litigation against someone or something (such as a
company, the state, etc.) in the U.S.? *
236 Has anyone or anything ever threatened to bring a lawsuit against you in the
U.S.? *
237 Have you ever been sued in the U.S.? *
238 Please describe your experience with litigation in the space provided below.
(If you have had no experience at all, please simply write, "not applicable".) *
239 How frequently do you watch "Judge Judy" or similar court-related television
programs? *
240 Overall, do you think there is justice in the workplace in the U.S.?
241 Which of these job types best matches your job now? (If you are not working
now, please tell us about your last job.)
242 Thinking about the next 12 months, how likely do you think it is that you will
lose your job or be laid off? *
243 Did you ever work for the same employer for as long as one year?*
244 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with this statement: "If I
work hard and exceed my employer's expectations, he will reward me with job
security and by treating me fairly." *
245 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with this statement: "If
my employer treats me unfairly, I would be justified if I took 'revenge' by
slacking off at work or stealing small items from work like office supplies." *
246 Do you agree or disagree with this statement: "I would expect my employer to
reward me for my hard work and devotion to my job." *
247 Do you agree or disagree with this statement: "Employers in the U.S. expect
too much from their employees." *
248 What is the minimum wage in your state? If you don't know, please make your
best estimation. *
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249 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with this statement:
"Employers and their employees should not try to get along--work is just an
economic exchange without trust or loyalty." *
250 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with this statement:
"Most corporations take advantage of their CUSTOMERS more than the law
permits."
251 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with this statement:
"Most companies take advantage of their EMPLOYEES more than the law
permits." *
252 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with this statement: "I
would go out of my way for my employer because I trust that my employer
will reward me in the end." *
253 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with this statement: "It's
OK to take office supplies (without permission to do so) if it's highly unlikely
that I'll get caught." *
254 What words best capture your feelings with respect to employees who
intentionally sabotage or steal in their workplaces? *
255 What is the LOWEST dollar amount that would justify firing an employee for
theft? (Please enter a number below-- if you think that stealing anything,
regardless of it's dollar-value justifies termination, please write the number
zero below.) *
256 Do you consider it "theft" when employees copy employer-owned software
(like Microsoft office, for example) for their own personal use on their
personal computers? Why or why not?
257 How much do you agree or disagree with this statement: "Irish, Italian, Jewish
and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up.
African-Americans should do the same without special favors."
258 Are you trying to find a new job right now? *
259 Please select the number three in response to this question. *
260 Do you think you are fairly paid for your work at your current job? *
261 How many people you know have applied to your company for a job because
you told them about the opening with your company? *
262 How important is it to you that then next president of the United States protect
workers' rights? *
263 How important is it to you that the next president of the United States make it
tougher on employers who hire illegal immigrants? *
264 Please share with us your opinion generally on illegal immigrants in the
United States? *
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265 Should U.S. employers have the right to give genetic tests to people who are
applying for a job, or shouldn't they have that right? Why or why not? *
266 Should employers have the right to REFUSE to hire workers if tests show they
have an inherited tendency to develop certain forms of cancer or heart
disease? Why or why not? *
267 Should employers have to pay for their workers' medical insurance? *
268 How important is the issue of genetic screening of employees to you? *
269 Should U.S. employers be allowed to fire employees who refuse to submit to
genetic screening? Why or why not?
270 In the past five years, how frequently have you taken a break from work to
smoke cigarettes?
271 Please share with us your opinion on smokers' rights in the workplace in the
space provided below: *
272 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with this statement: "It should be
ILLEGAL for employers to screen people out of jobs for health-related
reasons." *
273 How do you feel about this statement: "In the United States, traditional
divisions between owners and workers still remain." *
274 How do you feel about this statement: "A person's social standing depends on
whether he/she belongs to the upper or lower class in the U.S." *
275 How do you feel about this statement: "In the U.S., there are still great
differences between social levels."
276 How do you feel about this statement: "What one can achieve in life depends
mainly upon one's family background." *
277 How much do you think about quitting your current job? *
278 Approximately what percentage of your income do you turn over to the
government? (If you prefer not to answer this question, please write "n/a"
below.) *
279 Do you think that the income tax you pay now is too much, too little or just
about the right amount? *
280 If you could, would you pay 5% HIGHER income tax if you were guaranteed
that 100% of the money went to funding public-school education? *
281 How do you feel about this statement: "The way most companies work, the
only thing management cares about is profits, regardless of what workers want
or need." *
282 How do you feel about this statement: "Corporations should pay more of their
profits to workers and less to shareholders."
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283 How do you feel about this statement: "Unions in this country have TOO
LITTLE power." *
284 How do you feel about this statement: "For the most part, unions just stand in
the way of economic progress in this country." *
285 How do you feel about this statement: "I would support a law that made it
HARDER for employees to join unions." *
286 How important is it to you that the next president of the United States supports
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")? *
287 Which presidential candidate do you think supports NAFTA the most? (If you
don't know of prefer not to answer, please so indicate in the space provided
below.) *
288 Over the past five years, how much would you say that NAFTA has benefited
the United States? *
289 In the last five years, did an organization where you worked go out of business
or close down? *
290 In the last five years, did the business where you worked merge with another
company? *
291 In the last five years, at any business where you worked, was there a major
lawsuit filed by employees against the organization? *
292 In the last five years, where you worked, was there was a major lawsuit filed
by shareholders against the organization?
293 In the last five years, at the place where you worked, were there many layoffs
(more than 30% of the workforce)? *
294 In the last five years, where you worked, was the business ever taken over or
changed ownership? *
295 In the last five years where you worked, has the company outsourced many
U.S. jobs overseas? *
296 In the last five years where you worked, was there ever a major strike by a
union? *
297 How did you FIRST learn about your current job? (If you are not working
now, please tell us about your last job.) *
298 Would you like to join a union at your current job? *
299 In response to this question, please ignore the other choices and select
"Other". *
300 Do you think that there is "dignity" in your current employment? Please
explain your answer with as much detail as possible.
301 In general, do you think that HR ("Human Resources") departments that many
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employers have are only interested in protecting the employers? *
302 Please share with us your opinion of HR departments in the U.S. in general: *
303 In the past two years, how frequently have you used web-sites like
"Monster.com" or similar sites to search for jobs? *
304 To what extent do you consider it "disloyal" for someone who is currently
employed to search for other jobs? *
305 Please share with us your opinion of the place of religion in the workplace: *
306 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "I feel like
I make a useful contribution at work." *
307 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "I can tell
that my coworkers respect me."
308 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "My job is
mostly boring." *
309 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "I put my
heart into my work." *
310 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "If I could
retire today and never work again, I would do it." *
311 Are you comfortable talking about your religious beliefs with your
coworkers? *
312 How important is it to you that your workplace be free of discrimination based
on religion? *
313 Have you ever been fired from a job? *
314 Have you ever quit a job? *
315 Have you personally been involved in an employment dispute? *
316 Have you personally been involved in an employment lawsuit?
317 In the U.S., are employers legally allowed to fire employees without any
reason at all? *
318 Have you ever negotiated your pay with an employer? *
319 How likely are you to initiate a negotiation with your employer about your
pay? *
320 Imagine that at work tomorrow, your employer told you that she would give
you a raise if you could justify it in one sentence. What would you say? *
321 Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are
mostly looking out for themselves? *
322 Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a
192
O# Question
chance, or would they try to be fair? *
323 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can't be too careful in life? *
324 Generally speaking, would you trust an attorney to assist you if your
employment were terminated and you suspected it was for illegal reasons?
325 Generally speaking, do you think that the way that employment disputes are
handled in this country is fair? *
326 What is your opinion on affirmative-action in employment? (If you prefer not
to do so or are unsure about this subject, please so indicate in the space
provided below.) *
327 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with the following statement:
"Affirmative-action doesn't benefit anyone because people tend to second-
guess the abilities of minorities in workplaces known to have adopted
affirmative-action hiring policies." *
328 Do you agree or disagree with this statement: "Employers are wrong to ever
take race into account when hiring people." *
329 Have you ever heard of "employment arbitration" or "mandatory arbitration"?
*
330 Do you think employers should be allowed to require employees to waive
their right to a jury trial? Why or why not? *
331 Are employers in the U.S. legally allowed to make their employees waive
their right to a jury trial? *
332 Have you ever heard of "mediation"? *
333 Which one of the listed types of employment claim do you think is the MOST
COMMON in the U.S.? *
334 Do you think that mediation is a fair process for resolving disputes between
employers and employees? Why or why not?
335 To what extent are U.S. employment laws MORE employee-friendly than
European employment laws? *
336 Is it LEGAL for an employer in the U.S. to require employees to sign a
contract saying that they won't joint a union? *
337 How easy/difficult is it for you to leave your job for a short period to attend to
personal matters? *
338 How easy/difficult is it for you to make a personal phone call from work? *
339 In the last two years, how easy/difficult was it for you to get time off to attend
to personal matters such as a doctor's appointment or to attend a wedding?
340 How easy/difficult is it for you to take time off when you are sick? *
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341 How easy/difficult is it for you to understand the benefits you receive for your
work (if any)? *
342 What percentage of time at work would you estimate you spend attending to
personal non-work-related matters? *
343 How frequently do you have to travel for work?
344 How likely are you to do extra work assignments off work-time if your
employer asked you to? *
345 Are the people who work where you work all white, mostly white, about half
and half, mostly black, or all black? *
346 In general, how much discrimination is there that makes it hard for African-
Americans to obtain jobs in the U.S.? *
347 Please rank how much your current job is like a "relationship" where you feel
there is mutual trust, loyalty and respect between you and your employer. *
348 Have you ever been the victim of sexual harassment at work?
349 How important is it to you that your employer treat everyone fairly at work? *
350 In general, do you think your employer treats you well? *
351 How important is it to you that your workplace reward hard work? *
352 If you could identify ONE THING that your employer does that you could
change, what would it be? *
353 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "The
people running the U.S. don't really care what happens to individuals like me."
354 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "There's no
point trying to negotiate with companies (like employers or banks) because
they are too powerful." *
355 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "My
employer does not care about my opinion about how to make my job better or
otherwise improve working conditions." *
356 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "In
general, I feel left out of things going on around me."
357 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "Most
people with power try to take advantage of people like me." *
358 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "If
someone returned a wallet you lost, you should try to do something in order to
repay him/her." *
359 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "The most
realistic policy is to take more from others than you give."
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360 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "It
generally pays to let others do more for you than you do for them." *
361 Do you think it should be legal for employers to secretly listen-in on
employees when they talk on the telephone? *
362 Do you think it should be legal for employers to secretly monitor employees'
e-mail at work? *
363 Do you think it should be legal for employers to secretly monitor employees'
instant messaging at work? *
364 Do you think it should be legal for employers to video-record employees in
break areas (without telling them about it)?
365 Do you think it should be legal for an employer to fire an employee for
writing an e-mail to a friend saying that the company isn't paying them fairly?
*
366 What is your opinion generally about wire-tapping and eavesdropping? *
367 How important is the issue of clandestine monitoring of the workplace to you?
*
368 Do you think that EMPLOYEES should be allowed to secretly record their
conversations with their employers? *
369 Do you feel that a person of color who has the same education and
qualifications can get as good a job as a white person? *
370 If a person of color has the same qualifications as a white person, do you feel
that he or she can make as much money? *
371 Generally speaking, do you think the opportunities for people of color to get
ahead have improved in the last five years, remained about the same, or gotten
worse? *
372 Do you think that the EMPLOYMENT opportunities for people of color have
improved in the last five years, remained about the same, or gotten worse? *
373 Do you think that people of color should have as good a chance as white
people to get any kind of job, or do you think that white people should have
the first chance at any kind ofjob?
374 Do you feel that you were ever passed over for being hired or promoted
because of your race? *
375 How frequently do you think employers in the U.S. hire minorities SOLELY
because they don't want to appear racist or discriminatory? *
376 Do you feel that you were ever passed over for being hired or promoted for
ANY REASON AT ALL? (If so, what do you think the reason really was?) *
377 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "I receive
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the respect I deserve from my coworkers."
378 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "I receive
the respect I deserve from my supervisor(s)." *
379 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "I
experience adequate support in difficult situations at work." *
380 Please select "Not sure" in response to this question. *
381 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "When
something goes wrong at work, I can talk it over with my friends or family."
382 Approximately how many people do you work with at your current job? (This
includes people with whom you come in contact on a regular basis.) *
383 Of those people with whom you work, how many do you consider a "close
friend"? *
384 Of the people with whom you work, how many do you consider a "friend"? *
385 If someone is pregnant, is she considered "disabled" for purposes of U.S.
employment law? *
386 If someone has a broken leg, is he considered "disabled" for purposes of U.S.
employment law?
387 Do U.S. employers have to make reasonable accommodations for disabled
employees? *
388 How frequently do you think employers in the U.S. hire disabled individuals
SOLELY because they don't want to appear discriminatory? *
389 Is it true that in the U.S., employers are not allowed to fire employees who
claim to be recovering alcoholics?
390 To what extent do you feel one would be better off living in Europe rather
than the U.S. if one were permanently wheel-chair-bound? *
391 Do you think that MOST employers play by the rules when it comes to hiring
disabled people? *
392 How important is it to you that the law protect disabled individuals from
discrimination in the workplace? *
393 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "What one
achieves in life no longer depends on one's family background, but on the
abilities one has and the education one acquires."
394 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "What one
gets in life hardly depends at all on one's own efforts, but rather on other
things beyond our control." *
395 In response to this question, please select the option, "Not Sure". *
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396 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "One's
income should not be determined by one's work."
397 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement:
"Everybody should get what they needs to provide a decent life for their
family." *
398 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "In the
long run, it's better to accept favors than to do favors for others." *
399 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "You
SHOULDN'T offer to help someone if they don't ask for your help." *
400 What would you do if you were fired from your job, and you were sure that
the reason you were fired was because of your political beliefs? *
401 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "I am sure
that I can handle my job without constant assistance."
402 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "When I
feel uncomfortable at work, I know how to handle it." *
403 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "I know I'll
be able to cope with work for as long as I want." *
404 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "I can tell
that other people at work are glad to have me there." *
405 Please rate how strongly you agree or disagree with this statement: "I'm proud
of my relationship with my supervisor at work." *
406 Approximately how many different individuals have you directly supervised
over the entire course of your career? (If you've never supervised anyone,
simply write "zero" in the space provided below.) *
407 Approximately what percentage of your time at your current job do you spend
doing tasks that you think could be considered "supervisory"? *
408 How many times in the past two years have coworkers come to you for advice
on how to handle work-related situations? *
409 Should marijuana use be made legal or not? Why? *
410 Should employers be allowed to fire employees caught smoking marijuana
off-work-property and off-working hours? *
411 Should everyone who starts a job at workplace that already has a union have
to join that union? *
412 Should employers be allowed to fire employees if they fail a drug test? *
413 Should employers be allowed to fire employees for no reason at all?
414 In general, how important is the issue of the legal status of drugs to you? *
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415 Which presidential candidate do you think most supports your views with
respect to drugs in the workplace? *
416 To what extent do you think that MOST unions agree with your views about
drugs in the workplace? *
417 What is your opinion on how much we're spending on the following:
Improving and protecting the environment. *
418 What is your opinion on how much we're spending on the following:
Improving and protecting the nation's health.
419 What is your opinion on how much we're spending on the following: Solving
the problems of the big cities.
420 What is your opinion on how much we're spending on the following: Halting
the rising crime rate. *
421 What is your opinion on how much we're spending on the following: Dealing
with drug addiction. *
422 Which presidential candidate do you think is MOST aligned with your views
on SPENDING on the areas identified in the preceding questions? (If you are
not sure, please so-indicate in the space provided below.) *
423 How important to you is it that the next president of the United States be
aligned with your views on spending on the areas identified in the preceding
questions? *
424 Which of the five spending areas identified in the preceding questions is the
MOST important to you? *
425 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: "Unions help their members." *
426 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: "MOST employees lie to their employers." *
427 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: "America has an open society."
428 In response to this question, please select number three. *
429 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following
statement: "Most jobs are merely economic exchanges of money for time and
labor. There's no place for loyalty and justice at work." *
430 How do you feel about this statement: "You should help others so that later
they'll help you." *
431 How do you feel about this statement: "You should not bend over backwards
to help another person." *
432 How do you feel about this statement: "I feel used when people ask favors of
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me." *
433 Generally speaking, which best describes how you would think of yourself? *
434 In 2000, you may remember that Al Gore ran for president on the Democratic
ticket against Bush for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether or
not you voted in that election? *
435 If you did vote in the 2000 presidential election, for whom did you vote?
436 In 2004, you may remember that Kerry ran for president on the Democratic
ticket against Bush for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether
you voted or not in that election? *
437 If you did vote in the 2004 presidential election, for whom did you vote?
438 Are you planning to vote in the 2008 election? *
439 What is your primary source of news about the upcoming election? For
instance, CNN, Fox, ABC, NY Times, etc. (If it's several sources, please so-
indicate in the space provided below. If you do not pay attention to the news
coverage at all, please so-indicate below.) *
440 How much do you trust the primary source of news that you identified above?
441 In the U.S., Is it legal for an employer to refuse to hire someone who has a
MENTAL disability? *
442 Does depression qualifies as a "mental disability" under U.S. law? *
443 Are employers in the U.S. legally allowed to ask job-applicants whether they
have a disability?
444 Are employers in the U.S. legally allowed to ask wheelchair-bound job-
applicants whether they need special accommodations?
445 Are employers legally allowed to fire disabled employees who cannot perform
their jobs as well as they are supposed to? *
446 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with this statement: "There is
more discrimination against people who are recovering from drug or alcohol
addiction than is publicly recognized." *
447 Please rate your agreement or disagreement with this statement: "There is
more discrimination against people with mental disabilities than is publicly
recognized." *
448 Do you think that it is illegal for an employer to refuse to hire someone
because he or she served in the U.S. military? *
449 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with this statement: "In
our society, everyone must look out for himself." *
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450 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with this statement: "It is
of little use to unite with others and fight for one's goals in politics or in
unions." *
451 In response to this question, please select number four. *
452 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with these statements:
"The economy can run only if businessmen make good profits. That helps
everyone in the end."
453 Please rate your level of agreement or disagreement with this statement:
"Sexual harassment happens in the work place more often than most people
think." *
454 There has been a lot of press coverage of the "sub-prime mortgage crisis." For
the most part, would you say that you have been following this news coverage
closely? *
455 Do you think that the next generation of Americans will be negatively affected
by this crisis? *
456 Do you own your own home? *
457 To what extent do you help coworkers at work? *
458 To what extent would you estimate that you waste time when you are at work
taking care of personal matters? *
459 If you were passed over for a promotion you thought you deserved, and you
were sure that the reason you were passed over was because of your use of
company-provided health benefits, what would you do? *
460 Do you think that your employer's motives and intentions are generally good?
461 Is your current employer ALWAYS honest and truthful with you?
462 Do you agree or disagree that taking "sick days" even when not really sick, is
a perfectly acceptable response to unfair treatment at work? *
463 Do you agree or disagree that employment is not about having a
"relationship," but rather just a way to earn a living? *
464 To what extent do you think that many big companies do everything in their
power to provide an opportunity for employees to voice their concerns in the
workplace? *
465 To what extent do you feel that you are fairly compensated considering your
responsibilities at work? *
466 To what extent do you feel that you are fairly compensated in view of the
amount of experience you have? *
467 To what extent do you feel that you are fairly compensated for the amount of
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effort you put forth at work?
468 Do you agree or disagree that at work, you are rewarded justly for the work
you have done well? *
469 To what extent do you feel that you are am fairly compensated for the stresses
and strains of your work? *
470 If you felt that you were not compensated lawfully what would you do, if
anything? *
471 Have you ever done anything like what you described above? *
472 Which would you rather have on your side in the event that you noticed that
your employer was not compensating you legally-- a union or a lawyer? *
473 What would you do (if anything) if your employer asked you to spy on your
coworkers and report back to him?
474 Please rate how much you agree or disagree with this statement: "My current
job is part of my career." *
475 How important is it to you that your employer increase your pay every year? *
476 How important is it to you that your employer pays you at least what you
could get if you went to work for a competitor? *
477 How important is it to you that your employer pay you based entirely on your
performance, without any regard to your seniority? *
478 How important is it to you that your employer trust you with company
resources? *
479 How important is it to you that your employer provide you with reassurances
that you could work there for as long as you wanted? *
480 Have you ever been drug-tested at work? *
* signifies that a response is required to continue with the survey.
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